derdisabilil1i such lis married women,: infants, and persons1l.on,comp08, therule'isioot (Bank v. Partee, 99 U. S. in general; it ma}"be true that thecapacity:of all such persons to'$ake a contract is. fully :determiqed by thejudgment of a court of competent jurisdiction:nponsuchcontract. In the cas,e of a Inunicipalcorporation acting in a representative capacity, with limited powers, a different rule IllaYQP!4ip, for reasons which it is not now nepessary, to considt'rat leQgtJ;l" 'In Broumsville v. Loa{j'Ue, .129 U. S. 493, 9 Sup., Ct. Rep. 327, where ·theact authorizing a tax to pay the bonds had been repealed, and the bonds were void, 'the remedy by mandamua was denied.Under the authority of that decision. when no issue has been made as to of the county to contract the indebtedness" it seems to doul;ltfu1 whether a judgmenhgainst a county void obligation can be, flnforced in any form. When in the pleadings.the capacity of the county to contract the indebtedneSll is put in issue,' the'judgment is con-, elusive. Har8hman v. Knox'Co.j 122 U. S. 306, 7S 11P' Ct. Rep. 1171. As}o howe,ver, the nothing ¢oncerning the judgissued\ and therefore are unable to deCIde; and, mdeed,lponly, to conSIder whether, the judgments against the county, without reference to the pleadings or proceedings in the several·'cliusas "in which they were entered, shall be taken to preclude the connty: froth saying that· the indetedness now; represented by the warrants, in suit was void under the constitution; Inmy,opi'nion,.the judgments referred to in the 'warrants in suit have not,that effect'ex vi termini, under all circumstances to forbid' inquiry as to the capacityoftlie;,eounty to contract the debts. This answer, however, is defective 'in not showing the origin of the indeb,tedness for which the judgments Vliereentered, and in not showing whether the indebtedness of the county was then in"excess of the constitutional limit,anClaIso in not showing something of the record on which each of the several judgments is founded.' For these reasons the:,demurrilr will be sustained. . ' J'
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BARtl. SClloOL-DISTBIcr.r No.7, VALLEY <;J0UNTY. (O(rcuU 001llrl, D. NebraBka. February 21. 1890.)
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,' · :",. " TM ,paYment'of interest on sooool'bonds does not estop the school-district fr()U/. de,nYIIi,g their. !her6 Itis:liOt shown that the om,cars, and people of tbe di&., .: ,trl().at tl,:l.\l: fJ.ll!, the issuaI1-ca IIond nle of t,he
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.tbepeople of a school·dl5trict to vote that;( ·honels be 1', 'l'pBcl1lc purpQs,e, suc4 So vote40es not make the 'bondS even in the haiiC180f an ml10cent pUl'ohaser. ',," .,' ,
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At LaW.L
ASHUELOT NAT. BANK! iI.lfcHOOL-DISTRICT1 NO.'7PVALLEY COUNTY.
