972 F. 2d 1337 - Bray v. Dep'T of Corrections

MEMORANDUM**

Robert L. Bray appeals pro se the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus. He makes numerous claims, none of which has merit. We have jurisdiction, and we affirm.

Bray's central claim is that the state sentencing court violated Cal.Penal Code § 1170(c) (West 1985) by failing to advise him at sentencing that he would be subject to three years of parole, with the possibility of revocation, after serving his sixteen month sentence. Bray concedes he properly was advised during the hearing on his guilty plea.

The alleged violation of section 1170 does not amount to a violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 936 (1977); cf. Rodriguera v. United States, 954 F.2d 1465, 1468 (9th Cir.1992). Indeed, it appears there was no state-law violation. People v. Enright, 132 Cal.App.3d 631, 637 (4th App.Dist.1982).

Bray also claims the state sentencing court was not a court of competent jurisdiction. However, Bray offers no allegations which tend to support this claim; he pleaded guilty to grand theft in California State Court. That court had jurisdiction over him.

Finally, Bray claims the revocation of his parole violates the ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses of the United States Constitution. Revocation of parole for a violation of the conditions of that parole does not offend the ex post facto clause. See generally Wallace v. Christiansen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1553 (9th Cir.1986 (en banc) (defining an ex post facto violation). Nor has Bray alleged any facts which could establish he is subject to a bill of attainder. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n. 30 (1968) ("This Court's decisions have defined a bill of attainder as a legislative Act which inflicts punishment on named individuals or members of an easily ascertainable group without judicial trial").

AFFIRMED.