804
I'EDERAL REPORTER,
vol. 45.
done on the first day; and, surely, suc.h a premature and voluntary action cannot be said to close the right of removal under this act of congress, but expiration of the two days allowed the defendant to plead would close it, perhaps whether he actually did plead or did not." The opinion in the case of Lockhart v. Railroad 00.,38 Fed. Rep. 274, cited by counsel for the plaintiff,.was also written by Judge HAMMOND, and he therein refers to the case of Gavin v. Vance, and plainly adheres to his views therein expressed1)y distinguishing it from the case then under consideration. This will be made apparent by the following extracts from the latter opinion: . . .. This court held in (Javin v. Vance, 88 Fed. Rep. 92·. that the filing of an anSwer prematurely-that. is', before the time specifically fixed by the statutes or rule of court-did not terminate the right of remo'val, and that a removal petition filed before the time aHowed for pleading had expired was in time. ... ... ... In (Javinv. Vance, 8upra, the answer that was filed. and which was held not to terminate therigbt of removal, was filed before the time which was fixed by a day certam ,tj:> plead, Which is not the case here." The appearance entered in case brought the defendant for the first time within the jurisdiction of the. court, and it was· entitled, by law and the rules of the court, to at least 20 days thereafter within which to answer or plead. As the petition and bond were filed within that time, there is no ground for this motion to remand.
STATE ex
ret TIl,.LMAN, Governo'r, et al. v. COQSAW MIN. Co,. ji
{CirCUit Oourt, D. Sooth OaroZina. April 21, 1891.}
B.
The'petition ·for removal of a cause from a state to the federal court is part of the record·. and will be considered by the federal court in determining its jurisdiction. SAME.
FORREMOVAt-REcORD.
8.
When the petition for removal totner;federal court and the bond are:flled in t,he state court, the jurisdiction of the latter ceases, and of the former imlllediarely at.taches. , .. Where the judge of the atate court in vacation passes upon the petition for remo.val and bond, courtesy does not require the federal court to withhold action. . ..
.
l
'
,-. SA1IlE-COURil'ESY TO STATE CoURT.
Ii.
SAME-COMITY.
The question of comity between the federal and state courts does not arise on removal of a cause. . ,
In·Equity. Y. J. Pope, Atty. plaintiffs.
Mitchellc!& .Smith, and George S. Mower,
fOJ:·
STATE
v;
COOSAW MIN. CO.
805
McOrady, Sons
Bacot and Smythe
Lee, for defendant.
SIMONTON, J. The summons and complaint in this case were filed in the office of the clerk of Beaufort county in South Carolina on23d March, 1891. The complaint sets forth the ownership by the state of the beds .of Coosaw river, including that part of it which "lies opposite to and south of Chisolm's island," and inthe phosphate and phosphatic deposits therein. That the Coosaw Mining Company, a joint-stock company, claims a perpetual grant to all such deposits hi that part of Coosaw river, and the exclusive right to mine the same, which claim relators deny . That, notwithstanding such denial, the Coosaw Company continues to assert its claim, and hinders and obstructs the relators; who p.re the duly qualified and appointed board of phosphate commissioners, and all persons authorized by them, from mining in said territory. That it is to tlispose of this claim, which is based on a certain act of the general assembly of South Carolina,. approved 20th March, 1876, (setting out the title of the act,) which act relators charge to be in con· flict with the state constitution. That the deposits are of great value, variable, however, in price,and liable in this respect to be affected by the discovery and the production of phosphate rock elsewhere. Charges that the Coosaw Company has brought and threatens suits against per. sons licensed by plaintiffs to mine in this territory, and that this cloud on the state's title should be removed. The prayer is for a perpetual injunction against the Coosaw Company, and in the mean time a restrain· ing order, antI also for the appointment of a receiver. After the filing of the complaint an order was made by his honor, Judge.ALDRICH, sitting in ohambers at Aiken, containing a rule against the Coosaw pany to show cause before him, on 7th April next thereafter, why the injunction as prayed for be not granted; and why the receiver be not ap. pointed. In the mean timA' a ,restraining order was issued, and a terripo;. rary receiver appointed without bond. The defendant was served with summons and complaint on 23d March, 1891. On 30th March, 18911 a petition was filed with the clerk of the court of common pleas'for Beaufort county for the removal of the cause into this court, accompa· nied by a bond with good surety in the sum of $5,000. The court of common pleas for that county was then and is now in vacation. The next regular term will be held on 4th of May next. The defendant exhibited a copy of the petition and bond to Judge ALDRICH at Aiken on 31st March. What action he took does not appear. A copy of the summons and complaint, petition and bond, with exhibits certified by the clerk of the court of common pleas for Beaufort county, was filed in this court on 1st April. Oil the 6th day.of April the regular term of this court began. On the 7th of April the Coosaw Company came into open court, and asked leave file a return to the rule issued by Judge ALDRICH. Thereupon the Honorable Y. J. Pope, who is the attorney general of the state of South Carolina, and who appears on the record as plaintiffs' attorney, entered a qualified appearance for tbe plaintiffs, simply to the jurisdiction of the court. At the same time he filed
806
FEDERAL BEPOO'rER',
vol. '4:5.
in writing a sl1ggestiQritothe the rule and the ·teturn thereto were then actually being heard before his honor, Judge ALDRICH, at Aikenj C. ';, iii': :. ' AUhe-threshold of this case: plaintiffs submit twoqtlestions to the court:. First. Has it jurisdictiOn::Of' ;thiscase? Second. Hit has jurisdiction, are, there not conside.ratioilsofeourtesy and comity towards the state court which willinduce:itli1:owithhold action? Has this court.jurisdiction oflhis,:ease? This will depend upon two questions.: Is the caseremovablel from the state,:court to this court? Has it been removed? ' The case ;,ciumot be removed unless it comes within theolass of oases arising under the constitution of the United States, ofwhioh circuitcourts oftha United States a.re given jurisdiction by the first section of the act ,of congress of 1888.: 25 St. at Large, 434. Section 1 of that. act gives to the circuit courts of the United States original cognizanoecoDOurrerlt:with the courts ofthe several states of.all suits ofa civil, nature, at; (lQmmon law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive 'of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2,000, anda-rising under the constitution of the United States. The value of the matter in dispute here is beyond the sum stated. The act makes,mo 'exception because of the character of the parties. The sole question, therefore, is, does this case arise under the constitution of the United States? The cqmplaintdoes: not anywhere'state the authority upon which it is brought .bythese rela.tors in the name of the state, nor how they became and are the duly appointed and qualified boarel of phosphate commissioners, nor how or when they 'were do the acts which it is charged the Coosaw Mining Company obstructs. Nor does it mention or refer to any legislative action of the state of South Carolina with respect to the claim of theCoosaw Company to hold her grant. It does allege that the state is the sole owner of the disputed territory; that the Coosaw Mining Company claims a perpetual grant of the exclusive right to mine therein, based upon an act of the general assembly of that state,i;whose title and the date Of whose approval are stated in the complaint, which the complaint says is invalid. The petition for removal states that the relators are ·ll:ctingunder and by the authority of an act of the asseinbly of this state, approved December, 1890, giving its title at length; that the grant which they have, and which they charge is 8, contract between them and the said state, is impaired by said act of 1890. That the sai-dact'is a violationof the constitution of the United States in sundry particulars, especially in that it impairs . the obligation of a contract. There can be no dotlpt tbatif the question, whether the actof 1890' impairs theobligationofa contract,: can be made to appear on that part of this record:,whioh this court is' at liberty toexatnine at this stage of the proceedings, the case is removable. ' It is a federal question, arising under the constitution of the United States. hi the case of Dartmouth Oollegev.: W,oodward, 4 When,t. 518, the legislature of New Hampshire had passed an act materially amending the charter granted by the crown
·STATE V. OOOSAWMII'(.c<).
