GUINN"": iOWA
dENT.
BY. 00.
898
There is no doubt buti'tha.t the· effect of these judgments by means of the lien they carried, when docketed, unless set aside at' the snit of creditors for fraud, was to transfer whatever interest· Griswold had in the property, in question to the plaintiffs therein. -But, upon further reflection and examination, I am satisfied that they did not amount to or operate as an assignment within the purview of the statute. The latter is only applicable to ClLses where the/ debtor's estate, eitherby:his death; legal bankruptcy, or insolvency, has passed into the hands ofa.n administrator or assignee for the benefit of his creditors, or wl1ere the debtor himself has' voluntarily made such dis'· position of it·. It does not apply,:then, toR cOnveyance, assignment; or transfer, by whatever means accomplished, to a real or pretended creditor or creditors in payment or satisfaction of a debt or claim. There must be in some wayan assignment of the debtor's property to a third person for distribution among his creditors before the stat· ute can be invoked, and then it operates directly upon the assignee by requiring him to pay the claim of the United States first, and making him personally liable therefor if he does not. Section 8467, Rev. St. The following authorities bear, with more or less directness, upon these conclusions: U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 390; U. S. v. Hooe, 8 Cranch, 90; ConQ/f'd v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 1 Pet. 438; Beaaton v. Farmers' Bank ojDelaware, 12 Pet. 132; 1 Kent, Comm. 247; U. S. v. Canal Bank, 3 Story, 81; U. S. v. McLellan, 3 Sumn. 850; Conk!. Treat. 723. It follows that so much of the decree as provides that lot 8, in block 10, and the W. t of lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, in block 73, in the town of Salem, shall be subject to the payment of the judgment of the United States, after they have been sold on legal process from the state court and before the entry of said judgment, upon the assumption that the priority of the United States had attached thereto prior to such sale, to-wit, on January 6, 1879, is erroneous and must be reversed, and lit decree entered dismissing the bill as to the plaintiffs in error.
GUINN V. IOWA CENT.
Ry.
(J()
(Oircui' Ofmrl, 8. D. Iowa. 1883.) Coll.POllATJON-JUll.tBDICTION.
The "principal place of bUSlnel!s" or a corporation uno test of resIdence, whether of a corporation or of a natural person, as S person may reside in one state and have his principal or sole place of businellil illSDother state.
324
FEDERAL REPORTER.
Trimble, Carutherl it Trimble, for plaintiff. H. E. J. Bourdman, for defendant. LOVE, D. J. The prinoiple laid down in the case of McCabe v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. 13 FED. REP. 827, is decisive of the present oase. The defendant is an Iowa oorporation, having its principal place of busi. ness at Marshalltown, in the oentral division of the district of Iowa. Prooess was served upon its agent, C. M. Miller, at the town of ·Albia, in the southern division, returnable at Keokuk. The late aot of con· gress, creating circuit court jurisdiction in the severaldivisions of the distriot of Iowa, provides, in substanoe, that suit shall be brought in the division in whioh the defendant has his residenoe. The defend. ant herein now moves to have the cause transferred to the oentral division on the ground that the residence of the defendant is at the principal place of business, which is in the central division. In addi. tion to what is shown in the Case of McCabe, supra, it may be said that the "principal place of business" is no test of residence, whether of a corporation or natural person. A natural person might reside in one state and have his principal, or, for that matter, his sole place of business in another state. I presume that thousands of persons reside in Jersey City and have their principal place of business in New York, and many no doubt reside beyond the limits of the state of New York and oarry on their sole business in the city of New York. : >The motion is denied.
UNITEDl::)TATES 11.
HULL.-
(District Oourt, D. NelYraska.
November Term, 1882.
1.
INDICTMENT-FALSE CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Any person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented, any false claim against the United States, knOWing the same to be false, or who, for the purpose of aiding another to obtain the payment of a false claim, by making or using, or causing to be made or used, any false bill, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to be false, may be. punished under the provisions of section 5438 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. 2. SAME-8TATUTE CONSTRUED. The section above cited is not limited in its operation to false claims presented by the accused on his own behalf, but applies as well to such claims ].1resented by an .attorney, agent, officer, or other person presenting or aiding in the collection of a false claim, knowing it to be false. "From the Colorado Law Reporter.