518 "
'fl "
"J
BRdDHlUD
v. f
SHOEMAKER
et al. '
(Circuit cP'U11t. N. D. Grorgw.. December 26. 18llO.) " . , . , .
,'I' "
.,. REMOVAL
" .
Undel' Act! Cong. Aug. 18, 1888, (25 St. at Large, 438,) which provides that removals. ,on the ground of prejudice or local influence may be had "at any time be,fore the 'trial; n the removal)& not too late if the case, though it has been once de, 'elided, is yet to be tried dll n(YVo in the appellate tribunal'before a jury. &SAME-A,PPLIC&TION-TRAVERjIE.
a.
Under Code Ga. §§ 2424,2427, which provide for the probatlrlg of a will In Bolemn by a pt'oceeding inrer. part!l8 which 18 conclusive as again8t those conte8ting the will, Bucha proceeding ls,8 suit within the meaning of the removal 8tatutes.
or
. ,
,
PROOEEDfNlJ·
.
BAM!I:';"'LocAL PREJUDICE:"'TiME OFAl'PLIOATION.
A petitlonfor removal on the ground of local prejudice, when in proper form and dulyvoi'ified, cannot be'tril.versed or contradicted by the adver8e party. Following COOp6'/' v. RailroadO()., 42 Fed. Rep. 6117. On motion to. remand.
:.<rhe
In Equit)'"
..he. ,I\nd
BRODHEAD '11. SHOEMAKER.
!
IH9
tered, but by the consent of the adverse parties.. Sec. 3630. 'Ail arpeals to the superior court shall be tried b)' a special jury.at the first term after the appeal has been entered, unless good cause be shown fOl' continuance." On the 21st of February, 1889, Robert SJ Brodhead filed a petition in the office of theorciinary of Floyd county,Ga., showing that his wife, Susan A. Brodhead, lately domiciled in and a resident of said county, departed this life on the 17th day of February, 1889, after having heretofore, to-wit, on the 22d day of October, 1887, made, executed, and published her last will and testament, wherein petitioner is nominated and made sole executor j and petitioner, said executor, produces said last will and testament, and prays that the Sl\me may be probated and admitted to record as pr6vided by the statute, etc. Thereafter, on the .4th day of March, 1889,' ,after dUe proceedings had;' said last will and testament of Susan A. Brodhead was admitted to probate in common form under the statute hereinbefore cited, and letterf testamentary were ordered to be issued to the said Robert S, Brodhead, as sole executor nominated in eaid will. Thereafter, od thtl 19th day of March, 1889, the said .RobertS. Brodhead filed 'with said ordinary a petition setting forth the death of said Susan A. Brodhead j her last will and testament j the fact that she left no ,chjl-: dren; that petitioner is her Bole heir at law, and entitled to all her real and personal estate; that she left no:heirs at law in the state of Georgia other than petitioner, but did leaveth'ree heirs at law by the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, to-wit, peiitioner, and Jane H. Shoe.: maker, and Elijah McB. Shoemaker.thetwq latter of the state of Pennsylvania, in which last-named state deceased is alleged to have left tain property in the nature of annuities, alleged to be personal property., Petitioner alleged that the said last will and testament had already been probated in common form , and, producing the will, prayed that it might be proven in solemn form according to the 'statute hereinbefore cited,' To that erid he prayed that the heirs at lllW: of said decea$ed,to-wit, Mrs. Jane H. Shoemaker and Elijah McB. Shoemaker, be cited to in the said court of ordinary on the first Monday of the month of May following, to show cause, if any exists, why 'said will should not' be' proven in solemn form, and admitted to record as the last will and tes-· tament of said deceased. 'J'hereupon an order was made that the stid Jane Shoemaker and Elijah McB. Shoemaker, residents of Wilkesbarre, Pa., should appear before the court of ordinary at Floyd coutity on the first Monday of May following, then a,nd there to show cause, etc.; and it was further ordered that the said heirs at law be served personally with a. copy of the petition and order, at tbeirresidence, or by,scrvice on their attorney at law, and also by publication. Thereupon Jane H. Shoemaker and Elijah McB. Shoemaker appeared in the said court' of ordinary, and filed a: demurrer totbesaid petition; and 'de-' murrer was overruled they appeared as caveators,.and in theirsaid caveat, denied the of the court of the county of l,i'!oyd,. on the ground that the only residence of thedflceased. in the smW,of Georgia was ,the county of Fulton, wherein she left personal property,'
n.