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r: 'Morlf{JiJrfOOr:!1 k;jeffreiJ:andL.' P. Dosh,' for plairitiff!. :: Martz&- Williams and Tht'r8t<m&: HaU, for 'I : I
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. DUNJ)Y,J. On the 15th of October, 1874, triot voted in favor ofissniugbonds, to the amount of $2,000, fOf the purpose'of building and furnishing a school;,house for the use of the diS-: trict. About two years thereafter a school-honsewas erected under tract with the district, and the bonds in suit were' turned over to eontractor or his assignee in payment for the building so erected for the district. The bonds contained the name of, and purported to be issued by, the three officers of the district. 'l'he name or one of these (Ziba Ferguson) was forged to the bonds. 'l'he jury found this to be a fact, and both parties concede it to be so. The bonds, however, were delivered to the contractor or the subcontractor whoere¢ted the building, and were by him put on thenla:rket, and eventually passed into' of the Corbin Banking Company, in due cours'e o(business, after wqich the plaintiff became the purchaser, for value, and without notice of any infirmity. Taxes were levied and interest paid on the bonds for several years. in oonsequence of which it is claimed the district is estopped froni denying the validity of the bonds when in the hand,S of innocent purchasers. This suit was brought in 1883, by Mr. D. G. Hull, for the plaintiff. A jury was at one time impaneled, ahdsome progress was made in the trial, when it was discovered that Ferguson's name to the bonds was a forgery. The plaintiff thereupon moved to have the jury discharged from the further consideration of the case, which was then done. The plaintiff also moved for leave to amend the petition by adding a cotint for money had and received, and leave was given therefor; but it seems tl;1at no amendment of the petition was made. It was apparently conceded at the time that no recovery could be had on the bonds, for the reason as claimed, that the same were not the 'Valid obliof the district. I have not had my attention directed to any similar case, brought to recover on bonds to which any portion of the signatures were conceded to be forged. It may be possible, thll.tunder conditions such as we have here, the validity of the bonds should be upheld. But, as I view tliematters presented by the 'special' verdict, it is unnecessary to determine this question, which might be altogether decisive of the controversy. Very much might be said against the claim of the plaintiff "that the defendant is estopped from setting up the invalidity of the bonds" after paying the interest on them for several years prior to the institution of this suit. Certainly, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply with much force unless the officers and people of the district acted in the premises with full knowledge of the facts connected with the issuing of the bonds, and putting them on the market. In this case there is not enough to show that such knowledge existed at the time the interest was paid on the bonds. At the time these bonds were voted the laws of the state did not au· thorize the proceedings which led to the iSBuing of the bonds, and the
FEDERAL RlWORTER,
vol. 41.
turning them over to acontractotor subcontractor, in payment tOt a school-house. The law authorized the borrowing of money for such a. purpose, and provided for the manner of raising the money to repay tbe amoullt to bE1,borrowed. A bond might be given by the district as evidence of the' debt, but no voteofthe people of the district would be necessary therefor. That would be an incident to the authority to borrow money:for the purpose stated. When tbe law does not authorize the voting of bonds for a specific PUrpOEi8, such a vote has no binding authorityon a school-district, or political subdivision of a county. A bona could not acq\lire title to bonds so issued so as to relieve them fr()ID su.ch /1.n infirmity. This questi0 Il is well settled here, and no extended seems necessary to establj.sh. tile correctness of it. I have heretofore bad occasion to consider and determine a similar question in. 0, suit brought on bbnds claimed to have been voted by Sherman coqllty to aid in building a court-house in that county. No authority existed for voting any such, bonds, and it was held in that case that the bonds 8ued on were not the valid obligations of the county. See Lewis v.. Board, 2 Mc9rary, 464, 5 Fed. Rep. 269. This same question has beel} before the supreme court of the state, and the result there reached is the same. The case of State v. School-Dist., 16 Neb. 182, 20 209, is in point. Thatwas a suit brought on bonds voted N. W. by a to build a school-house. The bonds were turned over to the contractor in payment for the house. No money was borrowed to build the house, and no authority existed for voting the bonds. Butthe of the district voted for the issuing thereof. They were issued. rhey were turned over to the contractor, in lieu of money, in payment for the house. The bouse was built. The bonds were put. 9n the. market, ,and went into th", hands of Otto in the due course of pU8iness, he (Otto) being innocent purchaser; and yet the supreme 90urt held there could be no recovery against the district, because no authority existed fql;' voting the bonds. That case is almoEit identical with the one under consideration; but in that case the signatures to the bonds were genuine, while in the present case one of three signatures was fOil'ged and The reasons ltbove stated e.ntitled the defendant to judgment on tile verdict. Judgment for defendant for costs of 8uit.
SALOMON
BOBBBTIOR.
517
SALOMON et al. v. ROBERTSON, Collector. (Oirauit Oourt, S. D. New York. January 27,1889.) CuSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIl!'WATION-SEEDS-VEGETABLES.
Common lI.eld beans used for food, heZd to be dutiable 88 8t 10 per centum adllaZorem, under Schedule G, tariff act of March;S, 1SSS, and not free as "leeds."
