OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE
ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 04—603. Argued April 18, 2005–Decided June 13, 2005
The Internal Revenue Service seized real property owned by petitioner
(hereinafter Grable) to satisfy a federal tax delinquency, and gave Grable
notice by certified mail before selling the property to respondent
(hereinafter Darue). Grable subsequently brought a quiet title action
in state court, claiming that Darue’s title was invalid because 26 U. S. C.
§ 6335 required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal
service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to Federal District
Court as presenting a federal question because the title claim depended
on an interpretation of federal tax law. The District Court declined to
remand the case, finding that it posed a significant federal-law question,
and it granted Darue summary judgment on the merits. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted certiorari on the jurisdictional
question.
Held: The national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax
litigation is sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federalquestion
jurisdiction over the disputed issue on removal. Pp. 312—320.
(a) Darue was entitled to remove the quiet title action if Grable could
have brought it in federal court originally, as a civil action “arising
under the . . . laws . . . of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
Federal-question jurisdiction is usually invoked by plaintiffs pleading a
cause of action created by federal law, but this Court has also long recognized
that such jurisdiction will lie over some state-law claims that
implicate significant federal issues, see, e. g., Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180. Such federal jurisdiction demands not
only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one. And the jurisdiction
must be consistent with congressional judgment about the sound
division of labor between state and federal courts governing § 1331’s
application. These considerations have kept the Court from adopting a
single test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law
claims between nondiverse parties. Instead, the question is whether
the state-law claim necessarily stated a federal issue, actually disputed
and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing
a congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.
Pp. 312—314.
(b) This case warrants federal jurisdiction. Grable premised its superior
title claim on the IRS’s failure to give adequate notice, as defined
by federal law. Whether Grable received notice is an essential element
of its quiet title claim, and the federal statute’s meaning is actually disputed.
The meaning of a federal tax provision is an important federallaw
issue that belongs in federal court. The Government has a strong
interest in promptly collecting delinquent taxes, and the IRS’s ability
to satisfy its claims from delinquents’ property requires clear terms of
notice to assure buyers like Darue that the IRS has good title. Finally,
because it will be the rare state title case that raises a federal-law issue,
federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine disagreement over federal tax
title provisions will portend only a microscopic effect on the federalstate
division of labor. This conclusion puts the Court in venerable
company, quiet title actions having been the subject of some of the
earliest exercises of federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims.
E. g., Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 490—491. Pp. 314—316.
(c) Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, is
not to the contrary. There, in finding federal jurisdiction unavailable
for a state tort claim resting in part on an allegation that the defendant
drug company had violated a federal branding law, the Court noted that
Congress had not provided a private federal cause of action for such
violations. Merrell Dow cannot be read to make a federal cause of action
a necessary condition for federal-question jurisdiction. It disclaimed
the adoption of any bright-line rule and expressly approved the
exercise of jurisdiction in Smith, where there was no federal cause of
action. Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as
treating the absence of such cause as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive
of, the “sensitive judgments about congressional intent” required
by § 1331. Id., at 810. In Merrell Dow, the principal significance
of this absence was its bearing on the consequences to the federal
system. If the federal labeling standard without a cause of action could
get a state claim into federal court, so could any other federal standards
without causes of action. And that would mean an enormous number
of cases. A comparable analysis yields a different jurisdictional conclusion
here, because state quiet title actions rarely involve contested
federal-law issues. Pp. 316—320.
377 F. 3d 592, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 320.
Eric H. Zagrans argued the cause for petitioner. On the
briefs was Charles E. McFarland.
310 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE
ENGINEERING & MFG.
Opinion of the Court
Michael C. Walton argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were John M. Lichtenberg, Gregory
G. Timmer, and Mary L. Tabin.
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on
the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General O’Connor, Deputy Solicitor General
Hungar, and Gilbert S. Rothenberg.*
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether want of a federal cause of action
to try claims of title to land obtained at a federal tax sale
precludes removal to federal court of a state action with
nondiverse parties raising a disputed issue of federal title
law. We answer no, and hold that the national interest
in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is
sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federalquestion
jurisdiction over the disputed issue on removal,
which would not distort any division of labor between the
state and federal courts, provided or assumed by Congress.
I
In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service seized Michigan
real property belonging to petitioner Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc., to satisfy Grable’s federal tax delinquency.