807
to the trustees of Dartmouth College. It was. claimed on the one side that the charter was a contract, and this was denied on the other. If it WM a contract, the amending act impaired it. The supreme court of the United States took jurisdiction of thiaas a federal question, discussed whether the charter waS a contract, and that it was. The decisionof the supreme court of New Hampshire to the contrary was reversed, and the act was declared invalid. So, in this case, if it can be made to appear from that part of the record which the court is at liberty to inspect that the questions are distinctly made whether there did exist such a contract. and whether thisactof1890impairs its obligation, then it is competent for this court to entertain and decide both questions. See Bank SkeUy, 1 Black, 436; Proprietorsv. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 145. Not only so, this federal question would be the controlling question in thecaae. .For H,on the one hand, the court should decide that there wasS1,lch a contract, and that the act of 1890 impaired its obligation, every pI:ovision in that act giving any power or authority to these relators to with the possession of the C008aw :Mining Company and its operatioDasanctioned by that contract, or. to give licenses to any person to mine ,in the disputed terrieory, or to seek an injuDctionora receiver, is null and vpid. On the other; hand, if there be no such contract,or the act of does not impair its.obligation. the case of the relators must be sustained. So.·the inquiry is, is this federal question presented to this court now? Where in the recordmustwe look for it·? The sel for the plaintiffs, with great learning and force of argument, contend that in makmg this inqu-il,'Y. tbecourt cannot go outside of the complaint; that the allegati'OOs of the. petition for removal cannot be used in aid of this inquiry. On the other hand, the 90unsel for theCoosaw Company, with equal learning and force, insist that as they seek the jurisdiction, and as the plaintiffs seek to escape it, they must not depend upon the allegatioDsof the. complaint; but that it is not only incumbent upon them, it is their right, to show the grounds ofjurisdiction, and that they can for this purpose use the allegations of the petition for removal. first, confining ourselves to the complaint without We Will any reference to. the allegations of the petition for removal, does it appear that. a federal question is involved in the case made by it? That is to say, suppose the parties are heard here on the complaint alone, without any. answer or plea setting forth facts not in the com plaint, would the federal ql1estion arise? Could the court entertain' the question, was there a contract between the state and the Coosaw Company? Has the state by legislation sought to.impair its Obligation? There are certain matters in all causes of which:courts will of themselves take notice, and which, therefore, need. not be pleaded or proved. Wharton on Evidence (sectioll 277) thus expresses it: "Certain, .facts or conclusions from 'filcts, however, may be noticed, which may be styled'non-evidentia,J.' from the tact· that they arenot proper objects of evidence, that consequently they may be judicially noticed by the courts." .
·
Story, in his Equity Pleading, (section 24,) says:
808
FEDERAL REPORTER,
. '''On the other hand, the plaintiffs need not, and indeed should not, slate in the bill any of which the court'is bonnd, jUdicia1!y, to take notice, or is supposed to, possess full knowledge, " Hence it need not state of law, .. .. , or recite public acts or laws, or aver facts, which the cO,urts are bound, judicially, to know. ,'" ..... A strong illustration of this general rule may be found in the right and duty of the courts of the United States to take judicial notice '" .. '" in an especial man ner of all tile laws and jurisprUdence of the several states in Which they exercise an original or an ap· jurisdiction." , , , <1 Chit. PI. 215, says: ;, statutes and the facts which they rl'cite or state must be noticed by theconrts without their being stated in pleading, and it is only necessary to state facts which will appear to the to be affected by the statutes. " , And these text-writers are fully sustained by the courts. "The law of any state of the Union, whether depending upon statutes or judicial <;>pinion, is a matter of which the courts of the United Swtesare bound to take noth,e,without plea or proof." Lamar v. Micou, t14U. S. 218, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857. In Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 625, is an application of the rule. "The next objection," suys the court, "was that the copy of the original bill Of sale of the slaves to Hull, on record in the notary's fice, was not evidence, unless the plaintiff accounts forthenon-production of the original. The validity of this objection depends upon the eonsidel'ation whether the non-production of the originalwassufficiently accounted for. It was not accounted for by any proof offered on behalf ()f the plaintiff, and, unless the cil'cuitcourt of the· United States could judicially take notice of the laws of Louisiana, there was nothing before of iheoriginal was the court to enable it to say that the l;l,ccounted for. We are of the opinion that the circuit court was bound to take· judicial notice 'or the law' of Louisiana. * * " , ' It is to be judicially taken notice of in the same manner as the laws of the United States are taken notice ofin these courts;" ' In U. S.v. Randall, Deady, 524, "the courts of theUIiited States take Judicial notice of the acts of congress, and, they l).eed, 'not be set forth or specially referred to in any proceeding before them)' In Gardner v. CoUector, 6 Wall. 499, "the c<?urts take judicial notice ofthe public statutes, and this notice extends, not only 'to the existence of the statute, but to the time when it takes effect, and to its true construction." In Starr v. Moore; 3 McLean, 354, "in this court it is not necessary to plead or prove a state statute. " In Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 167, "the provision of the act of incorporation that it should be considered a public statute must be regarded in courts of justice, and its enactments' must be noticed without being specially pleaded." . See, also, CheeVf!l' v. WilBon,9 Wall. 121; Armstrong v.U. S., 13 Wall. 154. The public laws of a state must be known to and be in the mind of every judge exercising jurisdiction within that state, not only as to tlleir existence, ,but as to their construction. When a right, privilege, ,or, duty is given tb or imposed upon any person, natural or artificial, by a public act, such person can pursue such right, privilege, or duty in the courts, and the courts will, without pleading, producing, or referring to the act, lJecognizeand. enforce it. I,t accompanies the
STATE 11. COOSAW MIN. 00.