-520
I'EDERAL REPORTER,
vol. 44·
.and afterwards, without waiving the said caveat filed on the jurisdictional ground, did further caveat the application to prove in solemn form, and for grounds, alleged: "(1)· That on October 22. 1887, the date when said paper purp()rting to be -a will was executed, the said Susan A. Brodhead was not entitled 'to make a will. hecause laboring under disability of the law which arises from want of 'Capacity, in this: That she had not the capacity necl'ssary to enable her to have a decided and rational desirll as to the disposition of her property. (2) That on October 22, 1887. the said Rusan A. Brodhead WliS not entitled to make a will because laboring under disability of the law arising from a want of perfect liberty of action, in til is: That. the propounder. Robert S. Brodhead, who was her husband. exercised undue influence upon her by cruel treatment and practicing upon her fears, thus substitutiol{ his own will foJ' the of said Susan A. Brodhead; that this cruel treatml'nt consisted of t>lowlfintlicted upon her. and III III * profane lanKuage. and harsh manner, by which the will of a weak and diseased woman was absolutely con(3) That 00 the date when said papel" purporting to be the will was executed. the said Susan A. Brodhead was not entitled to make a will because laboring under disability of the law arising from want of perfect liberty of action.iJ,l this: That her said husband, the propounder, to whom nearly her entire estate, consisting of personalty and lands of very great value, was bequeathed and devised. held her in' durance of imprisonment. and by imprisonment, and the. threat of imprisonment. compelled her to execute the paper aforesaid, Whereby his wishes were substituted for the will of the said Susan A. Brodhead. (4) That on the date when said paper purporting to be the will was said Susan A. Brodhead was not entitled to make a will, because laboring undl'r disability arising from want of capacity and the want of perfect liberty of action, in this: The said Susan A. Brodhead had no children; that ghe had been for years before the date aforesaid addicted to the intemperate use of liquor and opiates to such an extent as to have impaired her mind. and to render her an imbecile, and tile prey of any designing person; that so imbecile had she become that she would yield to any directions that were ,tmpqsed upon her by any person who would supply her with liquor or opiates; that bel' will power had. been totally destroyed. and she was constan,tly subject to the fears and apprehensions which characterize that dis-, eased condition; and these weree1;llphasized bythe cruel and barsh treatment of her said husband, the propoundel' herein; that the propounder had an easy SUbject upon which to opemte. and, to secure the execution of the paper aforesaid. used fraudulent practices upon testatrix's fears, and through diseased craving for stimulants and opiates." Whereforecaveators say that"The,paper purporting to be the will of said Susan A. Brodhead is not her will. and ,should not, be admitted to probate and record." ': Thereupon, on the 6th day of May, 1889, following, the said court of ordinary entered the following: ' "Upon the hearing and petition of Robert S. Brodhead, upon the probate of solemn form of the paper pronounced by'him as the last will and testament QfSusan A. Brodhead,late of said county, deceased. and for its admission to lecorqassuch, and it appearing that the parties in interest are heirs. to-wit. Mrs, JaneH.Shoemaker. mother of the testatrix, and Elijah McB, Shoemaker" brother of the testatrix, both of the city WilkesbarrEl, Pa·· have had legal of said· application, and the time of hearing, and ha ve failed to show any'Ieg'i\1 'and sufficient cause why said· paper should oat be proven and adanl,ttEl{\·to, record as the last will and testament of said deceased, it is therefore'
BRODHEAD V. SHOEMAKER.
521
ordered and adjudged by the court, upon the proof of said last will by all the witnesses to said will, that the same be set up aB the last will and teBtament of the said Susan A. Brodhead. deceased, and that the same be admitted to record as such. It is further ordered and adjudged that letters tpstamentl\ry iSlme to the said Robert S. Brodhead. the executor named in said will, upon his taking the oath required by law." From the aforesaid judgment and decree of the court of ordinary in the case the said Jane H. Shoemaker and Elijah McB. Shoemaker, under the statute hereinbefore cited, appealed the said cause to the superior court of Floyd county, which appeal was allowed, and the ::>roper record filed in the clerk's office of said superior court of Floyd county, August 2, 1888. On October 17, 1889, the following order was entered in the superior court of Floyd c o u n t y : ' " Robert S. Brodhead, Execu tor and Propounder (If the Last Will and Testament of Susan A. Brodhead, vs.Jane H. /:3hoemaker and , Eli/ah MoB. Shoemaker.
1887.
On the 15th day of November following, Jane H. Shoemaker and Elijah McB. Shoemaker filed a petition in the circuit court of the United for the northern district of Georgia, setting forth the aforesaid the residence of Robert S. Brodhead in the state of Georgia; their own residence in the state of Pennsylvania; alleging that from prejudice and local influence petitioners will not be able to obtain justice in said state court, or in any other state court to which the said defendants may; underthe laws of the state of Georgia, have the right. on account of such prejudice or local influence, to remove said cause; that the value in dispute largely exceeded the sum of $2,000; and praying that the said suit might be removed to the circuit court of the United States for said northern district of Georgia. Together with said petition, several affidavit.s and exhibits were filed. Thereupon, on said petition, the said circuit court certifying that it being made to appear that, from prejudice and local influence, the said defendants will not be able to obtain justice in th.e said superior court of Floyd county, Ga., or in any other state court to which said defendants might, under the laws of .the said state, have the right, on sccount of and local influence, to remove said cause, it was ordered that said cause be removed; and said cause is hereby removed from said superior court of Floyd county to the circuit court of the Uni\ed States for the northern district of Georgia. The record being filed in this court, Robert S. Brodhead appeared, and moved to remand the case to the superior court of Floyd county on the following ground!,!: "(1) Because the removal was had on the ex parte petition of caveators. without notice to the propounder or his counsel. (2) Because the court Qf ordinary of Floyu county, Ga., is a court of record, having general.origln"a), and exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills. and the petition to remove said cause should have been filed in that court· prior to the trial thereiD-; and
{522
REPORTER,
vol. 44.
after the dacislon of that, Qourt on a il'eg\llar hearing thereof, and tPl( from, tbejndgment there -rendered, the petition filt>d in ;Ji'loyd superior court came'too, ,late_ (3) tllis court, no j ul'i\lQiction of this case, or ,pt the"pJ:Qbat6 of wills, or otberwise.and, can acquire none ,unQer;PIte f,emoYalact o( the for reo moval are uncertain and insufficien t in la w., and nC? allegations suffi· c\entlycertain to authorize,Qr, reqUire issue to be joined therein. (5) Because 'I>etit16li for the removal,' and the affii:hrvit of' Jane H. Shoemaker, upon which saidpetitionisb'ased,;are nottru6; movel' in' motion traversing the of said. ,petition and affidav.it." I,' J; ,I, :
UIi CI er section 2423 of the a proceeqing,to probate a wUlincomluQnforJD is a probate: pure ands\mple. the probate and ,record not being conclusive upon anyone interested in the estate adversely to the will. and, . Bef. aside 1 0bt 'protecting the executor'in any of his ,acts fur· ther than'the'paymellt'of'tll'e debts 'of )Jpder the same seqtion, and sections 2424 and 2427 of the sanle Code, a proceeding to pro.. 'bate'a:WilJoiosolemn ithm1"iSR irtier!.artes to' establish 'the 'lrilH:onciumvelyand as'a'munimeht oftitlej ,an when, in such a prOceeding;!the,heirs at llrw'Rte-brought in, and fhey cOntest the validity -of the-'will'lI.nd the CAPacity of the testator, an issue dr oontroversy is if()1med 'or 'lriadewhieh :cauJbe' claSsified as a sriitiit 'law. 'The pleadings intha'state courtsin thlis' cltseshow such controversy between the parties. Fromthemiti 'clearly that the plaintiff', or propounder, a citizen 't>f. Georgia,isseeking tOeSfablish in his favor, andcohcltlsively against tlie fle1eridantsorcaveat<lrsi Citizens ofPennsylva.nia and heirs at law of Brodbeitd;the validityt of Mrs. Brodhead's will; the said defenditntsdlmyillg the capaeity 1of,]'.1:rs, :Brodhead to make a valid will,and 'specially denyingtbe validity of the will propounded. The pleadings :frirther '8how that, depen<ient upon the controversy thus existing in the I case, depends the ownership and title to property,not ollly in the state of G1lorgitt; b'llt in the state: Of Pennsylvania. From the statutes cited, and the record oftheca.l3e as made up to the time of removal, it appears .Iierfectly cleat tMt the' pt'oceeding pending in the superior court of Floyd county,Ga., taken in ccmnection with the removal statutes of the United Stl;ltes,w'as a suit inwhtch there was a controversy removable by the defendallts to the circuih\ourt ofthe United States for the northern dis· trict' Gel;:irgia, upon compliance with the conditions in said Jretnoval sbttutesj and this, within the rule la.id down by the supreme ci1urt'ili Gai'ri68v. Fuenres;!92 U.S: 10; EUiB v. Davis, 109U. S. 485, .3 Sup.'Ct. . See,also, Boom eo. v. Patterson, 98U .S. 403; Hess jr.',Reptwlrfa" gsu. q; Rep,. 377; Payne'v; Hook, 7 Wall. , . oPlnjop; ip RoSenbaum v r, Bauer, 120 PARDEE,
i. ,(after 8tati;.g:tJtej<id8 l1$,above.)
