46 F. 3d 1143 - Mosley v. Gilbert

MEMORANDUM**

Jerome Mosley, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 civil rights action. Mosley contends that the Parole Board miscalculated his crime severity level and his parole likelihood success score when determining his eligibility for parole. Mosley also contends that defendants violated his due process and Fourth Amendment rights because they allegedly invaded his sealed court files and included false and misleading information in the presentence report that was relied on by the Parole Board. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

We review de novo the district court's Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal. Kruso v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937 (1990). Review is limited to the contents of the complaint. Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 599 (1992). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. We may affirm on any grounds finding support in the record. Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1364 (9th Cir.1983).

When a prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his or her confinement, the exclusive federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2369 (1994); Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir.1991). Accordingly, a prisoner claiming that the Parole Board relied on inaccurate information in reaching its decision, must seek redress by way of a habeas petition. See Elliott v. United States, 572 F.2d 238, 239 (9th Cir.1978). In such a situation, a section 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to unlawful imprisonment does not accrue until the sentence or fact of imprisonment has been invalidated. Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2373.

Here, Mosley may not seek damages under section 1983 for parole decisions that were based on allegedly false and inaccurate information in his records until he proves that such information has been invalidated by the state or by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. See id. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed that portion of Mosley's complaint seeking damages under section 1983.1

To the extent Mosley seeks, by way of injunctive relief, to shorten the duration of his confinement by having his parole eligibility records corrected, his proper remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1973); Elliott, 572 F.2d at 239. Rather than dismissing that portion of Mosley's complaint which seeks injunctive relief, however, the district court should have construed his complaint as a habeas petition and required exhaustion of state remedies. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500; Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir.1981). Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.