CONSOLIDATED WYOMING GOLD MIN. CO. ". CHAMPION MIN. CO.
945
CONSOLIDATED WYOMING GOLD MIN. CO. v. CHAMPION MIN. CO.
(Circuit Court, N. D. California. · RES JUDICATA-JUDGMENT IN STATE COURT.
March 6, 1893.)
A judgmentot a state court, within and responsive to the Issues made by the pleadings, directly upon a point, Is, as a plea In bar and as evidence, conclusive between the same parties on the same matter ID another action In the federal court.
I.
SAME-FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION.
The fact that a judgment In the state court In an action Involving a contest between mining claims Is res judIcata ot the questions litigated in an action removed to the federal court does not deprive such court of jurisdiction, as a contest between mining claims necessarily Involves a consideration of the laws of the United States as to the location and the effect of end lines and side lines on the rights to the mineral veins and lodes, and as the evidence whereby these things are proved, whether direct or through estoppel by some act of the party, or by a judgment of a court, does not remove consideration of the laws as elements of decision.
Action by the Oons()lidated Wyoming Gold-Mining Company against the Champion Mining Company. Defendant files, a plea in abatement of the jurisdiction. Denied. Wilson & McCutchen, for complainant. lEdward Lynch and C. H. Lindley, for defendant. McKENNA, Circuit Judge (orally). This is an action for trespass and for an injunction. It was originally brought in the state court, and was removed here on petition of defendant. The petition alleges a prior suit between the same parties in the state court (16 Pac. 513), the parties, however, being reversed; the plaintift' here being defendant, and the defendant plaintiff. A motion was made (based on the petition) to remand to the state court, on the ground that the petition showed that there had been a prior suit between the same parties in the state court, in which it was claimed that the judgment of the court left no question, federal or otherwise, to be litigated between the parties, except the fact and extent of trespass. This motion was denied on the ground that the petition showed that a federal question was involved. A plea in abatement to the jurisdiction was then filed., alleging specifically the judgment in the state court, to which the defendant made replication, in which it was claimed that the points involved in the present suit were not involved in the suit in the state court. The replication sets out the pleadings, findings, and judgment of the state court, from which it appears that issue was made, and that the court found and adjudicated on the location, and the time of the location, of the mining claims involved in the suit at bar,determining in favor of the plaintiff here,-and also found that certain boundary lines were side lines, not end lines, as was alleged by defendant here (plaintiff in such prior suit), and, as conclusions of law, and adjudicated as follows: and the written decision of said court having been made on the 21st .day of
"The Issues in this cause having been trIed by the court without a jmy,
.
v.62F.no.1l-60
FEDERAL REPORTER,
vol. 62.
April,1886, bearing date of that day, and dlllyfiled with the clerk of saId cour1f.on:the same day, ordering" 11l'llccO'rdance therewIth': Now, therefore, it is considered,adjudged, and decreed that plaintiff have judgment against the defendant for the sum of one hundred and twenty dollars, with its costs therein expended up to the time of filing of the ,answer to the complaint; thatplaiiltiff IS not entitl,ed to any injup.ctlon or other against defendant; .' that defendant is entitled to work its, Wyoming t)Je.junctlon thereof witb, the Pbill,ips mine, mine along, andall poInts of plaintiff, and that it is entitled to work both its WJ'oming andUl'al .mines at any point below wbere eitber of sa,id on its. dip, may unite with the NeW Year's or Climax or ;New Year's Extension or Annex mines of the pi a illtlt'f;and that .defendant l;tave and recover his costs herein since tlXeJl.Ung of its said answer to amended complaint, wbich are hereby taxed at -'.. .-... ..' ' J. M. Walling, SuperlOl' Judge. 21st, 188,6/' .
