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546 U.S. 142 - Lockhart v United States
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546 US 142 Lockhart v United States
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Case Text
Syllabus
LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 04—881. Argued November 2, 2005–Decided December 7, 2005
In 2002, the Government began withholding a portion of petitioner’s Social
Security payments to offset his debt on federally reinsured student
loans that were more than 10 years overdue. Petitioner sued, arguing
that the offset was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations of the
Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U. S. C. § 3716(e)(1). The Social Security
Act generally exempts benefits from attachment or other legal process,
42 U. S. C. § 407(a), and provides that “[n]o other provision of law . . .
may be construed to . . . modify . . . this section except to the extent
that it does so by express reference,” § 407(b). The Higher Education
Technical Amendments of 1991 eliminated time limitations on suits to
collect student loans, 20 U. S. C. § 1091a(a)(2)(D). In 1996, the Debt Collection
Improvement Act subjected Social Security benefits to offset,
“[n]otwithstanding [§ 407],” 31 U. S. C. § 3716(c)(3)(A)(i). The District
Court dismissed petitioner’s complaint, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The United States may offset Social Security benefits to collect
a student loan debt that has been outstanding for over 10 years.
Pp. 145—147.
(a) The Debt Collection Improvement Act makes Social Security benefits
subject to offset, providing the sort of express reference that
§ 407(b) says is necessary to supersede the anti-attachment provision.
P. 145.
(b) The Higher Education Technical Amendments remove the 10-year
limit that would otherwise bar offsetting petitioner’s Social Security
benefits to pay off his student loan debt. Debt collection by Social Security
offset was not authorized until five years after this abrogation of
time limits, but the plain meaning of the Higher Education Technical
Amendments must be given effect even though Congress may not have
foreseen all of their consequences, Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U. S. 151,
158. Though the Higher Education Technical Amendments, unlike the
Debt Collection Improvement Act, do not explicitly mention § 407, an
express reference is only required to authorize attachment in the first
place. Pp. 145—146.
(c) Though the Debt Collection Improvement Act retained the Debt
Collection Act’s general 10-year bar on offset authority, the Higher Education
Technical Amendments retain their effect as a limited exception
Opinion of the Court
to the Debt Collection Act time bar in the student loan context. The
Court declines to read any meaning into a failed 2004 congressional effort
to amend the latter Act to explicitly authorize offset of debts over
10 years old. See, e. g., United States v. Craft, 535 U. S. 274, 287.
Pp. 146—147.
376 F. 3d 1027, affirmed.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Scalia, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 147.
Brian Wolfman argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Scott L. Nelson.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondents. With her
on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney
General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar,
Barbara C. Biddle, Kent D. Talbert, and Arnold I.
Havens.*
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether the United States may offset Social
Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that has been
outstanding for over 10 years.
I
A
Petitioner James Lockhart failed to repay federally reinsured
student loans that he had incurred between 1984 and
1989 under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. These
loans were eventually reassigned to the Department of Education,
which certified the debt to the Department of the
Treasury through the Treasury Offset Program. In 2002,
the Government began withholding a portion of petitioner’s
Social Security payments to offset his debt, some of which
was more than 10 years delinquent.
*Stuart Rossman filed a brief for the National Consumer Law Center
et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Opinion of the Court
Petitioner sued in Federal District Court, alleging that
under the Debt Collection Act’s 10-year statute of limitations,
the offset was time barred. The District Court dismissed
the complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. 376 F. 3d 1027 (2004). We granted certiorari,
544 U. S. 998 (2005), to resolve the conflict between the
Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, see Lee v. Paige, 376
F. 3d 1179 (CA8 2004), and now affirm.
B
The Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended, provides
that, after pursuing the debt collection channels set out in
31 U. S. C. § 3711(a), an agency head can collect an outstanding
debt “by administrative offset.” § 3716(a). The availability
of offsets against Social Security benefits is limited,
as the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, makes
Social Security benefits, in general, not “subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.” 42
U. S. C. § 407(a). The Social Security Act purports to protect
this anti-attachment rule with an express-reference provision:
“No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or
after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede,
or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except
to the extent that it does so by express reference to this
section.” § 407(b).
