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843;
agj\.inst a state upon whose soil he has never set, his foot, as iqputtingJQJ:'th a libel, (Com. y. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304,) or a threatening letter, (E88er's Case, 2 East,P. C. 1125,) or a letter inclosing a forged strumentto,<1efraud the one to whom it iSlldd.ressed,(Peoplt v. Rafhhun, 21 Wend. 509,) Qr a letter making a false pretense to one who parts with his goods in the place of the receipt of the letter, (Reg. v. JfYne8, 1 Eqg. Law & Eq. 533; Reg. v. Leech, 36 Eng. Law & Eq. 589; Norrisv. State, 25 Ohio St. 217.) But it is' objected that the charge, is that the petitioner received the deposit, and therefore his personal PreRence was essential to the commission of the act charged. The objection is unten"The act may be charged directly lI,S his act, and proof that he did the' act through the agency of another will sustain a conviction. , State v. ClddweU, supra. : In Roberts v. ReiJl,y,116U. S. 80-97,6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291, the supreme court defines,the phrase" fugitive from justice," and declares that, to be a fugitive from justice in the sense of the act of congress regulating the subject, "it is not nCCeS!lluy that the party should have left the state in which the crime is alleged to have,been committed, after an indictment fO'.1nd, or for the purpose of avoiding 8. prosecution, anticipated or begun, but simply that, having within a state committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his offense he had left its jurisdiction, and is found in the territory of another." In other words, there need be in flight. It suffices his departure from the sta,te no element of that after the cQmmission of the offense he has merely the judsdiction of the state. The question then recurs: Was the petitioner within the state of Wisconsin, within the intendmellt of the la'{l, at the time of the co.mmission of the alleged offense? In Ex,parte Reggel, U. S. 642-653, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148, itwas ruled that the proof tendered the executive made a pri?naf(lci£ case offlight. There, as here, the statement was only that the person demanded '.'was a fugitive from justice," without statement of probative facts. In Roberts v. Reilly, supra, the supreme court-referring to the of flight-also declared that "the determination of the fact by .the, execptive of the state in iflsuing his warrant of arrest upon the d.emanrl made 011 that ground, whetheJ:' the writ contains a recital of an express ,i;i.ndiQg to that effe9t or not,'.must be regarded as 8uffident to justify the removal until the presumption in its favor· is oVEjrthrown by contrary PIroof." Presumably, therelore, this petitioner was a fugitive from just\ce. onus is cast upon him to satisfy the court that he was not. He <::laimsthat it is conclusi\'ely established that he was not such fugiti\Ye, because he. was not within the demandiilg state at the time deposit was made. . lie has certainly established tl)at fact; but is that cQllclusive that he was not a. fugitive ftQID justice? Or, to express the pJ:'()position differently, is one who within the jurisdiction hath Set in ,Q:lotjon. the maehinli»'Y for crime, and departs the Ju., tisdiction brfore .the con/!lummation of the .crime. a fugitive ftom jlJstice? isol)e as to which it is essential-thatsev'¥p.en the qrhpinal act
BDERAL ' REPORTER,
voL 49.
sral.hcfiJor facts should conour, and which may occur at different times, if't'h:e !party charged"colnmits within the state any orieof the acts con,the before thehappen.ing of other andauthonzed by hIm, or upon tlIe happenmg of events n(!ieeS/lftlpilY' resulting 1l:dm his act, can he be deemed a fugitive from justine?, Weare of opinion that he Inust be so regarded. The purpose oHhe,'cOnstitutionalprov.fsion Was that criminals should find no asylum within,any:stat6of Union; that'''the law might everywhere and in all Ctilises' be vindicated." It will not do to refine too curiously upon suc!i';enactrnents, so that the very design of the law shall prove abortive, so ,thallJthfltehali shield arid a protecti'on which' was designed fis '8piveipon' of offense. :Oan it be that one may not be regarded a fugi,tive from justice who within a state hires another to kill and murder, but beforeEtne killing departs the jurisdIction to avoid the consequences of th'e:wnrder hA has designed? Can' it be that,if one' within a state make8!false representations to procure the goods of another, and departs the state: before that other parts with his property on the faith of these ifttpresentations, he may 'not tie' deemed a fugitive from justice? Or, ,forcible illustration of counsel at the argument, if bne places:a. i dy41amite bomb with clock attaohinent upon the premises of anotherl, that will explode only after the lapse of a certain time, and deathq-eBults,so that the act is murder, but departs the state before the explosion to avoid the consequences of his act, is he not to be regarded as's fugitive from justice? To put the question is to answer it. Tlle,s,uli>'sequent event waS the consequence of the act, naturally resulting from it. The subsequent event was designed to happen from and by reason'oftheact done. The event, wh it occurs as the consequence n of the 'set,gives quality to the act, rendering it criminal. The result was the foreseen and designed conseqUence of the act, stamping it as a crime:!IItis:itnmaterial whether employed be an inanimate object' or'asentientbeing. The resuHwas designed by and naturaJly flowed 'friOm his original act, which, by reason of the result, and the foreseen and intended consequence, is criminal. Departure from thejurisdictioRi after the commission of the act, in furtherance of the crime, subsequently consummated, is a flight from justice within the of the law. ,So here, if, as charged, this bank was insolvent or unsafe on day of:Janl!larYi 1890, and if, as charged, Cook had guilty knowledge thereof, and notwithstanding authorized, sanctioned, and direc1;edtbe keeping open of the bank, and the receipt of deposits, heinust be deemed a fugitive. from justice, although he departed the state' before the deposit was' actually received. rrhe,'petitionerihas not .shown that the bank was not insolvent as not shown' that he was unaware of its conditiod. He hasiberelyshownthat,he was Qstockholder in the Park National Bank to:iheamountof'$19,OOO; that that bank was improvidently closed, and has: since'paid its ,debts.' He has not shown, however, that its capital was oniInpairadso that his 'interest thereiIiwas intact. He has not shown, tllatthe ,Bank of Juneau tir its owners possessed 'any means to
meet the $25;000 of deposits charged to- have received. Nor has he shown that the olosingof the Park National Bank was the occasion of any losstl:fthe Juheau Bank, Ol'lieeessarily prevehted the continuance of its business. If the complaint lodged· against him, and upon which he was surrendered, be true, this bank was insolvent on and after the 6th day of January, 1890,. to the knowledge of Cook. Between that date and the closing of the bank on June 20, 1890, deposits were received to the amount of $25,000, which were owing depositors at the time of closing the doors. At "that time its entire assets consisted of $3,048 in cash and $2,000 in securities, and Cook is charged to have withdrawn all the eapitaland all of the deposits except the amount of the 234 of June the proprietors of the bank the assets stated. And assigned.. These allegations we·inust regard, under the ruling of the supreme court, so far as they bear on the question of flight, as presumptively true. They have not been,eontradicted.Cook .hasmerely shown that his interest in the Park National Bank was put 'in jeopardy.. But stock in one bank is not capital in another. He has failed to whatbecaD;le bf the capital of the Juneau Bankjor of the received. .He has failed to account for the meagre assets of the bank. So, upon this showing, and in the face of the primfL facie evidence of flight derived from the action of the executive of Illinois in issuing his warrant of rendition, we are bound to assume, for the purposes of this hearing, with a view to ascertain if he may be regarded a fugitive f:om justice, that when last within the state of Wiscbnsin; some two or three weeks prior to the closing of the bank, that bank was unsafe and insolvent, to his knowledge, and was. by his directi<;)n .thereafter kept open for business with the design that his servants should take and receive deposits; tha.t he design:ed the frand which was consummated by the actual re\leipt of the deposit, departing the jurisdiction intermediate the design and act to accomplish that design and the actual receipt of the deposit.· .'HEi was, therefore, in our judgment, a fugitive from justice within the intendment of the law. It isfurth.er urged that, being rendered by the executive of Illinois for trial upon the offense charged, Cook cannot be held or tried upon any other charge until he has had proper opportunity to return to the state ofIllinois. It was held in U.S. V'. Rauscher,119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. that when 0t:le was extradited by the government of Great Britain, undera treaty, for trial upon the particular offense charged, he cannot lawfully be tried for any other offense; .that he is clothed with the right to exemption from trial for iany other offense, until he has had opportunity to return to the country whence he was taken for the purpose al.one. of trial forthe offense specified in the demand for his surrender.' If the principles of extradition are appliCable and controlling in interstate rendition, this ruling must be held to determine the right of exemption, notwithstanding decision of the supreme court of Wisconsin in State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 N. W. Rep. It is not essential, howevet,'that we should at this time pass uponthls question, as the petitioner mU'st be remanded to the jurisdiction of the state 'court.
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