FEDERAL "REPORTER,
vol. 50.
wilLbe; &8' iUhoutd be. an intelligent, aOd lnot a blilld" ,Tbe j'l,1dgfounded pn"t}le recqrds before ,it, ,.nlltbese judg.be unhesitatingly liS their enf,orceme'nt maybe by events ':Wbsequent to the pe.dod covered bV tll1srecprd. That such events mayIDodlfy, and often do modIfy, the mode 'iiM ' hia1\her of e'nforcement is well all members of the professlOD. Th\:l,ci\:llitl1,of l'arties, partial ,satisfaction, changes of interest subject to judgmennl.hd sales upon the judgment pending the appe.al, are instances where th.is rasI,l'It is freq ueptly prod ueed. "
:,' 'It'fol19WS from these lluthoritiesrif it, indeed ,needed any authority thlsuppoltlso obvious ;aproposition,thatpayments or compromises made ihbis dWnl'behalf bya'party to ,a'deoreeafter its'rendition in the court be'low ate to be notided Rnd ,enforced tby the inferior. court after the affirmancebfthe decree by the supreme court and the return of its mandate. It is conceded; however, by counsel for thce±ecution creditors Tuyes and Moultoh are entitled to be',oreditedonthe execution with ,the amounts paid by them in compromise oIthe decreeS rendered against themJy..but it is insisted that they are entitled to no more. ,This concesSiOti, it:8eems to me,yields the whble case. Tuyes and Moulton insist that the decrees agMrist ,them- have been discharged by \Acoord and satisfaation. The accord and satisfaetibnis clearly esta,blished. It is impOl!lsibleit,oihold that they would be entitled to the benefit of full or partial payment, and to 'deny them the benefit of their accord and satisfaction.Both these methods of'Satisfying a decree, so far as the question in nand is concerned,staridonprecisely the' same footing. But it is insisted that the adjustments made with Tuyes and Moulton wereoompromises, and that the .compromises failed,; therefore the appellees were remitted 'to, their original rights, and can collect the balance ·of their decrees notoovered by the compromise payments. It is true, :the adjustments were compromises. but the, compromises have not failed. Thoseootnpl"omises were that the ,appellees should receive a certain sum in full, satisfactioD'.of. the decree.., ;This <was agreed to by the debtors; the:money w8!Spaid,and a release executed. So far from the oompromises .failing, they were fully exeoutedand performed. When these ,(lompromises were made it was perfectly well known to the owners of the Riohmondthat Tllyes, and iMoulton, could not prevent the owners of the Sabine al.rryingup the decree by appeal. They never agreed that there should be DO appeal. They compromised and satisfied the decreeS against.themselves. 'fhey took no appeal, for they had nothing to apIt is true that, if the decree of peal from. They were out of the ,1ihe (ll),Urt hadl1eenreversed. the. reversal extended to ,the and Moulton, But that would have been of no benefit to·thern.: They <lould not havereoovered back the compromise fuoneyvo1untaruypaid before the appeal in satisfaction of the decree. No reason is perceived why the execution in question should be allowed ·to proooed agJiinst the property of Tuy',es and Moulton. They have both satisfied the decrees upon which the execution is issued. The affirmlance by the supreme court of the entire deeree of the cirouit court does not make this any the less a fact. ·,It would not be just to compel another
THE LILLDl:LAURIE.
219
satisfaction by Tuyes and Moulton. As to Tuyes, he- is in fact subrogated,to the rights, so far as they have any, of the owners of the RichmODd in the decree against himself. If the decree is not he is, in effect, its owner, so that the levy of this execution upon his property is an attempt to compel bim to pay a decree which he haa compromised, and tbeowners of which have attempted to subrogate him to their rights th{lrein. In short, it is an attempt to enforce by execution payment of a.decree which, if it is not already satisfied, is the property of the per-sone froinwhom its payment is to be exacted. No question is made in reference to the method adopted by Tuyes and Moulton to gain the relief prayed for. The power to control their own process so aa to prevent injustice is one which belongs to all courts. McHenry v. Watkins, 12 Ill. 233; RusseU v. Hugunin,l SCllm. 562; Adamsv. Smallwood,8 Jones, C.) 258; Barnesv. Robinson,4 Yerg.186; Azcarativ. FitzaimmollBI 3 Wash. C. C. 134; Dams v. ShaplRty. 1 Barn. & Ado!. 54: Humphreys v. Knight, 6 Bing. 572. The exercise of this power is invoked by their motic>Ds, and there seems to be no good reason wby the relief asked for should not be granted. The motions are allowed.
THE LILLIE LA.URIE.
(Circu{t Court, E. D. Tezas. November Term, 1880.1 1. ADMIRALTY-PRIORITY OJ' LIENS.
Liens for salvage and for damage to goods aTe inferior to the lien of seamen for wages eat'ned on a subsequent voyage, but, being general maritime liens, aTe superior to those of mortgaj;tees, whether their mortgages were registered before or after the origin of the maritime liens.
Liens for salvage and for damage to goods are superior to a state St&tutor, u. for supplies subsequently furnished, in the home port. S. P AYHBNT. A libel for and for damage to goods was dismissed, and decrees were rendered in favor of certain furnishers of supplies in the home port, on a lien created by the state law, each decree being for less than $50, and therefore not subject to appeal. Libelant appealed to the circuit court, and, pending his appeal, the decrees for supplies were paid in full, though the proceeds of the vessel were in. suftl.qient to pay both classes of claims. HeW, that the payment was improvidentlymade, as the question of priority was C8l'ried up by the llbelant's appeal.
2. SAME.
In Admiralty. !Jibel for seamen's wages. On appeal from district court. The original libel was filed by Dennis Mahoney to recover seaman's wages. Several other seamen intervened, and filed similar libels. One E. N. Stevenson also intervened, and filed a libel for damages sustained by the nonperformance by the Laurie of a contract of affreightment and for salvage. Upon this latter libel the facts disclosed by the evidence were as follows: The schooner, in December, 1878, was bound on a voyage from Galveston to Moss' Bluff, on the Trinity river. A part of her cargo consisted of merchandise, valued at more than $1 ,200, the prop-