556
DDERAL REPORTER,
vol. 44.
MASON
v.
BEEBEE
et al.
(OWcuit Oourt. S. D. Iowa, O. D. December 17, 1890.) I. GARNISHMENT-PROCEDURE-JUDGMENT ON ANSWER.
Plaintiff, having obtained a judgment against defendant, garnished a corporation for which defendant was working, whose answer was as follows: The persons forming the corporation, among whom was defendant's Wife, agreed to devote their time and services to it withoLlt compensation; but it was agreed that defendant's wife should contribute the services of her husband instead of her own, and that, if necessary, $25 a week was to be paid to her for her living expenses. This sum was paid her for a given time, but there was never any agreement whereby the corporation was to pay defendant anything, or Whereby it employed him at p,ll, except as a substitute for his wife, under said agreement. Betd, that plaintiff was not entitled to judgment on the answer, ,as it does not on its face show any liability of the garnishee 00 defendant. Where defendant is a resident of Illinois, and wages due him were earned there, the sitU8 of the debt is Illinois, though plaintiff may have garnished the debtor while be was in Iowa, and by virtue of the principles of comity the Iowa court will apply the Illinois exemption laws tOJluch wages. Limiting Mooney v. Railroad 00., 60 Iowa, 346, 14 N. W. Rep. 343.
. . S.UIE-CONFLlCT OF
At LaW. Motion by plaintiff for judgment on answer of garnishee. W. S. (]lark, for plaintiff. J. H. Jones, for garnishee. SRIRAS, J. The plaintiff herein obtained judgment in this court 'against J. T. Beebee and 1. N. Rice for the sum of $449.85, on which execution was issued, and service thereof was had by garnishing the Rice-Hinze Piano Company,a corporation created under the laws oflowa. J. C. Macy, the president and treasurer of the company, answered the garnishment on behalf of the company, and the plaintiff now moves for judgment on such answer, claiming that it appears therefrom that the garnishee, since the service of the writ of garnishment, has paid for the benefit of 1. N. Rice, one of the execution debtors, the sum of $500, which amount should have been held tor the benefit of the execution plaintiff. In the answer on behalf of the garnishee the following facts are stated: 'rhe Rice-Hinze Piano Company was organized at Des Moines, Iowa, in March, 11;89, and continued the manufacturing of pianos at that place until about the 1st of June, 1890, when the factory was removed to Chicago. The capital stock of corporation was fixed at the sum of $2.5,000, of which J. C. Macy owned $22,000, and Mrs. L. E. Rice, wife of owned $1,000, and Mrs. Hinze $2,000; that it was agreed that 'the members of the company should devote their time and services to the work of the company without .compensation; that when Mrs. Rice subscribed for her shares of stock, it was agreed that she should contriuutethe time and services of her husband in place of her own, und that ifit became necessary the company should pay her, for her living expenses, the sum of $25 per week; that so long as the business was carried on at De Moines no payments were made her. but after the rpmoval to Chicagoweekly payments of $25 were made to her. Touching any arrangement between