Itis a(lJAitted findings .of the court and its judgment are in accordance.lwith the issnespresented by the pleadings, and that defendant·here is estopped to litigate the same, "as far," to use C?f, counsel, judgment is capable of cer,tain and definite It is, however, contended that the judgment is not estoppel, because, while the Ural and New Year's)nines were included iIi the pleadings,no trespass was shown to have been committed, involving either of those claims; and that lheuHegations of the pleadings concerning them were irrelevant an(l immaterial. And it is further contended that the judgment of the court on these aUegatiolll!lWlUl unnecessR1')' and immaterial, because the action was a trespass in trespaslJ,and"while theallegatidn was mine,.......that no trespass was proved or spoken on of on the New Yearlsclaim, and that the action resolved itself into one for a. tnlfflpass on the! Phillips and Muller mines. Counsel {at' defendant quotes a number of cases to show that in trespass quare clausum fregit the plaintiff may recover on proof Q£.trespass done to a part only of the claim described <in the declaration,.and judgment in the case is not conclusive of the title to the,whole, as only title to apart may have heen involved and decided, and therefore, upon plea of such judgment, evidence would, be received to limit its estoppel to that which was actually passed on. But 'are thesei.cases applicable? They might be if the jUdgment of the.courthad stopped by finding the special trespass, or ,awarding damages for it; but theeourt did not so stop. It not only Mjudged and decreed that plaintiff have judgment against the defendant for tile' sum of ,$120, with but it decreed "that defend8Jntis to work!its Wyoming mine along, and all points below the junction thereof with, the Phillips mine of'plaintiff, and that:it is entitled: to w6rk'both its Wyoming and; Ural mines at any point below' where either. of said mines, on its may unite with the New iYear's or Oliinax or New Year's Extension or Annex ,mines of the:plahitiff." ;In other words, it adjudged to the Oonsolidated· WyoIhing mine the. rights whieh, it is alleged, are trespassed upon by the Champion, and on· account "of which trespass this action is, brought. The judgments in the cases cited were con'sistentwithpl'oofof title to the whole claim described, or part Qflt, i
CONSOLIDATED
GOLD l'IIIN. CO. V,CHA:MPION :MIN. CO.
947
but the judgment. plealled here. only consistent with the supThe position of evidence offered on all the issues of rule is well settled that a judgment of a competent court, directly upon a point, is as a plea a bar, and as evidence conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter directly in question, in another acti()n or court The judgment of the state court seems to satisfy this rule. It is certainly within and responsive to the issues made by the pleadings.· If it· went beyond the proof,-in other words, was not sustained by the evidence,-it may have been erroneous, but I am cited to no case which holds that the estoppel of a judgment can be avoided by showing the judgment was erroneous. 'rheremedy for that is an appeal, and the plaintiff took that remedy. It appealed to the supreme court of California, and that court decided that the findings of the court below were sustained by the evidence. Besides, the action was not as narrow as defendant claims. The defendant .makes the judgment of the court a measure of what it contended for. If this were the measure, few judgments would be an estoppel. If a party's allegations are not sustained, or are overcome by adverse proof,· can it be said that he has not litigated them? It is the effort, not the success, which makes the estoppel. The reason is, having had his opportunity in court against the other party, he will not be permitted to contend with him again, on the same matters, in another action or court. The action in the state court united, as it could unite, legal and equitable relief, damages for trespasses done, injunction against trespasses threatened. The place of them was alleged to be "that body of quartz mining ground which is known as part of the 'Champion Consolidated :Mines and Tunnel Right.''' It was composed ·of a number of mining claims. The Wyoming Company own adjoining claims, and the controversy was not for trespass on the locus of the plaintiff, in the sense of the ordinary action of trespass quare clausum fregit, but turned on rights growing out of independent claims of different and nonconflicting surface boundaries. The rights of the parties therefore depended upon time of location of such claims, and whether their respective boundaries were end lines or side lines. The importance of an adjudication on such lines and such locations is apparent. Beyond an end line, the vein of miner31 cannot be followed into adjoining ground; beyond a side line, it can be; and to the oldest location is given, by section 2336 of the Revised Statutes, the right, when two or more unite, to take the vein below the point of junction, including all the intervening space of intersection. The trespass found by the court, and which counsel claims determines the extent of the estoppel of the judgment, was not an issue. It was confessed by the answer. It was an accidental trespass on the Phillips ledge, owned by plaintiff, at a point above its junction with the Wyoming, owned by defendant. trespass complained of," the supreme court say in its "The opinion, "was that the defendant took gold·bearing quartz out <:if theUnitetlledge below the junction, and so the is,
948
J'EDERAL REPoRTER,
who owns the Unite'diedge?" The court then quotes section 2336 of the Revised 'Statutes,Sllpra, and continues as follows: ''Consequelltly, tbemliin question. depends upon the underlying question, which plJ.rty holds Under .the older location? And the most important questhe record were theruUngs of the court as to the adtions which appear missibility of evide!lce offered upon this question of prior location." Page SO.