At Law. Motion for.a direction of verdict. This action was brought by Louis A. Salomon and Charles Salomon against William H. Robertson, collector of the port of New York, to re:cover duties paid upon three several importations of ordinary field beans by the plaintiffs in 1884, upon which the defendant collector of-the port exacted a duty of 10 per cent. as vegetables, under Schedule G of the tariff act of March 3,1883, (Tariff Index, 286.) The plaintiffs protested against this exaction, and claimed the same were free of duty, under section 2503, Rev. St., (Id. 760,) which reads as follows: "Plants, trees, shrubs, and vines of all kinds, not otherwise provided for, and seeds of all kinds, except medicinal seeds not specially enumeratetl or provided for in this act." This action was once before tried in the United States circuit court in the southern district of New York, in 1886, and then resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. By writ of error it was taken to the United States supreme court, which reversed the of the court below, and ordered a new trial. 130 U. S. 412, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559. It was contended 09 behalf of the plaintiffs that nothing had been really decided by the United States supreme court in this case, cept that the court below had erred in its charge to the jury, and had excluded testimony as to the common designation of beans when used fot food, and that the real question in oontroversy still remained cided. It appeared from the testimony that the words "vegetables" and "seeds" had no different meaning in trade and commerce than their nary meaning. It also appeared that the beans in controversy were not such as were usually sold 8S seeds by seedsmen; that beans, when used seeds, were carefully cultivated, their different varieties kept separate, and c.arefully picked and assorted, and guarantied to contain germinatirJg properties, and were usually sold within a year or two after being ered, and before they had become changed in color by agee, or had their full germinating power. At the close of the testimony counsel for the defendant made a motion for a direction of a verdict for the defendant, on the following grounds: First, that the plaintiffs had not shown facts sufficient to entitle them to recover; second, that the words "vegetables" and "seeds" had no different meaning in trade and commerce from their ordinary meaning,-that they were words of common speech, and their interpretation was matter of law for the court; third, that the treasury department had classified beanaand peas used for food as "vegetables," and subject to the vegetable duty, long prior to the passage of the tariff act of Match 3, 1883, (Treasury Decisions of May 11, 1886; and,,al$p ,
B. S. 76, 3848,) and congress must therefore have had in mind the previous and conclirrlmt rlili:rigsof the treasury in using the term "vegetables" in the tariff act ofMarch 3, 1883; jou''th, also that the word" vegetailles" was a mote specific deiignation than the word" seeds;" fifth, also that their classification as "vegetables" had been approved in tlle,Cfl;'36ofJfindmuller v. Ilobert80'n, 23 65.2; 8fXtA, that the un:' disputed evideneetended to show that :the articles in suit were intended to be used, and were imported to be used, for food, as shown by the oath 01 one of the plaintiffs written on the face ofthe entries in this case; 8el1enth, that if the articles wetenot enumerated in 'the tariff'act of March either of the words or "seeds," they would at· 10 pereenturti ad valorem as a unmanufactured artiole, under section 2518, Rev. St. U. Sp Tremain & 'lYTer, for plaintiffs. .'. . iEdwMdMitchell j U. S. Atty., and Henry C.Platt,Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendant j citing ilfarvelv.ilferritt, 116U. S. 11,&Sup. Ct.Rep. 207; Maillar'dv.Lawrence, 16 How. 251; Gree!ltleafv. GoodriCh,101 S. 278; J1rotfYn,v;Piper, 91 U. S. 37,42; Nw v.Hedden, 39 Fed. Rep. 109; Bogle v. MagO'n6,40Fed. Rep. 226. ' :LAcoM1J1il,J.,(oraUy.) The question before us is-How shall this ani'Cle()!' importation (white beans) be classified for purposes of duty? The'tirsfq'l1estion that is always put 'in a case of that kind is, what is the :eommercial designation of the artiole? The answer to that question in thi'8" clise', by undisputed testhn<lny; is that it is 'known in trade andcoltimerce as "beans," or morespec;ifically as "white :beans," "me"black beans/'or what you Will; it is kno\Vncommercially only and the partieular artiole here as" whitemedium beans." Having found out what theoommercial