MURDOCK V. CITY Oll' CINCINNATI.
891
-stances might be adjudged multifarious. Btlt it is apparent that the parties pr;oceeded against are proper parties to the bill considered in -either aspect; and that none of the defendants can say that they are called upon to answer charges in which they have individually no con-cern. Furthermore, while two. grounds of relief are stated, yet the relief sought in each instance affects the title to one and the same piece of property, and .concerns all of the defendants. If we should hold the bill to be multi(arious, and c9mpel the complainants to elect on which ground they will .stand and proceed to trial, I can see no reason why they might not file a bill, if defeated on the first, alleging in such .second tpe same cause of action that we compel them, to abandon in this. Derendal).ts lUust, in any event, as it appears to me, meet the averments of the bill in both of itsaspects, either in this suit, or in Qther suit. . If the bill.is ;re4lined in its present form, I cannot see that it will oc<lasion any confusion in putting in the proofs, or interfere with the orderly conduct ,of the trial,'or put the defendants to any disadvantage. If shall appear that the lorm of the bill has enhanced the costs unnecessarily, we can easily regulate that matter by appropriate orders at the conclusion of the case. Inasm uch .as it is largely discretionary with the court:w:hether it will permit two or more independent grounds of equitable relief to be stated in the same bill, and inasmuch as courts are very much governed in the exercise of that discretion by considerations of convenience, I think that for the reasons thus briefly outlined we are justified j 11 holding that grounds of relief have not been improperly united in the present case, and that the bill is not multifarious.
MURDOCK
v.
CITY OF CINCINNATI
et al.
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. Ohio, 'H': D.
september 24, 1889.)
:M UNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS-ASSESSMEN '1'- NOTICE.
A special assessment without notice to the property owner and opportunity to be heflrd is wanting in "due process of law." though neither the city nor state laws require such notice, and its enforcement will be enjoined.
In Equity. Application by James Murdock, Jr., for a preliminary injunction restraining the board of public affairs of the city of Cincinnati from enforcing a special assessment. Rankin D. Jones, for complainant. Thea. Horstman, for defendant. J"ACKSON, J. In this cause, now"before the court on application for a preliminary injunction, it appears from the allegatiolls of tbe bill that .complainant has had no notice of, nor any opportunity to be heard in
\ ri:DERAL REPORTER,
vol. 39.
relation to, made by the board of public affairs of cinnatiagainst his several lots in the bill; that no provision was made in any of the ordinances or resolutions' or acts of said city of or of its officers or board's, giving to property owners the right' and opportunity to be heard in respect to the amount of the special assessments complained of; and fha,t ,no such provision (as complainant alleges) exists in any of the laws of the state appliCable to said city and the assessments in question. Under such circumstances the court is of the opinion, in conformity with its in the case oLC:;cott v.City of Toledo, 36 Fed. Rep. 385, that the assessments made against complainant's lots are wanting in "due process of law," and that, upon the showing presented by the bill, an order should be granted restraining the city of Cincinnati,its officers and agents, from enforcing, or the taking of any steps to enforce, the assessments complained of until the further order of this court herein. This temporary restraining order is in no way to interfere with the rights of the city of Cincinnati or of its board of public affairs to nu.ke a reassessment against complainant's lots, on account of the improvements referred to in the bill, in any proper and lawful manner, which will afford him notice of, or an opportunity to be heard in respect to, such reassessment. Noris the restraining order, now granted upon the case, made by the bill alone to preclude the city of Cincinnati from answering and disputing the allegations of the biil, or from show-' ing that complainant has waived his right to notice of, or opportunity to be heard in respect to, said assessments. Should the city of Cincinnati, after full opportunity to contest the truth of the objections presented by the bill to the validity of the assessments complained of, fail or decline to do so, then complainant may renew his motion for a preliminary injunction. If, however, the city should answer and controvert the case made by the bill, the restraining order may, upon its motion, be discharged. A restraining order as above indicated and directed will be issued by the clerk of this court to the defendants.
BANNON 'V. BURNES
et al., September 2, 1889.)
(Clrcuit Court, Tv. D. Mi88ouri,
w: D.
1.
A city charter (charter of Kansas City, § 50,art. 6) provided that if realty could not be sold for the amount of taxes, interest, and cost, the city auditor should. if so directed, bid it off to the city for that amount, and make a record of the fact of the sale to the cit.y. No certificate was to issue upon such sale, but any person might thereafter pay to the collector the sum so bid, and receive a certificate, which ;should be assigned to him by the city auditor, which certificate should 'lre'st all the interest of the city in the'realty, and entitle such person to the same rights and privileges as if he had purchased the same at a tax-sale. Held, that the biddlllg in by the cityconst:ituted a public sale for taxes within the mcaning of the section conferring upon the au-
MUNICIPAl, COJIPORATTONS-TAXATION-SAJ,E FOR NON-PAYMENT.