of
S,.,4p,J., 7 Sup.
;,;
j,!'I
,"
,;
ls mnde, however, that, if the case was removable, the ap-, plication therefor, coming after appeal frpm the court of ordiJ;lary to the· superior court ofFloyd county, came too late. Code Ga. §§331,2,421, 3479,3611, 3627, 6628, 3630, show that, while the proceeding to probate a will in solemn form must be instituted in the court of ordinary' of the county in which the testator had his residence at his death, which' court of ordinary, under the statute, haSoriginl),l and exclusivejurisdic-' tion in the 111atter of probating wills, yet trial and decision ofthe ordinary is not final and conclusive upon the facts. involved, as eithellparty may appeal the matter to the superior court of the county, carrying up the whole case for a trial de novo upon new and additional evidence, and, if desirable or necessary, upon amended pleadings, and where, for the first time in the proceedings, the issues involved can be submitted to a trial by jury. Section 2 of the act of 1887, re-enacted August 13; 1888, (25 St. at Large, 433,) provides that "rehlovals of Cl(ses pending in the' state courts to the circuit courts of the United States, on the grourrdof' prejudice or loeal influence, may be had at anytime before the trial thereof." Thethird clause of section 639 of the Revised Statutes,which was the law controlling rernova')s in cases of prejudice or local influence prior to the act of 1887, pro'Vided that the removal should be onla" peti-: tionfiled at any time belore the trial or final hearingi,n the suit.',' .Under this there is a line of decisions holding that, no matter how: many previous trials might have been had in the case, the removal be had atany time before the final and efl'ective tria). See Inimrance Co. v. Dunn,.19 Wall. 214; Vannevar v. 21 Wall. 41jRailroad' Cb. v. Bates, 119 U. S. 464, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285. In the caseof;.JiliBJc v. He:natie, 82 Fed. Rep. 417, which was a case removed l1'lder the act of 1887 the ground of prejudice or local ilifluence, a/ler a number o( trials had. been had in the case, and after there had been to, the upreme court of the state, resulting in a new trial being ordered, Judge DEADY, alter considering the whole qqefition in a very able and; elaborate opinion, holds that, "the phrase I beiQre the trial,' as used in' the act of fairly construed, means. the' same as the phrl;lse in t.he' third clause of section 639, Rev. St., 'before the trial or of the suit.''' He says: ' "In the nature of things the trial of the case' is ,not anyone, but thetinal; one,-tll!, olle that stands as th!' thing accomplished. in the ease. Where a jury is without a verdkt the proceed,ng is properly known asa ·mistrial:' and where a verdict is set aside because It ought not to stand·the' result is the same.-the pruc!'edinA' has misc,lrried, and the cl1nst'qUl'nceis· Dut atrial, mistrial; lind ill the Case of removal from local p'rejudice or, influence, there is a good ,reason for gi v.ng the Don-r!'sident party 1he.rightj to make the application after a mistnal, for, as wall said by Mr. Justice.MILLEU 'in Hess v. Reynolds, 118 U. S. 75; 5 Sup: ,Ct. Rep. 377, the h'ostile local intlnence may not becOlue known or developed at an earlier stage of the proceedings.'" " We agree with th,eopinion of Judge add t() the rea- ' Bpning pll:rt of wha.t. waa said by thecb,ffl!; justice ill Yulee v. l'08ti, 99, the ,UIWe,r the act of 1866,.and!
on
u.
