546 US 517 Oregon v Guzek

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Case TextSyllabus

OREGON v. GUZEK

certiorari to the supreme court of oregon

No. 04—928. Argued December 7, 2005–Decided February 22, 2006

At the guilt phase of respondent Guzek’s capital murder trial, his mother
was one of two witnesses who testified that he had been with her on the
night the crime was committed. He was convicted and sentenced to
death. Twice, the Oregon Supreme Court vacated the sentence and
ordered new sentencing proceedings, but each time Guzek was again
sentenced to death. Upon vacating his sentence for a third time, the
State Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
provide Guzek a federal constitutional right to introduce live alibi testimony
from his mother at the upcoming resentencing proceeding. After
this Court granted certiorari, Guzek filed a motion to dismiss the writ
as improvidently granted.

Held:

1. Guzek’s motion to dismiss certiorari is denied. This Court does
not lack jurisdiction on the ground that, irrespective of federal law, state
law gives Guzek the right to introduce his mother’s live testimony. The
Court possesses jurisdiction to review state-court determinations that
rest upon federal law, 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a), and the Oregon Supreme
Court based its legal conclusion in relevant part on such law. It pointed
out that relevant mitigating evidence under state law refers only to
evidence that the Federal Constitution grants a defendant the right to
present. And it interpreted the federal admissibility requirement in
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (plurality opinion), and Green v. Georgia,
442 U.S. 95 (per curiam), to include evidence like the proffered
alibi testimony. Nor is this Court willing to dismiss the writ on the
ground that irrespective of federal law and of the State Supreme Court’s
federal holding, Oregon’s capital-case resentencing statute gives Guzek
the right to introduce witnesses who testified at the guilt phase. At
most, state law might give him such a right, but “a possible adequate
and independent state ground” for a decision does not “bar . . . reaching
the federal questions” where, as here, the State Supreme Court’s decision
“quite clearly rested... solely on the Federal Constitution.” California
v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 997, n. 7. Pp. 520—523.
2. The Constitution does not prohibit a State from limiting the
innocence-related evidence a capital defendant can introduce at a sentencing
proceeding to the evidence introduced at the original trial.
This Court’s cases have not interpreted the Eighth Amendment as pro

Syllabus

viding such a defendant the right to introduce at sentencing evidence
designed to cast “residual doubt” on his guilt of the basic crime of conviction.
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 173, n. 6 (plurality opinion).
Lockett v. Ohio, supra, and Green v. Georgia, supra, distinguished.
Even if such a right existed, it could not extend so far as to
provide Guzek with a right to introduce the evidence at issue. The
Eighth Amendment insists upon “ ‘reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,’” Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U. S. 302, 328, and that a sentencing jury be able “to consider
and give effect to mitigating evidence” about the defendant’s “character
or record or the circumstances of the offense,” id., at 327—328, but it
does not deprive the State of its authority to set reasonable limits on
the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which
it is submitted. Three circumstances, taken together, show that the
State has the authority to regulate Guzek’s evidence through exclusion.
First, sentencing traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant
committed the crime, but alibi evidence concerns only whether, not how,
he did so. Second, the parties previously litigated the issue to which
the evidence is relevant. Thus, the evidence attacks a previously determined
matter in a proceeding at which, in principle, that matter is
not at issue. The law typically discourages such collateral attacks.
Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94. Third, the negative impact of a
rule restricting Guzek’s ability to introduce new alibi evidence is minimized
by the fact that Oregon law gives the defendant the right to
present to the sentencing jury all the innocence evidence from the original
trial (albeit through transcripts). The Oregon courts are free to
consider on remand whether Guzek is entitled to introduce his mother’s
testimony to impeach other witnesses whose earlier testimony the government
intends to introduce at resentencing. Pp. 523—527.

336 Ore. 424, 86 P. 3d 1106, vacated and remanded.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined,
post, p. 528. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.

Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General of Oregon, argued
the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Peter Shepherd, Deputy Attorney
General.

Opinion of the Court

Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him
on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Richter, Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben, and Robert J. Erickson.

Richard L. Wolf, by appointment of the Court, 546 U. S.
974, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief
was J. Kevin Hunt.*

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Randy Lee Guzek was found guilty of capital
murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence
and ordered a new sentencing proceeding. The question
before the Court is whether the State may limit the
innocence-related evidence he can introduce at that proceeding
to the evidence he introduced at his original trial. We
hold that the limitation does not violate the Constitution.