809
person into court, throwing light upon, explaining, sustaining the record; is, in effect, a part of the record. So in this case, when the five relators, styling themselves the "Board of Phosphate Commissioners," bring into court their complaint, or it comes before the court in any way, using the name of the state, concerning the use of the property of the state, assertingthe. right to control that property, and especially the right to interferewith the claim of the Coosaw Mining Company to property on which that company set up an exclusive privilege under grant, praying the assIstance of the court to aid them in their control, protection, and disposition of the state's property, the courts are bound to take judicial notice of the act of1890, which confers on them these powers,and to take such hotlee of its :o.wn motion. Not.only would it be but it would be improper, to plead the statute, or to produceitas their authority .. StOl'y, Eq.P1.'§.24. So, also, the court will take judicial notice of the act-of 1876,specially mentioned in the pleadin/1;.The court'mustopenilhe statute Wok, and look into these acts. . In the language of MARSHALL., C. J·· in:Marbury v. Madiaon, 1 Cranch, 179: "If they 'Can open it·ilt ell, what part of it are they forbidden to read?" Thus, there are present before the court with this coniplaint two acts of the legislature of South Carolina. One of them, :say the defendants, creates a contract between them and. the state,; giving them certain exclusive .rights >in state territory. The other creates the board .which the relators' claim to be; by its several provisions, seekS to clothe them with ;powers ing these contract rights of defendants,and by general. repeoling clause seeks to destroy .them altogether.' Thus there is made in this way, going no' further than the complaint,and the.acts which ineotltemplation· of law accompany and illustrate it, an issue which raisea'Q federal question, and would be proper for the jurisdiction of this c{!)tlft. But· is the, court, in seeking to ascertain whether a cause is ,removable, confined tothaallegations of the complaint? Is it precluded from examining the petition for removal? When a petition for removal and bond are filed in the state court the cause is removed. Steam-Ship eli. v, Tugma'1l,:106 U. S. 118, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58. When the record is filed in this court the case will be remanded to· the state court, if it shaUappear to the satisfaction of the circuit court of the United States "that Buch· suit does not really andsu1;>stantially involve a dispute or, controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the said circuit court.", Act 1875, Supp. Rev. St. 175. And this question the circuit court determines for itself finally. Act 1888, 25 St. at Large. 435. The l'onrt looks into" the dispute or controversy." These words necessarily require the hearing of both sides, not the ex parte statement of one side. So. under.the act of 1789, in allcasf!8 of removal the petition for removaHs a part oftha record, and is examined by the court. Insurnnce <1>. v'. PechnCl'. 95 U.S. And under the act of 1875 it was an essential part of the record, and was always examined in determining re-movability of a suit. G'hrs01l. v. Dunhan,' 121 U. S. 426. 7 Sup; Ct. Rep. 1030. In this case it is sahi that the petition for removal forms theoflieeof plea<,l'ing. . And in v. Keyes, ,96 D·. S. 20:l,
its
810
i
voL 45.
