914 F. 2d 1496 - Benton Franklin Riverfront Trailway and Bridge Committee v. K Skinner
914 F2d 1496 Benton Franklin Riverfront Trailway and Bridge Committee v. K Skinner
914 F.2d 1496
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
The BENTON FRANKLIN RIVERFRONT TRAILWAY AND BRIDGE
COMMITTEE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Samuel K. SKINNER, individually and as Secretary of the
United States Department of Transportation; City
of Pasco, Washington; City of
Kennewick, Washington,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 89-35399.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Jan. 12, 1990.
Decided Sept. 26, 1990.
Before JAMES R. BROWNING, BEEZER and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
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Subsequent to the submission of this case on appeal, the concrete roadway and steel superstructure of the bridge has been demolished.1 Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the issues in this litigation have thereby been rendered moot.
The issue in this appeal is whether the Secretary of Transportation acted in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner in determining that there was no prudent or feasible alternative to demolition of the old truss bridge.2 Appellant's complaint sought injunctive relief prohibiting the appellees from taking steps to demolish the bridge. Since the superstructure of the bridge has now been demolished, the proposed alternative and adaptive uses for the bridge are clearly unfeasible and any possible judicial remedies have been rendered meaningless. "Where the activities sought to be enjoined have already occurred, and the appellate courts cannot undo what has already been done, the action is moot." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir.1978). See also Florida Wildlife Federation v. Goldschmidt, 611 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1980). Therefore, the appellees' motion to dismiss this appeal is granted.
Appellant was unable to post a $75,000 bond that the district court imposed as a condition for a stay on appeal. Their Emergency Motion for an Order Modifying the Bond or for an Injunction Pending Appeal was denied, as was their motion for a post-argument stay
The appellant argues that the "real" issue in this appeal is the permissibility of using federal funds for the demolition of the bridge. Appellant does not have standing to litigate this issue
In Benton Franklin Riverfront Trailway v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir.1983), we held that appellant's interest "in the historic and aesthetic appreciation of the bridge" was sufficient to allow appellant to maintain this action. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). The demolition of the bridge has deprived appellant of this interest.
Further, appellant cannot complain about the disbursement of federal funds solely on the basis of its taxpayer or citizen status. Standing cannot be established simply by pleading that the government must be administered according to law. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 482-88 (1982). See also 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3531.10, at 634 (2d ed. 1984).