I

Oregon tried Guzek for the offense of capital murder. The
evidence showed that Guzek and two associates decided to
burglarize the Houser family home, that they entered the
house, that an associate killed Rod Houser, and that Guzek
then robbed and killed Lois Houser. After the police

*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Alabama
et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Kevin C.
Newsom, Solicitor General, by Christopher L. Morano, Chief State’s Attorney
of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, John W. Suthers of Colorado,

M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Lawrence G.
Wasden of Idaho, Phill Kline of Kansas, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah
W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Brian Sandoval
of Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania,
Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark

L. Shurtleff of Utah, Judith Williams Jagdmann of Virginia, and Rob
McKenna of Washington.

Opinion of the Court

learned that Guzek held a special grudge against the
Housers, they traced him and his associates. The associates
confessed. And they testified at trial, painting Guzek as
the ringleader.

Guzek’s defense rested in part upon an alibi. He presented
two alibi witnesses, his grandfather and his mother,
who testified that Guzek had been with the one or the other
at the time of the crime. The jury disbelieved the alibi, it
convicted Guzek, and it sentenced him to death.

Guzek appealed; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction; but the court ordered a new sentencing proceeding.
Guzek was again sentenced to death; he again appealed;
and the Oregon Supreme Court again ordered resentencing.
Guzek was sentenced to death for the third time;
he again appealed; and yet again the Oregon Supreme Court
found the sentencing procedures faulty. 336 Ore. 424, 86 P.
3d 1106 (2004). Seeking to avoid further errors at the next
(the fourth) sentencing proceeding, the Oregon Supreme
Court also addressed the admissibility of certain evidence
Guzek seeks to introduce at that proceeding, including live
testimony from his mother about his alibi.

The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments provide Guzek a federal constitutional
right to introduce this evidence at his upcoming
sentencing proceeding. At Oregon’s request, we agreed to
review that determination.

II

Before turning to the merits of Oregon’s claim, we consider
a motion that Guzek made, asking us to dismiss the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. The motion rests upon
Guzek’s claim that, irrespective of federal law, state law gives
him the right to introduce his mother’s live testimony–the
additional alibi evidence here at issue. See Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 138.012(2)(b) (2003). For this reason, he says, the Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal, or, at the least, there
is no good practical reason for us to decide the federal issue.

Opinion of the Court

We cannot agree, however, that we lack jurisdiction to
hear the case. We possess jurisdiction to review state-court
determinations that rest upon federal law. 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257(a). And the Oregon Supreme Court here based its
legal conclusion in relevant part on federal law. The court
pointed out that state law permits the introduction (at a new
sentencing hearing) of “ ‘evidence... relevant to [the] sentence
including . . . mitigating evidence relevant to . . .
[w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence.’ ”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 45 (quoting Ore. Rev. Stat.
§§163.150(1)(a), (b) (2003); emphasis added and deleted).
But it immediately added that the state law’s words
“relevant... mitigating evidence” refer (in the present
context) only to evidence that the Federal Constitution
grants a defendant the right to present. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 45—52.

The Oregon court went on to discuss this Court’s statements
to the effect that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
“ ‘require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor...any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.’ ” Id., at 54 (quoting Lockett

v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); emphasis
deleted); cf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 56 (recognizing that this
aspect of Lockett was adopted by a majority of the Court in
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110 (1982)). And the
Oregon court then interpreted this Court’s holding in Green
v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), as including,
within that federal admissibility requirement, evidence
which, like the proffered alibi testimony, tends to show that
the defendant did not commit the crime for which he has
been convicted. Thus, it held that state law demanded “admissibility”
solely for a federal reason. And we possess jurisdiction.
See, e. g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553,
556, n. 5 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 651—653
(1979).

Opinion of the Court

Neither are we persuaded by Guzek’s argument that we
should dismiss the case because irrespective of federal law
and irrespective of the Oregon Supreme Court’s federal holding,
Oregon law gives him the right to introduce witnesses
who testified at the guilt phase; and his mother was such
a witness (a fact, he says, that the Oregon Supreme Court
overlooked). Guzek points in support to an Oregon capitalcase
resentencing statute that says,

“[a] transcript of all testimony and all exhibits and other
evidence properly admitted in the prior trial...are
admissible in the new sentencing proceeding.” Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 138.012(2)(b) (2003).

