902
FEDERAL REPOaTER.
year 1865. This, at least, seems to me to be elear, that the conception and description of Davis' valve is not carried back by any witness to the time when it is shown Kneeland described and sketched his invention in the early part of September, 1864. That this is the latest period a.t which Kneeland's invention can be fixed is settled by numerous deeisions. As was said in Reeves v. The Keystone Bridge Co., 1 Off. Gaz. 466: "But a patentee, whose patent is assailed upon the ground of want of novelty, may show, by sketches and drawings, the date of his inceptive invention, and if he has exercised reasonable diligence in perfecting and ada.pting it, and in applying for his patent, its protection will be carried. back to such date." Kneeland's inceptive inventiDn was the earliest, and he was diligent in perfecting and adapting it, and in for his patent. He is, therefore, prior in right to Davis, and is. entitled to a decree as prayed for. Let a decree accordingly be prepared.
LORILL.lRD
v.
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY.
(Oircuit Oourt, S. D. New York. lNFRINGEMENT-8UIT BY MARRIED
May 27, 1880.}
WOMAN.-In the southern district of New York a married woman is not disqualified by reason of coverture from bringing and maintaining a suit in her own name, without joinder of her hmband, for the infringement of a patent within the state of New York. .
In Equity.
Infringement of patent·
. Ali1"aham L. Jacobs, for plaintiff. T. B. Kerr, for defendant.
BLATCHFORD, C. J. This is a suit in equity for the infringement of letters patent. The bill alleges that the plaintiff is the 80le owner of the entire patent. The answer sets up that the plaintiff was, at the time of bringing this suit, a married woman, having a husband, Blaze Lorillard, in full life, and that by reason of coverture the plaintiff is incapable of, and
LOBfLL4"JID tI.
STAlJDAlU> OlL
co.
903
disqualified from, bringing a.nd maintaining the suit in her own name, without joining her said husband as a party thereto. The plaintiff, although a general replication has been filed to the answer, has, under rule 52, in equity, set down the cause for argument on, such objection, and the defendant takes no point that this is irregular, because a replication has been filed, and the question involved has been argued. The defendant contends that the rule of practice of the courts of New York, regula.ted by the statutes of New York, which permits suits by a married woman in her own name, does not apply to suits in equity in this court; that there is no statute or rule which permits the plaintiff to bring this suit without joining her husband; and that, under the general prine ciples of equity practice, and the practice of the high courts of chancery in England, the husbandmust be joined. Rule 90 of the rules in equity, prescribed by the supreme court,provides as follows: "In all cases where the rules prescribed by this court, or by the circuit courts, do not apply, the practice of the cir· cuit court shall be regulated by the present practice of the high court of chancery in England, so far 80S the same may reasonably be applied. consistently with the local circumstances and local conveniences of the district where the court is held, not as positive rules, but as furnishing just analogies to regulate the practice." The legal title to this patent is in the plaintiff. By the law of New York, as interpreted by the courts of New York, a. married woman may hold property of every description in the same manner as if she were a feme sole. Gage v. Danchy, 34 N. Y. 293; Buckley v. Wells, 33 N. Y. 518; Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277. The bill alleges that the plaintiff belongs to New York, and is a citizen of the United States, and that some of the infringements were committed in New York. Under the provisions of sections 629, 4919 and 4921 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, suits in equity for the infringement of letters patent must be brought by the party in interest in his or her own name, and such right cannot be delegated to another person, to bring the suit in the name of such other person, when the suit is not for the benefit in any way
90&
FEDERAL REPORTER.
of such other person. Goldsmith v. American Paper Collar Co. 2 FED. REP. 239. On the same principle such other person is neither a proper nor a necessary party to be joined with the real party in interest, as plaintiff, when such other person has no interest in the patent, and when the suit is not for the legal benefit in any way of such other person. Under rule 90 it is inconsistent with the local circumstances of this district to require the wife in this case to join her husband with her. The rule of joining husband with wife in suits to recover her personal property was founded upon the principle of unity of existence and interest between husband and wife, in law, and the right of the husband in the 'wife's personal property, and the care exercised by courts in regard to those who are not in a situation to take care of their own rights. These principles being now changed for this jurisdiction, the practice based on them necessarily falls. Cessante ratione cessat lex. Voorhees v. Bonesteel, 16 Wallace, 16, 31. The objection taken is overruled.
THE NEW YORK COFFEE POLISHING COMPANY (limited) v. WILSON. (Circuit Court, E. D. New York. PATEl"iT FOR
June 11,1880.)
COFFEE POLISHING.-The first claim of a patent being abandoned at the trial, and no defence being made to the averment of infring-ment of the second claim. held, that a decree must be given against the defendant for infringement of the second claim.
In Equity. TV. TV. Goodrich, for plaintiff. Richards tX Held, for defendant. BENEDICT, D. J. This is an action brought by the assignee of a, patent for an improvement in cleaning and polishing coffee, which patent was issued to William Thompson and Samnel Thompson, on January 31, 1871, numbered 111,403. Upon the trial the plaintiff abancloned the first claim of the patent and relies only upon the second claim.