Moreover, the Debt Collection Act’s offset provisions generally
do not authorize the collection of claims which, like
petitioner’s debts at issue here, are over 10 years old. 31
U. S. C. § 3716(e)(1). In 1991, however, the Higher Education
Technical Amendments, 105 Stat. 123, sweepingly eliminated
time limitations as to certain loans: “Notwithstanding
any other provision of statute...no limitation shall terminate
the period within which suit may be filed, a judgment
may be enforced, or an offset, garnishment, or other action
initiated or taken,” 20 U. S. C. § 1091a(a)(2), for the repay
Opinion of the Court
ment of various student loans, including the loans at issue
here, § 1091a(a)(2)(D).
The Higher Education Technical Amendments, by their
terms, did not make Social Security benefits subject to offset;
these were still protected by the Social Security Act’s
anti-attachment rule. Only in 1996 did the Debt Collection
Improvement Act–in amending and recodifying the Debt
Collection Act–provide that, “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law (including [§ 407]...),” with alimited exception
not relevant here, “all payment due an individual
under . . . the Social Security Act . . . shall be subject to
offset under this section.” 31 U. S. C. § 3716(c)(3)(A)(i).
II
The Government does not contend that the “notwithstanding”
clauses in both the Higher Education Technical Amendments
and the Debt Collection Improvement Act trump the
Social Security Act’s express-reference provision. Cf. Marcello
v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302, 310 (1955) (“Exemptions from
the terms of the...Act are not lightly to be presumed in
view of the statement . . . that modifications must be express[.]
But...[u]nless we are to require the Congress to
employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption
from the... Act, we must hold that the present statute
expressly supersedes the . . . provisions of that Act”); Great
Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U. S. 452, 465 (1908).
We need not decide the effect of express-reference provisions
such as § 407(b) to resolve this case. Because the Debt
Collection Improvement Act clearly makes Social Security
benefits subject to offset, it provides exactly the sort of express
reference that the Social Security Act says is necessary
to supersede the anti-attachment provision.
It is clear that the Higher Education Technical Amendments
remove the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar
offsetting petitioner’s Social Security benefits to pay off his
student loan debt. Petitioner argues that Congress could
Opinion of the Court
not have intended in 1991 to repeal the Debt Collection Act’s
statute of limitations as to offsets against Social Security
benefits–since debt collection by Social Security offset was
not authorized until five years later. Therefore, petitioner
continues, the Higher Education Technical Amendments’ abrogation
of time limits in 1991 only applies to then-valid
means of debt collection. We disagree. “The fact that Congress
may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a
statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to
give effect to its plain meaning.” Union Bank v. Wolas, 502
U. S. 151, 158 (1991).
Petitioner points out that the Higher Education Technical
Amendments, unlike the Debt Collection Improvement Act,
do not explicitly mention § 407. But § 407(b) only requires
an express reference to authorize attachment in the first
place–which the Debt Collection Improvement Act has already
provided.
III
Nor does the Debt Collection Improvement Act’s 1996 recodification
of the Debt Collection Act help petitioner. The
Debt Collection Improvement Act, in addition to adding offset
authority against Social Security benefits, retained the
Debt Collection Act’s general 10-year bar on offset authority.
But the mere retention of this previously enacted time bar
does not make the time bar apply in all contexts–a result
that would extend far beyond Social Security benefits, since
it would imply that the Higher Education Technical Amendments’
abrogation of time limits was now a dead letter as to
any kind of administrative offset. Rather, the Higher Education
Technical Amendments retain their effect as a limited
exception to the Debt Collection Act time bar in the student
loan context.
Finally, we decline to read any meaning into the failed
2004 effort to amend the Debt Collection Act to explicitly
authorize offset of debts over 10 years old. See H. R. 5025,
108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 642 (Sept. 8, 2004); S. 2806, 108th
Scalia, J., concurring
Cong., 2d Sess., § 642 (Sept. 15, 2004). “[F]ailed legislative
proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous ground on which to
rest an interpretation of a prior statute.’ ” United States
v. Craft, 535 U. S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650
(1990)). In any event, it is unclear what meaning we could
read into this effort even if we were inclined to do so, as the
failed amendment–which was not limited to offsets against
Social Security benefits–would have had a different effect
than the interpretation we advance today.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, concurring.