Title 26 U. S. C. § 6335 required the IRS to give notice of the
seizure, and there is no dispute that Grable received actual
notice by certified mail before the IRS sold the property to
respondent Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. Although
Grable also received notice of the sale itself, it did not
exercise its statutory right to redeem the property within
180 days of the sale, § 6337(b)(1), and after that period
*Mr. Zagrans filed a brief for Jerome R. Mikulski et ux. as amici curiae
urging reversal.
had passed, the Government gave Darue a quitclaim deed,
§ 6339.
Five years later, Grable brought a quiet title action in
state court, claiming that Darue’s record title was invalid
because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of
the property in the exact manner required by § 6335(a),
which provides that written notice must be “given by the
Secretary to the owner of the property [or] left at his usual
place of abode or business.” Grable said that the statute
required personal service, not service by certified mail.
Darue removed the case to Federal District Court as
presenting a federal question, because the claim of title
depended on the interpretation of the notice statute in the
federal tax law. The District Court declined to remand the
case at Grable’s behest after finding that the “claim does pose
a ‘significant question of federal law,’ ” Tr. 17 (Apr. 2, 2001),
and ruling that Grable’s lack of a federal right of action to
enforce its claim against Darue did not bar the exercise of
federal jurisdiction. On the merits, the court granted summary
judgment to Darue, holding that although § 6335 by its
terms required personal service, substantial compliance with
the statute was enough. 207 F. Supp. 2d 694 (WD Mich.
2002).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 377
F. 3d 592 (2004). On the jurisdictional question, the panel
thought it sufficed that the title claim raised an issue of federal
law that had to be resolved, and implicated a substantial
federal interest (in construing federal tax law). The court
went on to affirm the District Court’s judgment on the merits.
We granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question
alone,1 543 U. S. 1042 (2005), to resolve a split within the
Courts of Appeals on whether Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986), always requires
1 Accordingly, we have no occasion to pass upon the proper interpretation
of the federal tax provision at issue here.
312 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE
a federal cause of action as a condition for exercising
federal-question jurisdiction.2 We now affirm.
II
Darue was entitled to remove the quiet title action if Grable
could have brought it in federal district court originally,
28 U. S. C. § 1441(a), as a civil action “arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States,” § 1331.
This provision for federal-question jurisdiction is invoked by
and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by
federal law (e. g., claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983). There is,
however, another longstanding, if less frequently encountered,
variety of federal “arising under” jurisdiction, this
Court having recognized for nearly 100 years that in certain
cases federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law
claims that implicate significant federal issues. E. g., Hopkins
v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 490—491 (1917). The doctrine
captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought
to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that
nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and
thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of
uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues, see
ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts 164—166 (1968).
The classic example is Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921), a suit by a shareholder claiming
that the defendant corporation could not lawfully buy certain
bonds of the National Government because their issuance
was unconstitutional. Although Missouri law provided the
cause of action, the Court recognized federal-question jurisdiction
because the principal issue in the case was the federal
constitutionality of the bond issue. Smith thus held, in a
2 Compare Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F. 3d 761, 764 (CA7 1994) (finding that
federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim requires a parallel federal
private right of action), with Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F. 3d
799, 806 (CA4 1996) (finding that a federal private action is not required).
somewhat generous statement of the scope of the doctrine,
that a state-law claim could give rise to federal-question jurisdiction
so long as it “appears from the [complaint] that the
right to relief depends upon the construction or application
of [federal law].” Id., at 199.
The Smith statement has been subject to some trimming
to fit earlier and later cases recognizing the vitality of the
basic doctrine, but shying away from the expansive view
that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will
suffice to open the “arising under” door. As early as 1912,
this Court had confined federal-question jurisdiction over
state-law claims to those that “really and substantially involv[
e] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction
or effect of [federal] law.” Shulthis v. McDougal,
225 U. S. 561, 569. This limitation was the ancestor of Justice
Cardozo’s later explanation that a request to exercise
federal-question jurisdiction over a state action calls for a
“common-sense accommodation of judgment to [the] kaleidoscopic
situations” that present a federal issue, in “a selective
process which picks the substantial causes out of the web
and lays the other ones aside.” Gully v. First Nat. Bank in
Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 117—118 (1936). It has in fact become
a constant refrain in such cases that federal jurisdiction
demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial
one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages
thought to be inherent in a federal forum. E. g.,
Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U. S. 156,
164 (1997); Merrell Dow, supra, at 814, and n. 12; Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for
Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 28 (1983).