designation of·thearticle is, the next step Is to turn to the tariff, and find that designation there. Unfortunately in this case, we do not find the word "beans" anywhere in the tariff 'act, save in a single: section, (paragraph 94,) which the suprt>me bourt hIlS held does not apply to this article at all, but to the kind of 'be.ans'whidh" have been illustratM in tbis case by the 'Clastor-bE'.an, the tonka-bean j the n'lla: vomica bean, and other beans which are not edible. IWlsmuch as this article 'Which is commercially known as "beans tl is not found. covered by that commercial expression in the tariff, we have to disbover, iewe can, by what other eccpression it is covered, if at all. Looking the tariff for words :which may properly describe the a'rticle j we iindthe word "seeds;" and,this is·undouotedJ.y the seed of the field bean.' :Botariieally, it is a seed, and in the common use of lan'gua.ge when it: is spoken of with the purpose of propagait iu'seedjsnd would be sodescrihed. Looking fnrther along in th" '86t;: "e', find the word "vegetables;Il'and these arti4es j ·when they astood by man orbybeast, would be referred to inevery-dayspeech There are,then, two words in the act which, when inter':" preted acoordingto, their commonevety:,dny'use, are each of them suffi... rei:eliltly: ·btood: ,to ,oovertlie· particular artjc:de here., The next question is
JUDSON L. 'THOMSON ," MANm"G co.I1.'ilA.THEWAY.
619\
wbether the use of the term bas been modified by mercial usage. The proof here, even on the part of the plaintiffs, is· I refer particularly to the tel;timony of Messrs. Wakeman and Ahlesthat there is no difference between the commercial and the ordinary meaning of the words "seeds" and "vegetables." A seed is ,a seed, and a table is a vegetable, say the witnesses, whether in, commercial language or in every-day life. Now the supreme court have' held over and over again that where words are not used technically, or have not been wrenched from their ordinary meaning by commercial usage, their interpretation is for the court. Thatsame tribunal has, in this very case, interpreted both those terms, "seeds" and" vegetables." Rob-ertson v. Sakmwn" 130 U. S. 412,9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559. As there are two words in the tariff act, each broad enough to cover the article, it only remains to determine under which it shall be classified for duty, whether as a seed or as a 'vegetable. Turning to the decisiOn ofthe supreme court, (130 U. S. 412,9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559,) lcannot escape the conviction that whatever the phraseology of the statute may now be" or whatever it may have been before the amendment of 1883, it was the clear understanding supreme court that such determination must be according to the use of the article. This seems to be quite sharply indicated ,by the phraseology of the opinion. Thus in one place it is said that liaS an article of food on our tables * * * they are used as a vegetable." Elsewhere in the opinion it is held error in the circuit court not to allow the defendant to prove "the designation of beans as an article of food," the supreme court saying that "the common tion, as used in when beans are used as food, (which is the great purpose of their production,) would have been very, proper;'" Why it would have been proper to introduce testimony as to how the beans Wel:8 called when they were used as food, I fail to see, unless it was on the, principle, that the use of the article was to determine its classification. The use of an article is a question of fact, and I should send this case to, the jtiry, were it not for the testimony of the plaintiff, which is that, as to this particular importation, the affidavit which he made upon the back of the ,entry is true statement; that are to used exclusively as food. For that reason I shall verdict for the defendant. Verdict accordingly.
a
JUDSON
L.
THOMSON MANUF'G CO. 'l1. HATHEWAY 1890.) BuCKLES.
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PATBNTS PoT
. 'Letters patent NO;S26,S57, issued to Jacob J. Unbehend, September 15,'1885, for an in an arctio.1:nJckle, haVing a tongue hinged between the leavll,fl,of a double, 1Iell:1:111e plate by a oail;l-shaped hinge-pin entering between the plates. :and ,having itlbeat;ngs'in transversa recesses, closed in fl'ont, whioh consists in 'the ad·' of thefiexible portion Qfthese dition of v.uards·ao,ro.. fain the hinge-pIn in its proper'1:iearings, and also to prevent lateral'displ.acieIlient;
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