37 F. 3d 1495 - Taylor v. United States
37 F3d 1495 Taylor v. United States
Norman TAYLOR, Plaintiff Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America; United States Department of
Commerce; Ernest Ambler, Director, National Institute of
Standards & Technology; Richard De La Menardiere, National
Institute of Standards And Technology; Katherine Gebbie,
Center for Basic Standards, National Institute of Standards
and Technology; Helmut Hellwig, Acting Director, National
Measurement Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and
Technology; Donald Johnson, Director, National Institute of
Standards and Technology; Laura Powell, Deputy Director,
National Measurement Laboratory, National Institute of
Standards and Technology; Kurt Reimann, Deputy Director,
National Measurement Laboratory, National Institute Of
Standards and Technology; Elizabeth W. Stroud, Personnel
Officer, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Defendants Appellees.
No. 91-2394.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Oct. 12, 1994.
Submitted Oct. 12, 1993.
Decided Oct. 12, 1994.
37 F.3d 1495
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Norman P. Ramsey, Senior District Judge. (CA-89-213-R)
Norman Taylor, Appellant Pro Se.
Ethan L. Bauman, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Before WIDENER and HALL, Circuit Judges, and SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
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Norman Taylor appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment for Defendants in Taylor's age discrimination action. Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Taylor v. United States, No. CA-89-213-R (D. Md. Nov. 12, 1991). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED