17 F. 3d 395 - Popelka

MEMORANDUM***

Appellants (the custodians) claim that the General Services Administration (GSA) and one of its regional administrators misled them in the course of their employment with the Government, and terminated their employment in violation of their constitutional rights. They brought this action in federal district court, seeking mandamus, injunctive and monetary relief. The complaint does not assert claims under a federal statute which expressly creates a private cause of action for federal employees who have an employment dispute with the Government. Instead, the claims can be characterized as Bivens -type constitutional claims. We agree with the district court that such claims are not cognizable in federal district court in light of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA).

This court has consistently held that federal civil service employment disputes cannot be brought originally in federal district court, but must instead be resolved under the comprehensive administrative scheme created by the CSRA. "Congress' purpose in enacting the CSRA was to channel grievances and disputes arising out of government employment into a single system of administrative procedures and remedies, subject to judicial review." Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir.1991). We have held that the CSRA has provisions designed to protect civil servants from personnel practices which contravene their constitutional rights, and that Bivens -type claims asserting constitutional violations cannot be brought by federal employees in federal district court. Karamanos v. Egger, 882 F.2d 447, 451-53 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that claim of improper job classification seeking mandamus and other relief precluded by CSRA); Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that Bivens claim brought by probationary employee and alleging that demotion violated privacy and free speech rights precluded by CSRA); Veit v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 508, 511 (9th Cir.1984) (noting that "other circuits have held that the comprehensive nature of the procedures and remedies provided by the CSRA indicates a clear congressional intent to permit federal court review as provided in the CSRA or not at all" and holding that "the federal courts have no power to review federal personnel decisions and procedures unless such review is expressly authorized by Congress in the CSRA or elsewhere."). Recognition of congressional intent to create a uniform, balanced administrative scheme for review of federal personnel actions compels the conclusion that the CSRA precludes such federal district court actions, whether or not the CSRA provides the remedy sought by the federal employee. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 448, 455 (1988); Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 840 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that "the CSRA precludes even those Bivens claims for which the act prescribes no alternative remedy.").

The GSA classified the custodians as temporary employees. The rights of temporary employees are limited under the CSRA.1 Nevertheless, such employees are covered by the CSRA and are afforded some rights to challenge personnel actions.2 Based on the authorities cited above, the custodians' claims cannot be brought in federal district court and were properly dismissed. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990), is distinguishable because that case involved a plaintiff who was a member of the armed forces, which is excluded entirely from the CSRA. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2101 (defining civil service).

AFFIRMED.