V. BEEBEE.
557
the company and I. N. Rice personally, the answer of Mr. Macy is as follows: "Neither the Rice-Hinze ,.company, nor myself, as its representative,nor myself individually, nor no other person representing either the company or myself, has ever made any arrangements) direct or otherwise with I. N. Rice, or anyone representing him. for his services, except as hereinbefore stated; that is, that Mrs. Rice should contribute the services of her husband to the company in place of her own services. 'fhe money that is paid to Mrs. Rice is charged to her account on the books of the company, and 1. N. Rice has absolutely nothing to do with the matter. He is not employed by the company, is not working for the company, and is not paid by the company. He is simply sent there by Mrs. RICe to represent her interests, and to fill her position, and to do the work which, nnder the agreement made when said company was organized, was to be done by her, and which would be done by her if she were able and capable of doing it." On part of plaintiff it is argued that it is fairly inferable from the whole of the answer made on behalf of the garnishee that the arrangement made between Mrs. Rice and the company is merely a means of hiring 1. N. Rice, and for his services paying the agreed sum of $25 per week. It is not to be denied that there is much force in the argument,' and it may be true, as claimed, that the real purpose of the arrangement was to secure the services of 1. N. Rice for the company at the ptice named, payment therefor to be made to his wife as a means of avoiding the claims of creditors, but I do not think the court is justified in so finding upon this motion. To entitle an execution plaintiff to a judgment against a garnishee upon his answer alone, it must clearly appear that the liability exists. It is said by the supreme court of Iowa, in Morsev. Marshall, 22 Iowa. 290, that "in order to charge a garnishee on his answer alone there must be in it a clear admission of a debt due to, or the possession of money or attachable property of, the defendant. * * * If it be left in reasonable doubt, whether he is chargeable or not, he is entitled to a judgment in his favor." The same rule is reiterated in Church v. Simpson, 25 Iowa, 408; and Hibbard v. Everett, 65 Iowa, 372, 21 N. W. Rep. 683. In the answer of the garnishee in this case there is not only not a clear admis.'lion of a debt due, but an absolute denial of any liability whatever. True, these general statements are accompanied with details intended to show the actual arrangement between the parties, and if these details, iitirly construed, showed a liability on part of the garnishee, it would be so adjudged, notwithstanding the general denial of liability. The diffi{lulty is that if we accept as true the statement of the arrangement as made by the garnishee, it does not necessarily show that the company' has been indebted to 1. N. Rice in the past, or will become so in the future. Suppose the answer had stated that Rice worked for the company, giving his entire time and services thereto, but that the agreement was that he should do so without receiving any payor compensation therefor, would the court be justified in rendering a judgment figai'nst the company for what it might deem was the reasonable value of suchservices, upon the argument that no reasonable·man would make''8ucn'an:
558:,
FEDERAL :BJill'1JR'l'E;R. vol.
44.
it must be a ,mere cover I1nd Clearly not, it seems to me. If issue is taken' upon the answer of the garnishee, and fact of insolvency, andany aqd all.other circumreal situation 'of the parties is then, upthe court will adjudge the matter. according to the fair preponderance of the entire evidence, but upon a motion for judgment upon the anSWer alone the facts stated in the answer must be accepted as true, and the conclusion they require must be the one placed upon the answer: "Therestllt of a judgment in favor of plaintiff would be to compel the garnishee to pay to the plaintiff the 'sum of $500, while it is not made to appear from the answer that if Rice had sued, in his own behalf, the piano company, he would be entitled to any judgment against thie company. If this was an action by Rice against the company, and the only evidence offered was the testimony of Macy, president of the defendant, containing just the facts and f:tatements set forth in the the garnishee, it is clear that he could not recover thereon agaJnsUhecompally, and that for the reason that it did not appear that the QO,II1panywas bound, to him for the work he had done, but, on the contrary, that the company was not, bound to pay him for his services. I do notthin)t the liability of the garnishee is so clearJy as to justi(y a judgm:ent against it. , it should bEl held, according to the contention of plaintiff,that). N. Rice is in fact engaged as a Joreml\n or superintendent in the factory at 'Chicago, and that the company, for such services, has engaged to.: ,Pl\Y the price or wagt's of wepk, the mode of payment testified, being Ulerl,'!y a sham, then the question arises whether such salary oJ;,wages is not exempt from execution. Rice is a married man, and head;()fa family ,and pnder the statutes of Illinois, as well as under his wages are exempt from executioJl, unless allowed ,tp accu,rnulate beyond $.10 in amount in Illinois or beyond 90 d,ays in Iowa. of plaintiff it is contended that liS Rice is now non-resident of the state o(lowa, his wages are not exenlpt from exeIna gelwral s,ense5t is held that matters of exemption pertain to the remedy, and are by thelaw of the state wherein suit is bropght, but the ,reason for holding is that the property sought to I.'eaChedis situated where ;the remedy js song!:Jt, and in truth it is the sitm of the property that,d(jtermines what statute shaJI govern in the matter of exemption.' $pin4le v. U. S. 542-546, 4 Sill'. Ct. Rep. As to allp1!operty situated in Iowa, it is the law of Iowa determines what pOl'tion of it, if any. may be held exempt from Thereforeit ispeld that the provisions of the statute of lllibe invoked to protect property in lo.}\Ja from seizpre,upqn though the causeo!" action may have arisen in Illinois, apd between of that Newel/, v. Hayden, 8 Iowa, 140. ,,(', ., ,', :1 The whetherJl1epropertyor debt soup;httQbe reach,edpy the,proqesspLgarnishment in tbis, caille .issittlsted in Iowa orin, i' IJ)QQl, Q,n!>wer of' tpe g/lrnjshee itappears tha,t the fae-
'MASON '11. BEEBEK.