But even when the state action discloses a contested and
substantial federal question, the exercise of federal jurisdiction
is subject to a possible veto. For the federal issue will
ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if federal jurisdiction
is consistent with congressional judgment about the
sound division of labor between state and federal courts gov
314 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE
erning the application of § 1331. Thus, Franchise Tax Bd.
explained that the appropriateness of a federal forum to hear
an embedded issue could be evaluated only after considering
the “welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal
and state authority and the proper management of the federal
judicial system.” Id., at 8. Because arising-under jurisdiction
to hear a state-law claim always raises the possibility
of upsetting the state-federal line drawn (or at least
assumed) by Congress, the presence of a disputed federal
issue and the ostensible importance of a federal forum are
never necessarily dispositive; there must always be an assessment
of any disruptive portent in exercising federal jurisdiction.
See also Merrell Dow, 478 U. S., at 810.
These considerations have kept us from stating a “single,
precise, all-embracing” test for jurisdiction over federal issues
embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse parties.
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486
U. S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring). We have not
kept them out simply because they appeared in state raiment,
as Justice Holmes would have done, see Smith, supra,
at 214 (dissenting opinion), but neither have we treated “federal
issue” as a password opening federal courts to any state
action embracing a point of federal law. Instead, the question
is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated
federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally
approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.
III
A
This case warrants federal jurisdiction. Grable’s state
complaint must specify “the facts establishing the superiority
of [its] claim,” Mich. Ct. Rule 3.411(B)(2)(c) (West 2005),
and Grable has premised its superior title claim on a failure
by the IRS to give it adequate notice, as defined by federal
law. Whether Grable was given notice within the meaning
of the federal statute is thus an essential element of its quiet
title claim, and the meaning of the federal statute is actually
in dispute; it appears to be the only legal or factual issue
contested in the case. The meaning of the federal tax provision
is an important issue of federal law that sensibly belongs
in a federal court. The Government has a strong interest in
the “prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes,”
United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S. 677, 709 (1983), and the
ability of the IRS to satisfy its claims from the property of
delinquents requires clear terms of notice to allow buyers
like Darue to satisfy themselves that the Service has touched
the bases necessary for good title. The Government thus
has a direct interest in the availability of a federal forum to
vindicate its own administrative action, and buyers (as well
as tax delinquents) may find it valuable to come before
judges used to federal tax matters. Finally, because it will
be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of
federal law, federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine disagreement
over federal tax title provisions will portend only a
microscopic effect on the federal-state division of labor. See
n. 3, infra.
This conclusion puts us in venerable company, quiet title
actions having been the subject of some of the earliest exercises
of federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims.
In Hopkins, 244 U. S., at 490—491, the question was federal
jurisdiction over a quiet title action based on the plaintiffs’
allegation that federal mining law gave them the superior
claim. Just as in this case, “the facts showing the plaintiffs’
title and the existence and invalidity of the instrument or
record sought to be eliminated as a cloud upon the title are
essential parts of the plaintiffs’ cause of action.” 3 Id., at
3 The quiet title cases also show the limiting effect of the requirement
that the federal issue in a state-law claim must actually be in dispute to
justify federal-question jurisdiction. In Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S.
561 (1912), this Court found that there was no federal-question jurisdiction
316 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE
490. As in this case again, “it is plain that a controversy
respecting the construction and effect of the [federal] laws
is involved and is sufficiently real and substantial.” Id., at
489. This Court therefore upheld federal jurisdiction in
Hopkins, as well as in the similar quiet title matters of
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S. 526, 528
(1903), and Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo y Marcos, 236
U. S. 635, 643—644 (1915). Consistent with those cases, the
recognition of federal jurisdiction is in order here.
B
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S.
804 (1986), on which Grable rests its position, is not to the
contrary. Merrell Dow considered a state tort claim resting
in part on the allegation that the defendant drug company
had violated a federal misbranding prohibition, and was thus
presumptively negligent under Ohio law. Id., at 806. The
Court assumed that federal law would have to be applied to
resolve the claim, but after closely examining the strength
of the federal interest at stake and the implications of opening
the federal forum, held federal jurisdiction unavailable.