The supreme court also considers the finding and judgment of the lower court as to the Ural mine of defendant (plaintiff here) and the New Year's and New Year's Extension mine of plaintiff (defendant here), and holds that the findings were sustained by the evidence, and that there was no basis for an injunction or damages. Every point, therefore, on which the parties can rely in the case at. bar, except the fact or degree of trespass, and the denial of them, seems to have been passed upon by the state court. But counsel say, quoting People v. Johnson, 38 N. Y. 63: "Although a decree, in eXpress terms, professes to affirm a particular' fact, yet, if a.uch fact was immaterial, and the contloversy did not turn upon it, the decrelil wlll not conclude parties in reference to that fact."
And counsel cites, in addition to People v. Johnson, Woodgate v. Fleet, 44N. Y. 1; Fulton v. Hanlow, 20 Oal. 450. I think counsel draws too broad a conclusion from the language quoted. When properly understood, it expresses correct doctrine. In all these cases cited the finding of the court was not necessary to the judgment, and the language of the court must be interpreted by this fact. There is no intimation in any of them that the judgment was not conclusive of all that was covered by it. In People v.Johnson, tenancy between the parties was alleged to have been decided in the prior suit. This, the court said, was not a question in issue. "The mere fact of the alleged tenancy," the court said, "is undoubtedly found by the judge on the trial in the superior court; but the fact was immaterial, and the judgment did not, in any respect, rest upon that finding, as is most obvious from the inspection of the. pleadings, the findings of the court, and the final judgment rendered thereon." In the case at bar the judgment pleaded does rest on the findings, and could not be sustained without them. In Woodgate v. Fleet, as in People v. Johnson, there was a finding not necessary to the judgment; indeed, hardly amounted to a finding. At any rate, the judgment did not depend was good without it,-andthe court said: upon "If the court gave a wrong reason for its Judgment, or placed it on unnecessarygrQunds, the parties would not be estopped, as to such reasons and grounds, any other suit. The bill did not pray for a construction of the deed, and that does not seem to have been a matter of controversy and discussion on the trial. · · ...
Itw.illbe seen that it.was not decided that the judgment was not conclusive, of all it covered; only that the wrong reason for the judg. men,t stated -by the chancellor was not conclusive. :(Jithe case of Fultop.,v. Hanlow, thefrltct which was claimed to have been previously. decided was tha:t certain sale under a judgment and execution 'of the San FranciSco Gas Company against
CONSOLIDATED WYOMING GOLD MIN. CO. V. CHAMPION MIN. CO.
949
the city of San Francisco was valid, and effectual to pass title to the purchasers at the sale. It was contended that "the decree was admissible, in connection with the conveyance, as a muniment of title, constituting a link in the deraignment of title." 'I'he court, by Justice Field, said: "The construction which we give to the decree will render it unnecessary to consider the second proposition. As we read the decree, it is not an adjudication upon the character of the title to the city which the purchaser acquired from the sale and conveyance of the sheriff."