'J
559
tory of tbepiltno company is situated in Illinois; the work done by 1. N. Rice was so done and performed in Illinois; the weekly payments were made to him in Illinois, and he is a resident of that state. As the weekly wages were earned and came due" the debt thus created was the property of 1. N. Rice, and, as a chose in action, "follows the per,son of the owner and hits its Bitus at his domicile." Tappan v. Bank, 19 Wall. 490. It is equally true that personal property may be held to have a situs other than that of the owner's domicile. Based upon this fact the supreme court of Iowa, in Mooney v. Railroad Co., 60 Iowa, 346, 14 N. W. Rep. 343, held that, under the attachment laws·of Iowa, a debt due from the railway company to a resident of Nebraska,for wages earned in Nebraska, was a debt due in the state of Iowa, in such sense that a garnishment in attachment would give jurisdiction to the court, and further, that, the debt having a locality in Iowa, the question of exemption was to be determined by the law of Iowa, and, as the 'provisions of that law did not apply to non-residentS, the attachmentered.itorcould ,hold the debt,although by the statute of Nebraska it would have been exempt. It seems to me that the attention of the court could ,not have been fully given to the latter propositioDibut it is assnmoo to necessarily follow from the ruling that the presence of the debtor iii Iowa gave the debt a location in Iowa sufficient to sustain juriAdiction byattachment in the Iowa The Bitus' of property for the pUrpose of jurisdiction is one thing, and its aitWJ for the purpose of determining .the rights of parties thereto is another, and the two are not necessarily the same. ' Ldo not think the reasoning of the court in the Mooney Que,uponthe 'point that a debt due from ,a person living in Iowa may be reached by upon attachment, under the proyisions of the Iowa statute, and thel'Aby jurisdiction may be acquired over the ,debt considered l:ts .property,' can be successfully questionedibut even if there might be another Side to. the argument, yet that decision settles the law to be that a debt d.e from a person in Iowa tOll. non-resident may be deemed to be property in Iowa, within the meaning of the attachment laws of the state, so that by garnishing the debtor in Iowa jurisdiction can be sa-cured in ,the attachment proceedings. The jurisdiction thus secured ,enables the court from which the writ issued to hear and determine llll claims made touching the property, and to subject it to further process of the court. Does it .follow that because the debt has a situs in Iowa, ,by reason of. the presence. of the debtor in Iowa, sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of the court in attachment, that it may not be shown to have .anothermtu8 with regard to other questioll,sand rights? To property thus seized by attachment a !lozen claims may be asserted., and the, rcourt can bear and determine the thus presented. A lien for taxes may be asserted against the property, and the cdurtwill determine the aitus of the for purposes of taxation in detlmIlining ·the·question of· the priority,of the lien for taxes. The gar1'lishee may present questions touching.· the ,extent of his liability\' aM ,these. the court !\,ilLdetermine with regard tb· the lawoi the, place' bf,con-
560
FEDERAL REPORTER,
tract 01" performance as the . case may require. It cannot be true that simply because the court originally obtained jurisdiction by garnishment upon attachment, the court is precluded from ascertaining the proper sitU8 of the property with regard to other rights and questions that may be asserted to the property. The jurisdiction of the court having attached, then all other questions are to be decided upon their own merits, and just the same as though the jurisdiction had attached by means other than by attachment. In the case at bar the jurisdiction was obtained by personal service upon I. N. Rice in Iowa, and the garnishment was had upon execution, and not upon attachment. Certainly it cannot be true that the question whether the debt due Rice for wages earned in Illinois is or is not exempt from seizure in Iowa is to be determined or influenced by the fact that the garnishment was upon attachment rather than upon execution. The real question is whether Rice can claim the benefit of the Illinois upon the ruling as to the sitU8 of the propexemption, and this erty with reference to the exemption laws, and not upon any difference between the process of attachment or of execution under the statutes of Iowa., ' The jurisdiction of the court in a given case having attached, whether based upon personal service or upon service of a writ of attachment by garnishment, then the court can determine whether the attached property,ehould be sold upon execution or be released because exempt from for debt, and this question should be determined the salDe in a case wherein jurisdiction rests upon a garnishment as in a case wherein personal service was had upon the defendant within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The