Congress had not provided a private federal cause of action
for violation of the federal branding requirement, and the
Court found “it would... flout, or at least undermine, congressional
intent to conclude that federal courts might nevertheless
exercise federal-question jurisdiction and provide
remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because
the violation . . . is said to be a . . . ‘proximate cause’ under
state law.” Id., at 812.
to hear a plaintiff’s quiet title claim in part because the federal statutes
on which title depended were not subject to “any controversy respecting
their validity, construction, or effect.” Id., at 570. As the Court put it,
the requirement of an actual dispute about federal law was “especially”
important in “suit[s] involving rights to land acquired under a law of the
United States,” because otherwise “every suit to establish title to land in
the central and western states would so arise [under federal law], as all
titles in those States are traceable back to those laws.” Id., at 569—570.
Because federal law provides for no quiet title action that
could be brought against Darue,4 Grable argues that there
can be no federal jurisdiction here, stressing some broad language
in Merrell Dow (including the passage just quoted)
that on its face supports Grable’s position, see Note,
Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction
over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 Harv. L.
Rev. 2272, 2280—2282 (2002) (discussing split in Courts of Appeals
over private right of action requirement after Merrell
Dow). But an opinion is to be read as a whole, and Merrell
Dow cannot be read whole as overturning decades of precedent,
as it would have done by effectively adopting the
Holmes dissent in Smith, see supra, at 314, and converting
a federal cause of action from a sufficient condition for
federal-question jurisdiction 5 into a necessary one.
In the first place, Merrell Dow disclaimed the adoption of
any bright-line rule, as when the Court reiterated that “in
exploring the outer reaches of § 1331, determinations about
federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional
intent, judicial power, and the federal system.”
478 U. S., at 810. The opinion included a lengthy footnote
explaining that questions of jurisdiction over state-law
claims require “careful judgments,” id., at 814, about the “nature
of the federal interest at stake,” id., at 814, n. 12 (emphasis
deleted). And as a final indication that it did not
mean to make a federal right of action mandatory, it expressly
approved the exercise of jurisdiction sustained in
Smith, despite the want of any federal cause of action available
to Smith’s shareholder plaintiff. 478 U. S., at 814, n. 12.
4 Federal law does provide a quiet title cause of action against the Federal
Government. 28 U. S. C. § 2410. That right of action is not relevant
here, however, because the Federal Government no longer has any interest
in the property, having transferred its interest to Darue through the
quitclaim deed.
5 For an extremely rare exception to the sufficiency of a federal right of
action, see Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 507 (1900).
318 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE
Merrell Dow then, did not toss out, but specifically retained,
the contextual enquiry that had been Smith’s hallmark for
over 60 years. At the end of Merrell Dow, Justice Holmes
was still dissenting.
Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as
treating the absence of a federal private right of action as
evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the “sensitive
judgments about congressional intent” that § 1331 requires.
The absence of any federal cause of action affected Merrell
Dow’s result two ways. The Court saw the fact as worth
some consideration in the assessment of substantiality. But
its primary importance emerged when the Court treated the
combination of no federal cause of action and no preemption
of state remedies for misbranding as an important clue to
Congress’s conception of the scope of jurisdiction to be exercised
under § 1331. The Court saw the missing cause of action
not as a missing federal door key, always required, but
as a missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances,
when exercising federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding
action would have attracted a horde of original filings
and removal cases raising other state claims with embedded
federal issues. For if the federal labeling standard without
a federal cause of action could get a state claim into federal
court, so could any other federal standard without a federal
cause of action. And that would have meant a tremendous
number of cases.
One only needed to consider the treatment of federal violations
generally in garden variety state tort law. “The violation
of federal statutes and regulations is commonly given
negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings.” 6 Re
6 Other jurisdictions treat a violation of a federal statute as evidence of
negligence or, like Ohio itself in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986), as creating a rebuttable presumption of
negligence. Restatement § 14, Reporters’ Note, Comment c, at 196.