I agree with the Court that, even if the express-reference
requirement in § 207(b) of the Social Security Act is binding,
it has been met here; and I join the opinion of the Court
because it does not imply that the requirement is binding.
I would go further, however, and say that it is not.
“[O]ne legislature,” Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “cannot
abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.” Fletcher
v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 135 (1810). “The correctness of this
principle, so far as respects general legislation,” he asserted,
“can never be controverted.” Ibid. See also Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (unlike the Constitution,
a legislative Act is “alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it”); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 90 (1765) (“Acts of parliament derogatory
from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not”);
T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 125—126 (1868) (reprint
1987). Our cases have uniformly endorsed this principle.
See, e. g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U. S. 839, 872
(1996) (plurality opinion); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S.
315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he will of a particular Congress . . . does
not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years”);
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 487 (1905); Newton v.
Scalia, J., concurring
Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, 559 (1880) (in cases involving
“public interests” and “public laws,” “there can be . . . no
irrepealable law”); see generally 1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 2—3, p. 125, n. 1 (3d ed. 2000).
Among the powers of a legislature that a prior legislature
cannot abridge is, of course, the power to make its will
known in whatever fashion it deems appropriate–including
the repeal of pre-existing provisions by simply and clearly
contradicting them. Thus, in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S.
302 (1955), we interpreted the Immigration and Nationality
Act as impliedly exempting deportation hearings from the
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), despite
the requirement in § 12 of the APA that “[n]o subsequent
legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the
provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation
shall do so expressly,” 60 Stat. 244. The Court refused
“to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in
order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative
Procedure Act.” 349 U. S., at 310. We have made clear in
other cases as well, that an express-reference or expressstatement
provision cannot nullify the unambiguous import
of a subsequent statute. In Great Northern R. Co. v. United
States, 208 U. S. 452, 465 (1908), we said of an expressstatement
requirement that “[a]s the section . . . in question
has only the force of a statute, its provisions cannot justify
a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested either expressly
or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment.”
(Emphasis added.) A subsequent Congress, we
have said, may exempt itself from such requirements by “fair
implication”–that is, without an express statement. Warden
v. Marrero, 417 U. S. 653, 659—660, n. 10 (1974). See
also Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 218 (1910).
To be sure, legislative express-reference or expressstatement
requirements may function as background canons
of interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware.
For example, we have asserted that exemptions from the
Scalia, J., concurring
APA are “not lightly to be presumed” in light of its expressreference
requirement, Marcello, supra, at 310; see also
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48, 51 (1955). That assertion
may add little or nothing to our already-powerful
presumption against implied repeals.
“We have repeatedly stated... that absent a clearly
established congressional intention, repeals by implication
are not favored. An implied repeal will only be
found where provisions in two statutes are in irreconcilable
conflict, or where the latter Act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003)
(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974).
When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts
with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless
of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement
of an express reference or other “magical password.”
For the reasons set forth in the majority opinion, in the
Higher Education Technical Amendments and the Debt Collection
Improvement Act, Congress unambiguously authorized,
without exception, the collection of 10-year-old
student-loan debt by administrative offset of Government
payments. In doing so, it flatly contradicted, and thereby
effectively repealed, part of § 207(a) of the Social Security
Act. This repeal is effective, regardless of whether the
express-reference requirement of § 207(b) is fulfilled.
Despite our jurisprudence on this subject, it is regrettably
not uncommon for Congress to attempt to burden the future
exercise of legislative power with express-reference and
express-statement requirements. See, e. g., 1 U. S. C. § 109;
5 U. S. C. § 559; 25 U. S. C. § 1735(b); 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb—3(b);
50 U. S. C. §§ 1547(a)(1), 1621(b). In the present case, it
might seem more respectful of Congress to refrain from de
Scalia, J., concurring
claring the invalidity of the express-reference provision.
I suppose that would depend upon which Congress one has
in mind: the prior one that enacted the provision, or the current
one whose clearly expressed legislative intent it is designed
to frustrate. In any event, I think it does no favor
to the Members of Congress, and to those who assist in drafting
their legislation, to keep secret the fact that such
express-reference provisions are ineffective.
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