query is, what is to be deemed to be the aitus, with regard to the exemption law of Illinois, of a debt due for wages earned in Illinois by a resident of that state? Why not, to such a case, apply the general rule that a chose in action has its aitus at the domicile of the owner thereof? True, it may be said that this is a fiction of the law which will, in many instances, be disregarded. Is it, however, any more of a fiction than to hold that the situs of the debt is wherever the debtor may be found? Fiction or not, it is the primary or general rule, and will govern unless good reason exists for adopting some other guide. What principle is there, or statutory provision, which requires the holding that the exemption afforded by the Illinois statute to wages due: should be lost to a resident of that state simply because the debtor happened to come, for a single day, into Iowa, and was here garnished upon execution? If a resident of Illinois buys realty in Iowa, or sends personal property, like cattle or horses, Into Iowa to here remain, he, bY'his own act. subjects the property to the laws of Iowa, and is conclusively bound thereby. If A., a resident of Illinois, engages in the service of B., likewise 'a resident of Illinois, his wages, if he is a head of a family, are exempt to the amount of $50. B. comes to Iowa for a temporary purpose, and is garnished <?n an execution against A. issuing from a court in Iowa. Did B., by coming to Iowa, without the knowledge, perhaps, of A., change the sitU8 of A. 's property. to-wit, the sum due him for wages,Bo that the benefit of the exemption secured to
MASON V. BEEBEE.
561
him by the Illinois law is thus lost to him? Is the situ8 of A. 's property, to-wit, the debt due him for wages earned in Illinois, changed back and forth every time B. chooses to cross the Iowa state line? Why not hold that the situs of the property, in view of the exemption laws, remains unchanged at the domicile of the owner of the chose in action? But it may be said that it is only on the principle of comity that Iowa will recognize and give force to the laws of another state. This may be true, but if the basis of recognition be comity only, it is, nevertheless, the fact that recognition should be given to the laws of a sister state, when justice and fair dealing require it, unless the right claimed is contrary to public policy or some statutory or other established rule of law in Iowa. The statutes of Iowa, in this regard, are in entire accord with thoRe of Illinois. It is the Rettled policy of Iowa to exempt the wages earned by the head of a family. No ground, therefore, exists for refusing to recognize the law of Illinois on the theory that such recognition would contravene the rule prevailing in Iowa on that subject. The supreme court of Iowa, in Teager v. Landsley, 69 Iowa. 725, 27 N. W. Rep. 739, held that the courts of Iowa would, by injunction, restrain a citizen of Iowa from prosecuting a suit by attachment irJ Minnesota against another citizen of Iowa, and by garnishment reaching a debt due for wages earned in Iowa. It was held that the jurisdiction to issue the injunction is founded on the clear authority vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction, "to restrain them from doing acts which will work injury and wrong to others, and are contrary to equity and good conscience," it being further said that "the settled policy of this state is to exempt certain property from the payment of debts. Con.tracts are made and credit extended with full knowledge of the law in this respect, and the state, we think, has the power to compel its citizens to the laws beyond its territorial limits. " If it is the settled policy of this state that wages earned' in this state, and exempt h:om execution under the laws thereof, will be protected from seizure in Illinois whenever the courts of Iowa can afford such protection, by enjoining the creditor from prosecuting his suit in Illinois, and this for the reason that it is contrary to equity and good conscience to permit the creditor, by f:luing in Illinois, to evade the settled policy of Iowa in exempting wages from seizure for debt, why should the courts of Iowa encourage citizens of Illinois to come into this state for the purpose of evading the settled policy of the iaws of Illinois by subjecting, through the process of Iowa courts, wages earned in Illinois, and exempt by the laws of that state. to the payment of their claims? Is it consistent for the courts of Iowa to forbid, by injunction, its own citizens from suing in Illinois for the purpose of evading the exemption laws of Iowa, ana at the same time entertaining suits by citizens of Illinois brought here for the purpose of evading the exemption laws of Illinois? If this becomes the settled doctrine in Iowa, and is accepted as the correct rule of law, it must be expected that the adjoining states will adopt the same principle in dealing with the citizens of Iowa, anel what will be the necessary consequences? Thousands of men are in the employ of the forv.44F.no.8-36 .