Either approach could still implicate issues of federal law.
statement (Third) of Torts § 14, Reporters’ Note, Comment
a, p. 195 (Tent. Draft No. 1, Mar. 28, 2001). See also W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton
on Law of Torts § 36, p. 221, n. 9 (5th ed. 1984) (“[T]he
breach of a federal statute may support a negligence per se
claim as a matter of state law” (collecting authority)). A
general rule of exercising federal jurisdiction over state
claims resting on federal mislabeling and other statutory violations
would thus have heralded a potentially enormous
shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts. Expressing
concern over the “increased volume of federal litigation,”
and noting the importance of adhering to “legislative
intent,” Merrell Dow thought it improbable that the
Congress, having made no provision for a federal cause of
action, would have meant to welcome any state-law tort case
implicating federal law “solely because the violation of the
federal statute is said to [create] a rebuttable presumption
[of negligence]... under state law.” 478 U. S., at 811—812
(internal quotation marks omitted). In this situation, no
welcome mat meant keep out. Merrell Dow’s analysis thus
fits within the framework of examining the importance of
having a federal forum for the issue, and the consistency
of such a forum with Congress’s intended division of labor
between state and federal courts.
As already indicated, however, a comparable analysis
yields a different jurisdictional conclusion in this case. Although
Congress also indicated ambivalence in this case by
providing no private right of action to Grable, it is the rare
state quiet title action that involves contested issues of federal
law, see n. 3, supra. Consequently, jurisdiction over actions
like Grable’s would not materially affect, or threaten to
affect, the normal currents of litigation. Given the absence
of threatening structural consequences and the clear interest
the Government, its buyers, and its delinquents have in the
availability of a federal forum, there is no good reason to
320 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE
Thomas, J., concurring
shirk from federal jurisdiction over the dispositive and contested
federal issue at the heart of the state-law title claim.7
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding federal
jurisdiction over Grable’s quiet title action, is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
The Court faithfully applies our precedents interpreting
28 U. S. C. § 1331 to authorize federal-court jurisdiction over
some cases in which state law creates the cause of action but
requires determination of an issue of federal law, e. g., Smith
v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921); Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804
(1986). In this case, no one has asked us to overrule those
precedents and adopt the rule Justice Holmes set forth
in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241
U. S. 257 (1916), limiting § 1331 jurisdiction to cases in which
federal law creates the cause of action pleaded on the face
of the plaintiff’s complaint. Id., at 260. In an appropriate
case, and perhaps with the benefit of better evidence as to
the original meaning of § 1331’s text, I would be willing to
consider that course.*
7 At oral argument Grable’s counsel espoused the position that after
Merrell Dow, federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims absent a
federal right of action could be recognized only where a constitutional
issue was at stake. There is, however, no reason in text or otherwise to
draw such a rough line. As Merrell Dow itself suggested, constitutional
questions may be the more likely ones to reach the level of substantiality
that can justify federal jurisdiction. 478 U. S., at 814, n. 12. But a flat
ban on statutory questions would mechanically exclude significant questions
of federal law like the one this case presents.
*This Court has long construed the scope of the statutory grant of
federal-question jurisdiction more narrowly than the scope of the constitutional
grant of such jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Jurisdictional rules should be clear. Whatever the virtues
of the Smith standard, it is anything but clear. Ante,
at 313 (the standard “calls for a ‘common-sense accommodation
of judgment to [the] kaleidoscopic situations’ that present
a federal issue, in ‘a selective process which picks the
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones
aside’ ” (quoting Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299
U. S. 109, 117—118 (1936))); ante, at 314 (“[T]he question is,
does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal
issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”);
ante, at 317, 318 (“ ‘[D]eterminations about federal jurisdiction
require sensitive judgments about congressional
intent, judicial power, and the federal system’ ”; “the absence
of a federal private right of action [is] evidence relevant
to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive judgments about
congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires” (quoting Merrell
Dow, supra, at 810)).
Whatever the vices of the American Well Works rule, it
is clear. Moreover, it accounts for the “ ‘vast majority’ ” of
cases that come within § 1331 under our current case law,
Merrell Dow, supra, at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of
Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 9 (1983))–further indication that trying to
sort out which cases fall within the smaller Smith category
may not be worth the effort it entails. See R. Fallon,
D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 807—808 (1986). I assume for present
purposes that this distinction is proper–that is, that the language of 28
U. S. C. § 1331, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States” (emphasis added), is narrower than the language of
Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution, “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority...”(emphasis added).
322 GRABLE & SONS METAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. DARUE
Courts and the Federal System 885—886 (5th ed. 2003). Accordingly,
I would be willing in appropriate circumstances to
reconsider our interpretation of § 1331.
