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FEDERAL REPORTER. STEAM STONE-CUTTER CO. (Uircuit Court, D. Vermont. V.
SEARS.
October 11, 1881.)
1.
PROCEDURE-WRITB OF SEQUESTRATION IN 'l'HE NATURE OF ATTAClDIENT-
LIENs. Under its rules, this court has the power to issue writs of sequestration in the nature of attachment; and such writs, when duly served, create valid liens upon real property in this state so attached, as against a grantee with knowledge of the attachment to whom the property was conveyed pendente lite. 2. SAME-SERVICE.
Due service is service in the manner provided by the state statutes. 3. S8Inble that the knowledge or ignorance of the grantee does not affect the validity of the levy.
In Equity. Prout cf; Walker, for orator. E. J. Phelps and Wm. Batchelder, for defendant. WHEELER, D. J. The orator, as owner of a patent, brought a bill in this court against the Windsor Manufacturing Company for infringement, and obtained a decree establishing the title to and validity of the patent, the fact of infringement, and for an account of profits. After this decree, on application of the orator a writ of sequestration, in the nature of an attachment, to create a lien for satisfying the decree, was issued, and served by attaching the real estate of that defendant in accordance with statutes of the state of long standing, which enable the courts of chancery of the state to issue such process and create such liens. After this attachment, that defendant conveyed to this defendant, who had full knowledge of the attachment, a portion of the estate so attached. The orator obtained a final decree for the payment of money in the original cause, took out execution thereon, and caused it to be levied upon that estate, and caused the estate to be set out to the orator in satisfaction of so much of the execution as it would apply to, at its appraised value, agreeable to the statutes of the state in relation to levy of execution upon real The defendant refuses to recognize the validity of the attachment and levy, and claims to hold the land against them. This bill is brought to confirm and enforce the orator's attachment and levy, and to obtain possession of the estate, and the cause has been heard upon bill and answer. No question is made about the propriety or regularity of the writ of attachment issued in this case, if there was authority to issue such a writ at all; nor about the regularity of the attachment upon the writ, or the levy of the execution and setting out the estate by the
STEAM STONE-CUTTER CO. V. SEARS.
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marshal, according to the laws of the state, if the attachment could effectually be so made, or the estate be so levied upon in any case in equity. The only questions made are as to whether the court has the power to issue such writs, and whether the service of such a writ in that manner created a lien that will hold until decree. It has been the practice of the court for about 30 ;years to issue such writs, upon cause shown, in this manner, some of which have been served by attaching real estate in this manner, but doubts have arisen latterly in respect to the legality of this course. In no case has the question arisen, so far as is known, except upon the application for the writ, and not then so as to involve appearance for the opposite party or argument. It is presented now for the first time for and has been argued with thoroughness and ability upon each side. An attempt has been made to rest these proceedings uport the general authority, usage, and practice of courts of chancery. That such courts have issued writs of sequestration from the earliest times is abundantly shown. Hind. 127; Colston v. Gardiner, 2 Ch. Cas. 44; Francklyn v. Colhoun, 3 Swanst. 276; Peck v. Crane, 25 Vt. 146. But these writs were always issued in the nature of distresses to compel appearance or performance of some decree or order, and not for the purpose of creating a mere lien upon property to be held must be for the satisfaction of a money decree. These maintained, if at all, by the force of the statute of the United States, the rules and practice of the courts in pursuance thereof, and the laws of the state adopted thereby; although the practice of courts of chancery, both ancient and modern, is to be looked into for the purpose of understanding and applying these statutes and rules. The statutes of the United States make a distinction between common-law causes and equity and admiralty causes as to provision for process, and forms and modes of procedure. For the former, the practice, proceedings, and remedies by attachment and execution of the courts of the states are adopted. Rev. St. §§ 914, 915, 916. For the latter, it is merely provided that., The forms of mesne process, and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, in the circuit and district courts, shall be according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity and of admiralty respectively, except when it is otherwise prOVided by statute or by rules of court made in pursuance thereof; but the same shall be subject to alteration and addition by the said courts respectively. and ta regUlation by the supreme court, by rules prescribed from time to time to any circuit or district court, not inconsistent with the laws of the United States." Rev. St. § !n3.