FEDERAL Rll:PORTER,
eign and other in this state.Under'the 6i Iowa. wages are to heads of families. If the rule announced in Mooney v. Railroad 00., BUpra, is carried out, without modification, the protection intended to be secured to the families of the wage-earners, by the exemption law of the state, is practically destroyed. A creditor can go to Illinois orWisconsih, bring suit by attachment, garnish the railway company, !lnd defeat the Iowa exemption on the fiction that the debt -due from the corporation has a situs'in the state wherein suit is brought. 'It may be, ans\vered that the Iowa courts will enjoin the creditor from 'so doing under the rule followed in the Teagcr Case. The creditor rriay not reside in Iowa, or, ira resident,he may absent himself from the state, So that personal 'servi(:e cannot be had un.tilthe attachment suit is disposed of, or by the easy device of selling the claim to a non-resident ,the effect of an injunction may be avoided. At best, the cost of an injun'ction sult renders that form of protection valueless to the wage-earner. Practiclllly, therefore,the doctrine laid down in the Mooney Case strips ,the families of workmen in lowaof the protection the statute intended to give them. By holding, as that case seems to do, that the situs of a debt dUe for w!lges earned in Iowa,' ib' regard to this matter of exemption, is to be deemed to be wherever thedebtor may be found for pur'poseo! it follows that the creditor' ,of the'workmell evade the Iowa statute by the simple device of bringing. or causing to be brought, suit in, an adjoining state; ,T4e, injustice and ,idequity of suuh a result" it. seems to me, may he avoided by holding that when,' by 'garnishment Upon execution or attachment', it is sought t6 reach a debt due for.wllg6s, the court has' the right to determine whetherthedebt is or is not exemp1from seizure uponjudicial process, a.rld that in the determination of this question the sitUs,of the debt will ;be deemed to be at the domicile bi the by whose labor the property. i. e., the debt due him,\\'ascreated. In the case of corpora'tlons carrying on, busIness in earned' will' be by the law of the place where the workman has his domicile, according to the primary rule regarding the location of choses.iri action. !fa workman, living in Iowa, eatriswages in Iowafdrwork donefor a foreign corporation, the question of the exemption ,'crr non-exemption of such wages should be governed by the law of Iowa, no matter where the tribunal may be located that is reqilired to hear and determine the question. Is there any reason, either"in matter of form or of substance, that prevents courts from adjudgibg, in such cases; the rights of parties, according to the law of Iowa, or the law-of Illinois,as the case may be? ] can see no difficulty in so doing. For illustration: ",suppose suit is brought in Iowa ,by attachment, against a non-resideilt,and service is had by garnishing a supposed debtor living in Iowa. The garnishee answere that he is, indebted to the defendan:tfor goods sQlq him on credit in and for for work donaln by the defendant, '8 resident of Illinois,in another ainoutit:"A thh'dpilrty-appears, and, being allowed to intervene, sets up' that the, debt d4e Irotlithe garnishee for goods soldliad been assigned to him for value' before ., ' of the ,:.!' !!; ,.
