THE GEVALIA.
47
THE
GEVAUA
and THE VISION.
(District Court, S. D. New York. MRY 20, 1889.) 1. STRANDING VESSELS-ANCRORS AND CABLES-FOULING.
Good seamanship requires that the inboard end of the anchor cable, if fastened. be lashed with ropes only, that may be cut at a moment's notice, and the anchor slipped when necessary. SAME.
2.
The yachts G. and V. having anchored in Larchmont harbor. and a gale arising, during which both dragged their anchors, the G. got under way for another harbor, and in doing so crossed the line of the V.'s cables and fouled them with her starboard anchor. not yet hove aboard. On being hailed to slip the cable she was unable to do so. because the chain was shackled fast, and both vessels. through the fouling, shortly went ashore. He d, that the G. took the risk of crossing the V 's cables, and of her inability to slip her cable at once, and was solely liable for the damages.
In Admiralty. Libel and cross-libel for damages. Shipman, Barlow, Larocque, & Choate, for the Vision. Eugene L. Bushe, for the Gevalia. BROWN, J. On the evening of June 28, 1888, the yacht Vision anchored near the mouth of the harbor at Larchmont, Long Island sound, from 200 to 300 feet nearer the shore than the yacht Gevalia, previously at anchor there, and also a little to the northward of her. On the following day a gale arose, blowing from the east or south-east, causing the Vision to drag her two anchols. Signals of distress were set, and help was subsequently procured by borrowing two anchors and cables from other vessels. Her four cables ranged from 20 to .1)0 fathoms; one of the borrowed ones being partly of rope, next to the yacht. With these I find that she was held safely and securely, though quite near the shore, after having dragged several hundred feet. The Gevalia, which bore off the Vision's port bow, also dragged somewhat, and her master, not wishing to remain there over night, at about 5 P. M. got under way for the purpose of seeking another haven. He was obliged to start upon the port tack, and in getting under way the GevaEa drifted astern and to leeward, so as to cross the line of the Vision about 100 feet ahead of her, or less than half the length of her longer cables; so that the starboard anchor of the Gevalia, not yet being have aboard, in crossing the Vision's cables fouled with some one of them, the result of which W90S that both vessels went ashore a few minutes afterwards, and sustained damages for which the above libel and cross-libel were filed. I think the weight of evidence is that at the time the Gevalia got under way she was from 300 to 400 feet distant from the Vision, and off her port bow; that is, at least 300 feet abreast of her, and a little ahead. The evidence also is that when she reached the line of the Vision's cables, she had attained a speed of about six knots. I am not satisfied that at t:lis speed, or about this speed, she could not then have come about and made a short tack, and afterwards resumed her port tack,
4.8
FEDERAL REPORTER,
vol. 39.
without crossing the line of the Vision's cables. But, without regard to this question, I think she had no right to cross the cables of the Vision without taking the risk of her own anchor's fouling. Her master well which were in fact knew of these cables, and of their probable about the same as his own. He had seen additional cables brought to her aid during the day, and knew that she had drifted more than he. He knew that he would cross at half her cable's length or less. No anchur buoys could therefore have given him more serviceable infomlation than he already had. When it was known that the anchor had fouled, because the Vision began to be hauled ahead in tow, the master of the latter hailed the GevaJia to let slip her anchor cable. That could 110t be done, as the master of the Gevalia says, because it was shackled so fast to a beam in the hold that it afterwards took him two hours to unshackle it. The necessity of letting anchor cables slip, and of being prepared fur it upon emergencies like this, has been tamiliar to seamen from time immemorial. It is the customary means of averting imminent danger alter fouling. To have a cable shackled so that it canna' be slipped at need is bad seamanship. If lashed at all, it must be by a rope that can be cut at a moment's notice on emergency. See Kares on Seamanship, (6th Ed.) 156. The lwglect of the Gevalia to have her cable in ship-shape order in this respect, was undoubtedly the ultimate cause of this collision, as the primary cause was her crossing the line of the yacht's cable before her starboard anchor was hove up; and for both she is responsible. It is alleged as a tauIt against the Vision that she did not cut her cable when hailed to do so by the master at the Gevalia. But the ptorm was then at its height. She was near the shore and had been obliged to borrow additional cables to hold her. One of the short cables was cut for another reason, and the kedge cable parted. She was under no obligation to the Gevalia to cut her own cables, and take the risk of speedily running ashore. I do not see any llmlt in the Vision, and the result it:; that the Gevalia must be held alone answerable for the damages. Decrees accordingly, with costs.
UNITED STATES V. I.EHMAN.
49
UNITED STATES V. LEHMAN.
(District Court, E. D. Missouri, E. D. June 10, 1889.)
1.
COURTS-JURISDICTION-ALlENS.
Hev. St. U. S. {:; 2165. confers the power to naturalize aliens on "courts of record of any of the states having common-law jurisdiction." 2 Hev. St. Mo. 1879. p. 1511, establishing tbe court of criminal correction, declares it to be a court of record, and gives it "exclusive original jurisdiction of all misde· meanors under the laws of the state committed in the countl' (now city) of St. Louis." Ht:'d. that as the common law and all general statutes enacted by parliament before tbe fourtb year of the reign of James 1. have been adopted in Missouri, and as the proceedings of the court are in accordance with common law except as modified by tbe Code of Criminal Procedure. the court is one of common-law jurisdiction, and authorized to naturalize aliens. ALIE:'orS-NATURALIZATION-PERJUHY.
Rev. St. U. S. 2167. requires the court to ascertain whether the applicant for naturalization under that spMion has resided three years in the United States before attaining majoril,: fled. that a third persrin. swearing falsely in tbat regard. is liable to the !'dllaity prescribed in section ii424 for any witness who in such proceeding falsely makes an oath "required or authorized" by the naturalization laws. SAME-INDIC'l'MENT.
3.
An indictment for such offense, alleging that the person who administered the oath was a deputy-clerk of the court of criminal correction. and acting as such wheu tbe oath was administered in open court. is sllflicient without alleging the steps by which the officer became deputy-clerk. SAME.
4.
As the district court of the United States takes judicial notice of the laws of the state in which it is situated, an allegation that the deputy-clerk was authorized to administer such oath is not necessary.
At Law.
Demurrer to indictment.
George D. Reynold, Dist. Atty., and Thomas P. Bashaw, for the United
States. D. P. Dyer, for defendant. THAYER, J. 1. The first question raised by the demurrer filed in this case is whether the court of criminal correction of the county (now city) of St. Louis has power to naturalize aliens. Section 2165, Rev. St. U. S., confers such puwer on "courts of record of any of the states having common-law jurisdiction." The court of criminal correction is declared to be a court of record by the second section of the act establishing that court. 2 Rev. St. Mo. 1879, p. 1511. Hence the sole point for consideration is whether it is also a court" having common-law jurisdictiun" within the meaning of the federal statute. That is a question, as it appears to me, that admits of little controversy. The jurisdiction of all the courts in this and other states is defined with greater or less particularity by statute, and in that sense their jurisdiction is statutory. But, as is well 'known, certain courts in this as well as in other states have power to' punish oflEmses that existed at common law, and to enforce private rights and to redress private wrongs recognized by the common law,and in the exercise of that power their action is governed by the principles, rules, and u3ages of the common law, in so far as they have v.39F.no.2-4