108
FEDERAL REPORTER.,
"When the locatlon was made and the sections granted ascertained, the tit] e of the plaintiff took effect by relation as of the date of the act, except as to the reservations mentioned, the act having the sarpe operation upon the sections as if they had been specifically described in it. . "It is true that the act of 18tH enlarged the grant of 1862, bnt this was done, not by words of a new and an additional grant, but by a change in the words of the original act, substituting for those there used words of larger import. This mode was evidently adopted that the grant might be treated as if thus made originally; and therefore, as against the United States, the title of the plaintiff to the enlarged quantity, with the exceptions stated, mllst bQ considered as taking effect equ'ally with the title of tile less quantity as of the date of the drst act."
I do not ilIiderstand the supreme court to hold that the amendatory grant of 1864 passed to the gra,ntee' the,title to land which congress had in. the mean time granted to another t or which had in the mean time been. by competent authority otherwise disposed of. It is certainly clear that during the till}e intervening between July 1, 1862, when. the original grant was made, and July 2, 1864, when it was amended and enlarged, the United States was at liberty to dispose of any public lands outside of the limits of the' original grant, and the lands in controversy were during that period public lands outside of said grant. They were, I presume, up to the time of their withdrawal under the grant to the state, lands in the market subject to pre-emption . or homestead entry. If any of them had been, prior to the passage of the act of 1864, 'disposed of under the pre-emption or homestead laws, or patented to private parties under any law of 1ihe United States, it would, I apprehend, hardly be claimed' that lands thus disposed of would have .passed to ,the oomplainant. And yet this would be the conse.quence of holding that the two acts are to be construed as one aot for all purposes. . The supreme court was careful to avoid this cbnstruction. It is said that "when the location was made and the sections g1'antecl ascertained, the title of the plaintiff took· effect by relation as of· the date of the act, exceptaJs to the res61'vation8 mentioned." There is in this language a distinct recognition of the fact that the reservations mentioned did not pass; arid that an inquiry was .necessaryto ascertain .what sections did and what did not pass. But to the meaning stillmore definite and supreme court add, "and therefore, d8 against the United States, the title of the plaintiff to the quantity,.with the exceptions stated, must be considered as taking effect equally with the title to .the less: as of the date
IN BE- DIXON.
109
of the first act." This language not' only does not authorize, but it forbids the inference that as against I'm intervening grantee of some of the lands included within the limits of the larger grant, the title would pass under the two grants as of the date of the former. It is only as against the United States that this construction pre· vails. As against other grantees claiming adversely to the ,United States as well as to complainant, the later act must be considered as a subsequent grant and as taking effect only from its date. Decree for respondent.
In re
DIXQN,
Bankrupt.
(Circuit Court, W. D.'MiSsouri, E. D. January,
NovATION-SUFFlCIENT. CONSIDERATiO:li. An agreement on the part of a debtor ,to plake five new notes, in accordance with the request of the creditor, for. tlie purpose of enabling the creditor to bring suits on the new notes in the justice's court, which he CQuld· not do on the original claim, is an agreement upon sufficillnt consideration. Such an for it five new'conagreement cancels the' original cOntract, and. tracts.
Petition for Review in Bankruptcy. Belch IX Silver, for " J. R. Edwards, for bankrUpt.. .' . . MCCRARY, C. J. Uponpetitiofr of the. bankrupt the district.apurt ordered that certain land be set apart to him as a. home,stead, and such, exempt. This order was made against the objection of the. First National Bank of Jefferson City, one of the credito.rs of the bankrupt estate. The bank files.its· petition. under. seotion 4986, Rev. St., praying a review and reversal of said order. of the district court. The groundfipon the decision Of the court below is attacked is that the'debt held by the bankagaiust the bankrupt was contracted prior the acquisition by the bankrupt of the premises now claimed py him as "exempt under the ,homestead law of Missouri. 1 Mo. p. 4'52, § 2695. " . . The proof shows that at the original indebtedness was COD,traeted land in question was held in common by the, bankrupt and his father, Levi Dixon. The originatdeb.t ·wascontrMted January 23,'1874. It does not appear frOm the evidence whether the ariginaldebt was evidenced by more than one note or not; buk it