563
writ of and therefore creditor could not subject that debt to ,execution. The defendant in the attachment suit also appears, and sets up that the debt due from the garnishee for work done was for wages earned in Illinois for work done therein, he (the defendant) being the head of a family, and therefore the wages are exempt. Would not the court be charged with the duty of hearing and determining both the issues thus presented? In passing upon the chim of the intervenor, would not the court ascertain the facts of the transfer, and, finding that it had been made in Illinois, where both the defendant and the intervenor lived, would not the court apply the law of Illinuis, in determining whether a legal and valid transfer. of the debt had been made, and would it be debarred from viewing the fact of the transfer in the light of the Illinois law, simply because the suit in Iowa had been brought by attachment and garnishment? If, then, it appeared that a valid transfer of the claim had been mfl.de, according to the law of Illinois, belore service of the writ of garnishment, would not the intervenor defeat the attachment? Comin!!, now, to the issue as to the wages earned iilIllinois, the court would, in like manner, ascertain the lacts; and, it being made to appear that by the law of Illinois wages earned by heads of families are exempt from execution; that the attachment defendant lived in Illinois, and by working for the garnishee in Illinois had earned certain wages due anti payable in Illinois; and that he was the head of a family, and was such when the wages we,re earned,-then the question would arise as to the law that should be applied in determining the question of exemption. The law exempting wages from execution goes upon the principle that the family of the workman has an interest therein, and the protection of the statute is afforded only to wages earned by the heads of families as distinguished from person8 not 80 situated. ' Practically the exemption statutes, both of Illinois and Iowa, assign to the families the wages earned by the head thereof; and in Tell.ger v. Landsley the wife joined with the husband in suing out the injunction sustained in that case. Why should not the court, then, hold that when the wages were earned in Illinois by a resident head of a family, the statute of Illinois practically assigned the debt due for the wages tht'ls earned to the family, and that the same fprce should be !/;iven to such statutory assignment as to a written assignment to a third party as against a 'writ of attachment in another state against the head of the family alone? But, aside from all refinements of this nature, upon the true principles of that enlightened comity that should exist betweell the sister states 'of this Union, it seems clear to me that the courts of Iowa should give full recognition to the policy of the Illinois statute, which is in hli.rmonywith that of Iowa, which is that the wagps earned by the head of the family belong to the family, and cannot be seized for the debt of any member thereof, and that the, beneficent purpose of the statute cannot be evaded by the of crossing the state line and bringingsuit in the courts of a.n adjoining state. The benefits of the exemption thus provided can be saved to all without trenching upon the !a.\Ys oj' the state. jurisdiction conferred by the
564
to be decided is not one of the jurisdiction of the court, but of the right of the family to wages earned, a right to be settled by the law of the place where the workman lives and performed the work which created the debt. I have been drawn into this lengthy discussion of this question because of the conviction that the rule deduced from the Mooney Case, if carried out to fullest extent, will work an unnecessary hardship to the very class of Iowa citizens which the Iowa statute was enacted to protect. For this reason I have argued the proposition at when it might have been sufficient, for the purpose of the present case, to have held that in a controversy in fact between non-residents of Iowa this court was free to determine the rights of the parties according to the law of the place where the wages were earned, it not being a question arising under any statute of Iowa. If, then, it be held that in fact the sums paid weekly to Mrs. Rice, by the garnishee, were so paidns wages earned by her husband, according to the con:timtion of plaintiff, yet as it also appears that the wages were earned in Illinois, at the place of residence of Rice and his family, the conclusion would be that under the Illinois statute such wages are exempt from execution, and the garnishee is not liable to respond to the plaintiff herein for the amounts thus paid. For these reaSQllS the garnishee is discharged.
TELANDER tl. SUNLIN
(C(rcuit Court. D. Minnesota, Fourth Dtvision. January 18, 1891.)
1.
MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-FoREMAN'S AUTHORITY.
Where an employer places an employ!' as foreman in charge of a pieoe of work requiring several days' labor, away from his own factory, and of such a nature as may reasonably be supposed to require the use of appliances for raising and lowering a heavy piece of iron, but does not furnish such appliances, tbe foreman has implied authority to provide blocks and tackle by borrowing or otherwise, and if he obtains and uses insuffici.ent ones, whereby a workman under his control, without fault on his own part, is injured, the employer is liable. The fact that at the commencement of the work sufficient blocks and tackle were in the required position, and were used by the foreman in doing part of the work, does not rebut the presumption of authority to procure what was needed, when such blocks and tackle were placed there by a third person, who had borrowed them for his own use in doing a different part of the work, and Who afterwards removed them. ' ,
2.
SAME.
a.
SAME-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Plaintiff was working in a dark place, on the interior' of a large iron hoop, when the latter was raised and held suspended by rope and tackle, and he was directed to remove some dirt and stones from underneath it., While doing so the rope broke, and his hand was injured. He testified that he had a monkey-wrench in his hand, but it was crooked, and he could not use it, and that he was remOVing a stone weighing four or flve pounds with bis hands when the injury occurred. Held no sufficient proof of contributory negligence to warrant the court in dlrecting a verdict.
At LaW.
On motion for:a new trial. '