933 F. 2d 1016 - United States v. Garcia-Mora

MEMORANDUM^**

Alejandro Garcia-Mora appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. Garcia-Mora asserts as his sole ground for appeal that the district court erred by failing sua sponte to make inquiry into his competency to stand trial. Garcia-Mora's competency was not raised by either party in the trial court. On appeal, he alleges that certain of his actions which were brought to the trial court's attention should have triggered an inquiry into his competency. Garcia-Mora also argues that his "de facto waiver of his right to counsel" triggered a duty in the court to conduct a competency hearing. Because there is nothing in the record to suggest that Garcia-Mora was or is incompetent, the district court did not err in failing to consider the issue. The conviction is therefore AFFIRMED.

Due process requires a trial court to hold a hearing, sua sponte, on a defendant's competence to stand trial where the record as a whole discloses substantial evidence sufficient to raise a genuine doubt in the mind of a reasonable trial judge concerning the defendant's competence. Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977). On review, our inquiry is not whether the trial court could have found the defendant either competent or incompetent, nor whether we would find the defendant incompetent if we were deciding the matter de novo. We review the record comprehensively to see if the evidence of incompetence was such that a reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the defendant's competence. Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 515-16 (9th Cir.1981) (citing Bassett, 549 F.2d at 621); DeKaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 983 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).

To be competent to stand trial, a criminal defendant must have sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966); Chavez, 656 F.2d at 518. Garcia-Mora asserts that his refusal to enter a plea bargain which would cut his prison sentence by fifty percent, his decision to go to trial despite his trial counsel's belief that he had no defense, his inability to provide names of favorable witnesses, his initial refusal to testify on his own behalf despite advice of counsel, his expressed mistrust of the process during the trial, and his initial inability to review his probation report with counsel because of his distress over the conviction, raised a substantial question as to his competence such that the district court should have conducted a competency hearing.

Our review of the complete pretrial and trial record, with particular attention to the portions of transcript related to the enumerated actions, reveals not the slightest indication that Garcia-Mora was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. It is problematic to suggest that defendants who do not readily acquiesce in the advice of counsel, and instead exercise their constitutional rights to stand trial or not to testify, thereby raise questions of their competence. We have held on several occasions that the fact that a defendant refuses to cooperate with his lawyer does not automatically render him or her incompetent to stand trial. People of the Territory of Guam v. Taitano, 849 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir.1988). Here, while Garcia-Mora did not always follow the advice of counsel, he cooperated with his defense in a number of respects, eventually taking the stand as counsel recommended, and participating in an evaluation by the expert witness.

There is nothing in Garcia-Mora's testimony at trial or his colloquies with the court to indicate that he was incompetent to stand trial. On both occasions in which the district court spoke with Garcia-Mora about the trial process at defense counsel's request (at the hearing on defense counsel's motion to be relieved and at the point during trial when Garcia-Mora was refusing to testify and had expressed to counsel his view that the trial was a sham), Garcia-Mora gave responsive, albeit brief, answers to the court. In response to the court's inquiry as to whether he believed the trial was a sham, Garcia-Mora cogently expressed his concerns about the course of the trial:

Well, in many--they've presented--for example, they're talking about seven and a half pounds of amphetamine and ... all I seen is a small bag. Another thing about the informant, he lied on lots of things. Supposedly he's under oath. He's supposed to be telling the truth, just as if I were under oath and I would tell the truth.

R.T. 2-53. Following the court's explanation regarding the availability of the full amount of the methamphetamine and the role of cross-examination in demonstrating any falsehoods in the government informant's testimony, Garcia-Mora responded, "That's fine. Thank you." R.T. 2-56.

This case stands in stark contrast to prior cases in which we have evaluated a trial court's failure sua sponte to evaluate competence, all of which involve instances where the trial court had before it significant evidence of the defendant's possible mental illness, often coupled with aberrant behavior in the courtroom. See, e.g., Chavez, 656 F.2d at 519 (holding that a competency hearing was required where defendant had a history of antisocial behavior and treatment for mental illness, an emotional outburst in open court, a previous psychiatric finding of insanity, two conflicting psychiatric reports indicating "adequate" and "poor" judgment, had fired his attorneys, and had not even attempted to plea bargain); Bassett, 549 F.2d at 620-21 (holding no competency hearing required where the state hospital had concluded that defendant had improved to the point of competence in spite of defendant's repeated rebuffs of his counsel and testimony by a psychiatrist of an increase in defendant's anxiety and schizophrenia shortly before trial); De Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d at 978 (no hearing required despite psychiatric reports that defendant was suffering from serious mental disease and despite an emotional outburst at trial); see also, Cuffle v. Goldsmith, 906 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir.1990) (where it was aware of defendant's mental impairment and difficulty understanding the consequences of his actions, trial court had a "protecting duty" to conduct an inquiry into the issue of defendant's competence to waive his right to counsel and proceed as his own attorney). In the present case, there was before the trial court and is now no suggestion that Garcia-Mora is mentally impaired in any way. While his comprehension of the trial process was not exceedingly sophisticated, there is nothing in the record to suggest that it was so insufficient as to render him incompetent.

That Garcia-Mora was competent is further bolstered by the fact that his trial counsel never even raised the issue of his comprehension of the proceedings or competence to stand trial in the course of several lengthy discussions with the trial court regarding his frustration with Garcia-Mora's refusal to plead and refusal to take the stand. The expert on South American culture who interviewed Garcia-Mora likewise gave no indication that he had difficulty communicating with Garcia-Mora or that Garcia-Mora was mentally incompetent to participate in the proceedings. Finally, Garcia-Mora's testimony at trial was responsive to the questions asked him and demonstrated no mental impairment such that a reasonable judge would have questioned his competency.

The contention that the disagreements between Garcia-Mora and his counsel at various points during the proceedings amounted to a "de facto waiver of counsel" is without merit; thus, the district court did not err in failing to hold a competency hearing for that reason.

The conviction is AFFIRMED.