524:
I'EDERAL BF..PORTER I
which 'seems to be perfectly applicable to' removals for prejudice andlocal influence nnder the act of 1887: "In view 'of the fact that sornetimefl. in the progress of a cause, circumstances developed themselves which made such a transfer de8irable, when at first it did not appear to be so, the right of removal in this class of cases was kept open until the trial or final hearing, instead of being closed after an entry of appearance, as was the rule under the act of 1789. We think this gives such a party the right of removal at any time before trial, when the necessary citi1enship of his co-defendants is found to exist, and a separation of his interest in the controver!'\y can be made. There is nothing in the act to man· ifest a contrary intention, and this construction does no more than gi ve the party to whom this new privilege is g.anted an opportunitJ to avail himself of any circumstances that may appear in his favor previous to the time when be is calle!l-upon finally to act." . But tlw is specifically made in the present case that,although a cl,luae may be removed for prejudice odocnl influence after a mistrial in the state court, it cannot be removed after there has been a trial in one court,and an appeal taken therefrom to another. The jurisdictjopatac.t of 1887 says: ," Where a suit is now pending or may be hereafter brought in any state in,.which there is a controversy bef;ween a, citizen of the state in which the suit"is and a citizen of another state, thedeCendant, ueln" such citiZen of another state,illl\y remove said suit into tIle circuit .cOUlt of the l!nited States for the proper district, at any time before the trial thereof, " etc. ',This plainly reads that a suit pending for trial in the state cOurtniaybe removed, ira proper case, before the trial. If it be true, as claimed, ililit the act of 1837 was for the purpose of restricting and'limiting the jurisdiction of the United States courts, and therefore tobe strictly construed, it does not follow that the courts should insist additiona.l conditions relative to the right of removal. If the suit is,pendiIlg, in the state court, and the trial is yet to be had, and the right of removal from prejudice and local influence is not afl'ected by any numberqf preliminary trials, not conclusive on parties, previously had in court, why should the right of removal be affected by any number of prelimillaryand inconchisive trials in any other state court from which the suit has been removed by the operation of the laws of the state? In, Boom C;o. v.Patterson, supra, a case removed under the act of1875, where the petition for removal was required to be filed in the state court "before or at .the time at which said causeC1in be first tried, and before the the trial before conimissioners (the appeal from whose, decision constituted the pending suit) was held to be preliminary, and in the nature of 'an inquest; .stress being ,laid on the fact that, under the laweo! the, state, on the appeal there was to be a trial by jury. In R;essV.Reynolds, supra, a case removed under section 639, Rev. St., on acicount of pre.iudice and local influence,and where the pending ,suit was, appeal' from the decision of commissioners appointed by the probate, JJJstice MILLER, for the court, says:. .. .... . . court, ."It 'is said, h6we\- er, that the trial spokenofhad t ake,n place the Colllmissioners' of Ionia l!ounty, to, whom the calje had been referred. 'But, we d<) not 'look,atJthM pt{':)ceedingasa tl'ial within· the meaningofthe' statute·. It
an
BRODHEAD 'Ii. SHOEMAKJ!:R.·
525
was merely a report, subject to be affirmed or rejected by the probate judge, and. by the express terms of the statute, subject to a right of appeal to a court in which a trial by jury could be had. The latter was the trial or final hearing of the suit which would conclude the right of removal. and, until such trial commenced, the right of removal under this provision remained." Here, again, stress was laid upon the fact that the original proceeding was by- the statute subject to a right of appeal to a court in which a trial by jury could be had. In Pacific Railroad Removal Casta, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113, where one of the pending suits in the state courts held to be removable under the act of 1875 was an appeal from a trial before a mayor and jury, the case was held to be controlled by Boom Co. v. Patterson, supra, and that the said trial by the mayor and jury did not affect the right of removal. In the cases of Railway Co. v. Jones, 29 Fed. Rep. 193, and Mineral Range R.Co. v. Detroit &- Lake Superior per Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 515, cited