The learned justice further said that the court adjudged that the tliale was effectual to pass such title as the sheriff had sold,-whatever it might be. It is that title, and no other, to which the decree refers. This being so, the declaration of the decree as to the effect of the sale was a finding of an immaterial matter, not necessary to the judgment of the court, and upon which, as was said in People v. Johnson, the judgment did not rest, and hence was not covered by it. But, as we have seen, in the case at bar the time of the location of the respective claims of the parties, the fact that certain of their boundary lines were or were not end lines, the places where the veins cropped out, and the rights resulting therefrom, were all put in issue by the action in the state court, and actually passed on by such court, and they were material. Evidence was submitted as to all of them, and the judgment depended upon and rested upon them. The judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. The court say, ''From a thorough examination of the whole case, we find no reason to disturb the judgment of the court below." But does the fact of the judgment in the state court being res adjudicata of the questions litigated, and which I have detailed, remove this case from the jurisdiction of a federal court? The question is not without difficulty. A contest between mining claims necessarily involves a consideration of the laws of the United States. These laws prescribe how the location shall be made, and the effect of end lines and side lines on the rights to the mineral veins and lodes. The evidence by which these things are proved, whether direct, or through the estoppel of some act of the party, or by a judgment of a court, does not remove consideration of the laws as elements of decision. In section 86, Dillon on Removal of Causes says: "The motion to remand must be based upon the petition for removal, and the record as sent from the state court If the petition, in connection with the record, is sufficient, on its face, but states, as ground of removal, facts which are not true,-as, for example, in regard to citizenship, or value, · · · an issue may be taken thereon in the circuit court by a plea in the nature of a plea in abatement"
But citizenship and value have no other purpose than to fix the tribunal. The case, in its progress, or the judgment, does not· de· pend upon them. In Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172, the supreme court say, "The question of citizenship constitutes no part of issue upon the merits." The same may be said of value, so far':as fixing jurisdiction. But a law of congress, upon which, as a factor in decision, a party's rights depend,determines, in conjunc·
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titn"tvWl1Jthe,ifact$, the"judgment to be 'The form in wl\ich the, evidence shallbEHntroduced does not, therefore, remove the law of congress frombei;ng an element of decision, and hence of cognizance in it federal ()ourt;' The prayer of' the plea of abatement will therefore be denied, without prejudice,however, to the plaintiff, wging the facts alleged by it in the subsequent stages of the case. TRUS'J] CO. OF NEW YORK v. CHATTANOOGA, R. & C. R. CO. et al.(BUNN, Intervener).
(Oircuit Court, N. D. Georgia. May 2, 1894.) RROlllIl'>'lllR....CO:N;FLIOTINGSTATE.. ANDFEDERAJ,
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J URISDIClTION., property qfa railrolld has been in the uninterrupted poscourt from a time seSsiotiof successive l'¢ceivers'app01nted by a al'1te<1ating the appointment of il: 'receiver for same, property by a state @urt;:the 'federal:coure wlllnot order it transferred to the receiver of ther,s1;&te court, if it receiver of the federal court has ' undl:lra bm filed by a trustee of bondhOlder8i'wlio represent ,We' bulk of the indebtedness of the road, while the receiiver· of the state coUrt 'repreSents olily junior creditors, and but little Gfi, IndebtednesS. , <
the Chatta:p,ooga, & Columbus Railroad CQinPmi:Yi,.. to ,81 Western Company. At tb;a1; I all the iltock of tl1e SaV:8,l1nah & Western Railroad tc/ tpe Railr()ad Company, which was in and, Q<mtrol tl1e Savannah & Western, as so. tool.: ,and pperated ,the Chattanooga, Rome & ijjUlroad t4ereafter; as apart of the Savannah & Weste,rn, ;n.allroad. On;Mllrch 3, 1892; Rowena M. Clark filed an original l;>ill in ,the circuit court of the United States for the easternAhlisionof the southern district of Georgia against the others, Under this bill, E. P. 4.1¢xander .was m,ade, receiver of all the. property and of the Central Railroad & Bap.).dng Company. On March 28th tll.e: S,avannah & Western Railroad Company was made party defendant to this bilI, it. being ,stated in the application that that company was a separate corporation, of which the capital stock was owned by' the Central Railroad & Banking Company of Georgia, and operated by the latter company. On the l!!aWe day the, board, of directors of the Central Railroad & Ban:lcing"Company of Georgia Wei'e made permanent receivers of that company, the boardcbnsisting of H. M.Comer an<l,others. On July 4, 1892, the Central Railroad & Banking Company of Georgia ftledits ariginalbtn the Farmers'L()an & Trust Company 'and others, under which bill H. M. Comer appointed' sole receiver of all the properties of theCentrill Railroad & Banking Company 'of Georgia. This bill set out;' as a !part of the property of the Central Railroad & l;Janking Company of Georgfa, the Savannah & Western Railroad, and:also that the; Savannah & Western Rail· road owned the Bome&Ot:>lumbU8 Railroad Company. ,()l!:
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