8uchplea;ding is requwed. . this mustlbe So frOD:1 the very nature The judiof the removal cial power,was ;granted to the coutts ofthe United States for the common and equal benefit of all the people of the United Stlltes." It was not to exer{lised for the benefit ,of partiesiwho might be plaintiffs, andwho<wouldelect thenationalforuD:1, bu,hllSQ fot the protection of defendantB'who .might be entitled to try. their rights and assert their privilegesbefQre the same forum;" Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 348. Ifin determining. the character of the dispute or controversy we are confined to the allegations of the complaint, this right of defendant to come into the nau(j)J:1al torumwill depend, not on the dispute or controversy, but on the skill of the pleader:Whodraws. the complaint. A plaintiff who goes' into the state, court ih.a. case which really aitd substantially invol:vesadispute or <:ontroversy,. within the jurisdiction of the United States, pourt ,seeks to avoid this. court. He carefully eliminates from his pleading every fact wlD.ich:may .tend,.to give jUl'isdictionto this court. As he goes .into a coutt of genera1cjurisdiction, he canavoidthese. facts. On the face;of his complaint ,nothingean be seen showing jurisJictioI;l in this OOurk ,dRemay be:prepariag:a suit betw,een citizens of different St,ateJ;,bf,againstan offieer oLthe, United States for acts done ioan offioia,1:eapacit1, or for ,lands held udar grantsfl'Gttl'different states; inthe 'many: groundsi'or which this court could hold deed, juriadicti0Pi1" " If the court can ;loOk into the'complaint, it can never prewentld.tdrom remanding the case. The acts know any'faot,·which of cQngress ":presume" :(whether,right. or wrong we do not inquire) "that state attaobmeut'l'state :state jealousies, state interests, might Qr control,: OlrJ be supposed to obstruct or control,.the sometimes: regular administration of justice. ""i .Martin v. Hunter;. 8Upra. Rence the provisionremo¥ing fedel'al causes, into the national courts. But Wthe . position althe plaintitm defendant, however strong his convictions,however conclusive his case, however clear his right, .must stand mute.· before the· federal tribunal whose aid he seeks, and must be nts,,prejudices, jealousies, remanded to: the enCl9unter of these attachiTl and. inter.ests, dependent upon: the ,want· of skill or the grace of his adversary.' : Ii It is supposed that the uniform, practice. of federal courts in treating the petition for removal as part of the: record has been changed" by the act of 1887--88. .Under the ac1f.:of' 1875 either party could remove a s:nd a·suit could be brought in a state court in the subject-matter not have jurisdiction; and the of which. the. United States court. plaintiff:QOuld at once remove it, and under the removal act create jurisdiction.,'; Such was tl;ae case withvasuit brought by a citizen of one state, the assignee of an. unnegGitiable instrument, against the maker, a citizen ·ofano.ther state, and of the same State.as the assignor. This was an abuse of the privilege.of removaL.J 'Congl'.ess by the act of 1887-88 corrected the abuse.; .None but a defendantclin No Buit,can be removed 1I'hichis Dot within the originalijurisdiction of the circuit court. But of removal, altlJ.ough this was well no change was, made in the· I
E4'l1ATE V.-COOSAW MIN. 0'0.
811
known to congress. Indeed, in,ltmending the act of 1875, congress retainedthe.fifth section, and confirmed it. The time·for the application for removal is changed, and all elBe is retaiMd. The plaintiffs contend that if they could not have originally brought their suit in the federal court it cannot be removed. But theremdval act requires the court to examine into the dispute or oontroversy, and to determine if that is within its! jurisdiction. When a suit "brought originally into this court," the plaintiff must on the face of his complaint show jurisdiction. If he does not,the complaint will be dismissed; He may be a citizen of a different state from the defendant. He may hold lands under grant from another state. If he fail to show this on the record, he is disSo, when it is sought to remove a case from the state to the federal court, unless the defendant can in his record show jurisdiction, he will be dismissed. But as the question is as to the "dispute or controversy," if he can show in his petition that, notwithstanding the skillful statements and omissions of the plaintiff', the suit really and substantially im'olvesa dispute or eontl'Overs.r properly within the jurisdiction of this court, he will not be dismissed. This distinction clearly appears in Metcalfv. OiJ,y of WaUrtoum, 128 U. S.589, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173; It will be noticed that the'question is, does the suit involve a dispute or controversy 8ubstantially and really within this jurisdiction? That is to say, in its nature and essence, not whether as an ineident to the cause) a matter which might become a part of a defense dehor8 the record may or may not raise a federal question; but whether the real, substantial, fundamental issue made in the record, including the petition. is one over which this court by the law under the constitution has jurisdiction. To with Judge SHIRAS in Dey v. Chi,this extent, and no further) I cago, 45 Fed. Hep. 84.. courts of tbe United States since the act of 1887-88 treat the petition as partof therecord. . Statev. Railroad Co') 33 Fed. Hep.725; AU8tin v. Gagan, 39 Fed. Rep. 626; McDonald v. 31 Fed. Hep. 577; Insurant;e Co') 35 Rep. 374. See, also" Fost. Fed. Pr. § 385.