The provision adds that,

“[e]ither party may recall any witness who testified at

the priortrial... and may present additional relevant

evidence.” Ibid.

We do not doubt that these provisions give Guzek the statelaw
right to introduce a transcript of guilt-phase testimony.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 43 (authorizing introduction of transcript
of Guzek’s grandfather’s alibi testimony). But Guzek
wishes to do more than introduce a transcript of his mother’s
alibi evidence; he wishes to call his mother to the stand as a
live witness and elicit additional alibi testimony. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 37—39, 41, 55—56. The Oregon statute quoted
above does not expressly say whether he may do so. It does
give him the right to “recall any witness” who testified at
the first trial and to “present additional relevant evidence.”
(Emphasis added.) But is this additional evidence “relevant”?
The Oregon Supreme Court thought so, but only because
federal law insists upon its relevance. And its opinion
suggests that, in the absence of federal compulsion, it would
not fall within the scope of the state statutory word “relevant.”
See supra, at 521.

At most, Guzek has shown that state law might, not that
it does, independently give him the right to introduce this

Opinion of the Court

evidence. We have made clear that “a possible adequate and
independent state ground” for a decision does not “bar [our]
reaching the federal questions” where, as here, a “State Supreme
Court quite clearly rested its [decision] solely on the
Federal Constitution.” California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992,
997, n. 7 (1983); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts
Gen. Hospital, 463 U. S. 239, 242 (1983); United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U. S. 623, 630—631 (1973). And we consequently
deny the motion to dismiss the writ.

III

As our discussion in Part II, supra, makes clear, the
federal question before us is a narrow one. Do the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments grant Guzek a constitutional
right to present evidence of the kind he seeks to introduce,
namely, new evidence that shows he was not present at the
scene of the crime. That evidence is inconsistent with Guzek’s
prior conviction. It sheds no light on the manner in
which he committed the crime for which he has been convicted.
Nor is it evidence that Guzek contends was unavailable
to him at the time of the original trial. And, to the
extent it is evidence he introduced at that time, he is free to
introduce it now, albeit in transcript form. Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 138.012(2)(b) (2003). We can find nothing in the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments that provides a capital defendant a
right to introduce new evidence of this kind at sentencing.

We cannot agree with the Oregon Supreme Court that our
previous cases have found in the Eighth Amendment a constitutional
right broad enough to encompass the evidence
here at issue. In Lockett v. Ohio, supra, a plurality of this
Court decided that a defendant convicted of acting in concert
with others to rob and to kill could introduce at the sentencing
stage evidence that she had played a minor role in the
crime, indeed, that she had remained outside the shop (where
the killing took place) at the time of the crime. A plurality
of the Court wrote that,

Opinion of the Court

“the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as
a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death.” Id., at 604 (emphasis added and deleted).

And in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, the Court majority
adopted this statement. See also McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U. S. 279, 306 (1987); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637, 642
(1978) (plurality opinion).

But the evidence at issue in these cases was traditional
sentence-related evidence, evidence that tended to show how,
not whether, the defendant committed the crime. Nor was
the evidence directly inconsistent with the jury’s finding of
guilt.

The Oregon Supreme Court thought that this latter distinction–
the fact that the “alibi evidence was inconsistent
with,” rather than “consistent with[,] the underlying convictions”–
did not matter. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58. It said
that this “factual distinction . . . is of no consequence in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Green v. Georgia.” Ibid.
In Green, however, the Court focused upon a defendant convicted
of murder, who sought to introduce at sentencing a
statement his confederate made to a third party that he (the
confederate) had alone committed the murder (i. e., without
the defendant). The State opposed its use at the defendant’s
sentencing hearing on the ground that, as to the defendant,
it was hearsay. The Court, in a brief per curiam opinion,
noted that the State had used the confession in the confederate’s
trial, referred to an earlier case holding that the Constitution
prohibits States from “ ‘mechanistically’ ” applying the
hearsay rule “‘to defeat the ends of justice,’” and held that
the Constitution prohibited the State from barring use of the
confession. 442 U. S., at 97 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U. S. 284, 302 (1973)). The opinion focused only
upon the hearsay problem, and it implicitly assumed that, in

Opinion of the Court

the absence of the hearsay problem, state law would not have
blocked admission of the evidence.