with approval in the case of Searl v. School-Dist., 124 U. S. 197.8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460, which was a similar case,it was held that proceedings for expropriation instituted be-' fore comniissionersund'er special or general statutes of a state, for' assessment of damages, were -controversies removable under the federal ·statl ute to a proper circuit court of the United States; and that the removal could be properly made in the case pending before stlch .commissioners, and before any appeal to another court. In Delaware Co. v. Diebold Safe Co·· 133 U. S. 473, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399, which was a case commenced, under the Indiana statute, against Delaware county, before the board of county commissioners, and after trial before said commissioners was appealed to the Circuit court ofthe county, and thereafter removed by real son of prejudice and local infhtence· to the circuit court of the United States, the case was held removable; the court using this language: "It follows, according t\l the decisions of this court in analogous cases. that the trial in the circuit court of the county was · the trial' of the case at any time before wbich it might be removed to the circuit court of the UtlitedStates under clause 3, § 639,.Rev. St.;" citing Boom Co. v. Pattel'son; Hess v. Reyn:olds, supra; Railway Cu. v. Kansas City, 115 U. S. I, :> Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113; and Sea1'l v. School-Dist., supra. From these adjudged cases, it seems clear that, while a proper troversy may be removed under the statutes of the United States as Baon as properly made before any state tribunal, yet, where the time of removal under the statute is before the trial thereof, the removal is not' too late if the case is yet to be tried upon its merits before a state tribunal <If eitheJ' original or appellate jurisdiction; and, particularly, if such trial is to beil. jury trial; and in this connection we may U. S., Amend. 7, provides "that in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right. of by jury shall be preserved," from which we think -it a fair inference 'that the trial mentioned in the removal act refers to and was intended to! 'il'leall by jury secured by the constitution, ant still has the right to challenge the array of jurors, it cannot :bel too late to remove the cause for pr13judice and local influence. In the present case the whole case was carried futhesuperiorci>uftbfFloyd.::dbulity I
526 in whic117:oourfrthere was to be a trial de nollO with the right to present additi9na1 ievidEince and. to amend the pleadings; and, for. the first time of the cause, trial byjurywas to be had.' It is turther objected, however, to the of removalin this case, that the order of removal 'was obtained from the circuit court 'without notice to the parties, and, upon affidavits which, it is alleged; are not true. In the' Case of COoper v. Railroad Co;', 42 Fed. Rep. 697, this court held that..;...;. . . .. "Since Act March 8. 1887, which provides for the removal of causes on the ground of'localprejUdice.does not prt>seribe any mode of procedure, a petition for removal. accompanied by an affidavit by a person authorized to make it, stating. of his own knoWledge the existence of prejudice and local 1nftllence. i!!li sufficient to j an order. of remuval; aud w here such an affidavit .is the court will \lot .permitthe adverse party t() traverse it, and Will, not on thesuj.>ject." . it has been tbe rule of this court. On the whole case presented Qn· this motion; 'to remand are of opinion, for the reaBOns aIQresilid). that the. cause waS properly removed ,from the'state court to tbis court.';rhe Illotionto J"eJlland is denied.
a
d
·
we
NlllWXU.
J., ooncur8.
OmrmAt
TRUST Co. ". (!ANNISTON LoAN
&
& B. COAT" IRON & RAILWAY Co., Co., Intervenor.) N. D.December .28, 1890.) '. .·.. .··..
;
"
_ \.
.CO'Urt,1!1·· .,
'
; .
., ."
.. ,
\ .
II.
Where, by consent of all parties, the receiver. of a railroad company, though not in operating the road,' is authorized 'by order of court to issue certifioates whiQh shall CQnstitute a lieu on the company!s property superior to,certain prior mortgages, and the money obtained on such certificates.is ulled in preserving' and improving the property, the purchasers of the property at a subsequent sale to fore,'eIO&lJ,'Said UI'Ortgages are estopped from nenyillg the validity of the certificates.
....
, The receiver wlloissued the certificates,and who bas in bis hand the funds from tIley shOuld be paid it ,valid, is a necessary party defendant to suoh interven. 'tilln.; ... ,
.....
..
,.
...
I.
, travel'l!;)', aJld 110
ali! againsthilIl' "
, '..
, 'fp
" 011
to