· It appearing from the record in this case really involves a dispute or controversy whether the state of South Carolina has not .passed an act impairing the obligation of a contract, alleged. to·· have· been made between the said state and the defendant!'rthec:iuse ,presents a question within the orig- . inal jurisdiction of this court, (Railroad Co. v. California, 118 U. S.113. 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993,) and ,is removable. removed?·· ,This being a reThe next question is,hfj.Stbe cause movahlecase, as soon as the petition and bond were filed in the state court its jurisdiction ab!:lolutely ceased. and that of this court iInmediately attached. Railroad Co. v. 102 U. S. 135j Railroad Co. v.·Koontz) 104 U. S. 5; Steam-ShiJiC!o. v. Tugman) 106 U. S. 118) 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58jOrehorev.llailway Co') 131 U. S. 244) 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692. ... . . The question which weare asked to examine is, are there not consideratiOlls of comity and courtesy which-would induce the court to .withhold action? The petition for removal'and bond were. filed in the court
812
J1!1DERAL REPORTER,
of common, pleas for Beaufort county some days before the regular term of this court. Although it was the 'puty of the defendant temoving to bring his case to this term, (Brown v. Murray, 43 Fed. Rep. 614,) I would, in courtesy to the state court, have withheld action until it could meet and receive the petition. The course of Judge GRESHAM in Shedd v. F'uJj,er, Fed. Rep. 609, would have been followed. But it has been brought to the attention of the court that the petition and bond were presented to the charged with the case, and that be passed upon it. to the state court can now be supposed. Its nction cannot in any way affect the course of this court in determining upon the right With regard to considerations of comity, they have no place here. is one as to the right of the citizen, not as ,to the conduct oOlle: Had an actionheon brought in this court, after the jurisstate court had beJ:ln engaged over thesubjMt-r\:J.atter in auot4er thep the court could properly consider whether it ought qot t<;> th,e parties to the tribunal, first charged with the settlement 4isppw! But this iSlL case, brought in the state court, removed iPito tp'iSi, C9J.l.l't. " In petition forremoval, this court canQ<;>,t:lUoon, anY l'eHection upon the, state court. It simply considers: ,¥hetherthe petitioners have the right to the removal. If they have, reit would be a denial of right.,
FITZGERALD v.'MISSOURI PAC.
Ry. Co. et al.
D. Nebrqsk.q,. April 16, 1801.) , I.REMovd CAUSils-AME'Nnl.rENT oJ! ApPLIOATION. '. . , ··Thecase as,made by the lletition for removal and the pleadings at the time of the . removal is. t4e test of the rIght to remove; :and no amendment call be made in the \ .circuitctnirt;.sotting up grounds for removill;which were not presented to the state : .. court'oD,thembtion to remove. :' ' 21 ,FEPERAL OotrnTS-DEOISIONS 011' STATE COURTs. ' The,decisill1J, of the supreme court of the. state that a particular corporation is a, ,. state is binding on thefeperalcourt. ' .
When a consolidated company is 'formed, by. the. union. of 8evElral corporations chartered states It is a citizen .ofeach of the states which granted the . charter to any 'one of its constituent companies, and When sued in one of these states it cannot' claim the right of l'emovar on the ground that it is also a citizen of another state. ' , ' , 'SAME.. ;' . , " , . . ' ' ", i A consolidated corporation which bears the same name in three states, and has ! one board of directors and the same and operates the, road as lme euthe same purposes, exercises the same , ,tire line" and, designed ;. general corporate powers and ·fu·nctIons in all'the states, is not the same· corporation in each state. While it is a unit, and acts as a whole, in the transaction oJ its corporate business,! it is not a corporation at large, nor is it a joint corporation of the. three states..' uike all corporations, it :lIlUst have a legal d wellinl!' place, and it dweHliI in i,hree states, and is a separate ll:DQ.sinl!'le entity in each. .It is,. in 'effect, a c'orliotate having no citizenship ol. its own distinct frOm its constituent bl1t indentical with each. ' '
8/
OP CORPORATldNS-bITIZENsntp;