In any event, subsequent to Green, this Court decided
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164 (1988), and that case
makes clear, contrary to the Oregon Supreme Court’s understanding,
that this Court’s previous cases had not interpreted
the Eighth Amendment as providing a capital defendant
the right to introduce at sentencing evidence designed
to cast “residual doubt” on his guilt of the basic crime of
conviction. The Franklin plurality said it was “quite doubtful”
that any such right existed. Id., at 173, n. 6. And two
other Members of the Court added that “[o]ur cases” do not
support any such “right to reconsideration by the sentencing
body of lingering doubts about . . . guilt.” Id., at 187 (O’Connor,
J., concurring in judgment). See also Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U. S. 302, 320 (1989) (characterizing Franklin as
a case in which a majority “agreed that ‘residual doubt’ as to
Franklin’s guilt was not a constitutionally mandated mitigating
factor” (brackets omitted)).

Franklin did not resolve whether the Eighth Amendment
affords capital defendants such a right, for the plurality held
that the sentencing scheme at issue was constitutional “even
if such a right existed.” 487 U. S., at 174. But the Court’s
statements on the matter make clear that the Oregon Supreme
Court erred in interpreting Green as providing a
capital defendant with a constitutional right to introduce
residual doubt evidence at sentencing.

In this case, we once again face a situation where we need
not resolve whether such a right exists, for, even if it does,
it could not extend so far as to provide this defendant with a
right to introduce the evidence at issue. See, e. g., Alabama
State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461—
462 (1945). The Eighth Amendment insists upon “ ‘reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment
in a specific case.’ ” Penry, supra, at 328 (quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plural

Opinion of the Court

ity opinion)). The Eighth Amendment also insists that a
sentencing jury be able “to consider and give effect to mitigating
evidence” about the defendant’s “character or record
or the circumstances of the offense.” Penry, supra, at 327—

328. But the Eighth Amendment does not deprive the State
of its authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a
defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it
is submitted. Rather, “States are free to structure and
shape consideration of mitigating evidence ‘in an effort to
achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the
death penalty.’ ” Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 377
(1990) (quoting Franklin, supra, at 181 (plurality opinion));
see, e. g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 362 (1993); California
v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 543 (1987).

Three circumstances, taken together, convince us that the
State possesses the authority to regulate, through exclusion,
the evidence that Guzek seeks to present. First, sentencing
traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed
the crime. See United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1, editorial note, § 4(a), p. 4
(Nov. 2004). But the evidence at issue here–alibi evidence–
concerns only whether, not how, he did so.

Second, the parties previously litigated the issue to which
the evidence is relevant–whether the defendant committed
the basic crime. The evidence thereby attacks a previously
determined matter in a proceeding at which, in principle,
that matter is not at issue. The law typically discourages
collateral attacks of this kind. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449

U. S. 90, 94 (1980) (“As this Court and other courts have
often recognized, res judicata and collateral estoppel relieve
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve
judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions,
encourage reliance on adjudication”).

Third, the negative impact of a rule restricting defendant’s
ability to introduce new alibi evidence is minimized by the
fact that Oregon law gives the defendant the right to present

Opinion of the Court

to the sentencing jury all the evidence of innocence from the
original trial regardless. That law permits the defendant to
introduce at resentencing transcripts and exhibits from his
prior trial. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.012(2)(b) (2003). The defendant
here has not claimed that the evidence at issue was
unavailable at the time of his original trial. Thus, he need
only have introduced it at that time to guarantee its presentation
(albeit through transcripts) to a resentencing jury as
well.

The legitimacy of these trial management and evidentiary
considerations, along with the typically minimal adverse impact
that a restriction would have on a defendant’s ability to
present his alibi claim at resentencing convinces us that the
Eighth Amendment does not protect defendant’s right to
present the evidence at issue here. We conclude that the
Oregon court was wrong in holding to the contrary.

IV

Guzek also contends that, even if the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not mandate the admission of his
mother’s testimony, he is entitled to introduce that evidence
to impeach his associates, whose earlier testimony the government
intends to introduce at resentencing. The Oregon
Supreme Court did not address this issue; nor do we believe
it fairly encompassed within the question presented. The
Oregon courts are free to consider it on remand should they
believe it appropriate to do so.

V

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Oregon
Supreme Court, and we remand the case for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring
in the judgment.

In this case, we have the opportunity to put to rest, once
and for all, the mistaken notion that the Eighth Amendment
requires that a convicted capital defendant be given the opportunity,
at his sentencing hearing, to present evidence and
argument concerning residual doubts about his guilt. Although
the Court correctly holds that there is no Eighth
Amendment violation in this case, I would follow the Court’s
logic to its natural conclusion and reject all Eighth Amendment
residual-doubt claims.

I agree with the Court that we have jurisdiction and
should exercise it in this case. What requires me to withhold
agreement to the Court’s opinion is the last of the
“[t]hree circumstances” on which it relies, ante, at 526–
namely, “the fact that Oregon law gives the defendant the
right to present to the sentencing jury all the evidence of
innocence from the original trial.” Ante, at 526—527 (emphasis
in original). The first two of the circumstances are
alone sufficient to dispose of the claim that the Eighth
Amendment guarantees a capital defendant a second opportunity,
at sentencing, to litigate his innocence. In fact, the
Court’s third “circumstance” is an analytical misfit in the
company of the other two. The first two–that “sentencing
traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed
the crime,” ante, at 526, and that “the parties previously
litigated the issue to which the evidence is relevant,”
ibid.–show that compelling the admission of innocencerelated
evidence would be improper and unnecessary at a
sentencing hearing. The third, by contrast, suggests that
there is no constitutional violation in this case because
enough of such evidence may be admitted on remand. The
latter factor would be relevant only if the former two
were not.

If we needed any third factor to justify our holding, a better
candidate would be that the claim we consider here finds

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

no support in our Nation’s legal history and traditions. In
1986, Justice Marshall correctly observed that there had
been “few times in which any legitimacy has been given to
the power of a convicted capital defendant facing the possibility
of a death sentence to argue as a mitigating factor the
chance that he might be innocent.” Lockhart v. McCree, 476

U. S. 162, 205 (dissenting opinion). Nothing has changed on
that score in the last 20 years. On the contrary, in Franklin

v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164 (1988), four Members of this Court
noted that our “prior decisions...failto recognize a constitutional
right to have such doubts considered as a mitigating
factor,” id., at 174 (plurality opinion). They were, moreover,
“quite doubtful” that the purported right existed, because it
is “arguably inconsistent with the common practice of allowing
penalty-only trials on remand of cases where a death
sentence–but not the underlying conviction–is struck down
on appeal.” Id., at 173, n. 6. Two other Members of the
Court would have rejected the claim outright. Id., at 187
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

After Franklin, the lower courts have unanimously denied
constitutional claims like the one we consider today. See,

e. g., Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 F. 3d 1300, 1310 (CA11 2003);
Evans v. Thompson, 881 F. 2d 117, 121 (CA4 1989); Duest v.
State, 855 So. 2d 33, 40—41 (Fla. 2003); Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 572 Pa. 105, 115—116, 813 A. 2d 761, 767 (2002); People
v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 501—504, 727 N. E. 2d 302, 338—
339 (2000); State v. Fletcher, 354 N. C. 455, 470—472, 555 S. E.
2d 534, 544 (2001); Melson v. State, 775 So. 2d 857, 898—899
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999). The last apparent scrap of authority
for the contrary view came from our cryptic opinion in Green
v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), on which the
Oregon Supreme Court principally relied. See App. to Pet.
for Cert. 58—62. The chief virtue of today’s opinion lies in
its discarding the notion that Green provides any support
for an Eighth Amendment right to argue residual doubt at
sentencing. See ante, at 524—525.

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

In mentioning, however, the superfluous circumstance that
Oregon law happens to provide for the admission at sentencing
of some evidence that relates to innocence, the Court
risks creating doubt where none should exist. Capital defendants
might now be tempted to argue that the amount of
residual-doubt evidence carried over from the guilt phase in
their sentencing hearings is insufficient to satisfy the Court’s
third factor. Every one of these “residual-doubt” claims will
be meritless in light of the Court’s first two factors. We
should make this perfectly clear today.

546 U.S. 517 - Oregon v Guzek

546 US 517 Oregon v Guzek

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