''154
\rEDEB4L ;ijEl',OBTlllB.
SAWYlllB'V. PABISH' OF CONCORDIA.- ,
Court, W. D. Lo1-li8iana.
June, 1882. \
1.
JURISDlOTION-FEDEnAL QUESTION.
When there is a federal question' involved in the suit, the circuit court has jurisdiction, under act of March 3, 1875, without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 2. MUNICIl'AL CORPORATION-CONTRACT-REMEDY.
When a municipal corporation has made a contract during the exiAtence of a state law which provides an adequate remedy by compulsory taxation through the court8, that remedy is a vital element of the contract. ' 3. CONTRAOT-STATU'I'E IMPAIRING OF.
The subsequent repeal of that law,and the adoption of a new constitution prohibiting the levy of ,any judgment tax and limiting all taxation to the current support of the localgovernment, would, if valid, impair the obligation or Bucha contract. SAME-STATUTES
The invalidity of such en!ljctments D)ust be decree<l'by any cou.rt tryinc,,l/Ucb a case ,before, a enforcing the contract by the original remedy ,of judgment tax can be rendered. 5.8.um. ,
Such invalidity is the result of a violation of section 10, art. 1, Const. U.S., alone, and a suit to e,nforce thecontrllft through that article is a suit" arising under the constitution of the United States." 6. ,1. JURISDICTION-CONCURRENT.
Though the plaintiff could SUe in the state court, and could obtain full relief there, yet he can resort to the concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit court. COURTS.
The jurisprudence of the state courts, construing the effect of said section upon state laws and constitutional articles. whe*er holding the tatter valid'or invalid as impairing the obligations of anterior contracts, cannot determine, the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 8. SAME-'-JURISDlcTION, ON WlrAT DEPENDS. .
The jurisdiction of the latter cannot be vested or divested by, !he character of the defence made, but depends upon the issues 'raised by plaintiff's -petition. and necessary to be determined to afford him adequate remedy. -'.
t.
SAME-ACT OF
Does not the original jurisdiction of the circuit pourts, as enlarged by a.ct 0,1 March S, 1875, extend to all cases involving over $500, which could have belm carried, under former acts, to the supreme court on writs of error from state courts? An exception to the jurisdiction admits, for the purposes of the trial of'that plea. all the facts alleged in the plaintiff's petition.
1875-QUERY.
10.
PLEADING-ExCEPTION TO JURISDICTION.
W. W.
Farmer,
for plaintiff.
Boatner
et Liddell. for defendant·
SAWYER V. PARISH OFCONOORDIA.
755
BOARMAN, D; J. The plaintiff,a lawyer and citizen of Louisiana, sues the parish of Concordia for $27,000, claimed to be due to him because of certain professional services rendered the defendant, in pursuance of a conditional contract of date December, 1872. He alleges that he completed his part of the agreement before October, A. D. 1879, and that on the happening of the suspensive condition his contract became absolute and indefeasable; that by operation of law his contract has a retroactive effect, and takes date with the agreement-December, 1872. At that time he alleges the existence of two statutes of the state which gave him remedies for the legal and effectual enforcement of his contract, to-wit, the act, No. 69, A. D. 1869, and section 2743, Rev. St. 1870. The act, No. 69, provides substantially as follows: That the judge rendering,a judgment against any parish shall order the tax-assessing officers of the defendant parish to assess a special tax in amount sufficient to pay the judgment creditor; that 8&id tax shall be forthwith collected and held as a special frind for· the benefit of such creditor, and shall not be otherwise diverted; provided there are no other funds subject to such judgment in the parish treasury. . The act, or section 2743; authorized the parishes in, the state to levy and collect such taxes as may be deemed necessary by parish authorities to defray the expenses of the local government.; Having cited these two acts, he alleges that "act No. 96, A.. D. 1877, repealed them. This act :limits,the power of the parillhso that not more than 10 mills can be colleeted for any purpose, repeals all general laws authorizing the levy of any ,pecial or judgment taxes. In addition to the repealing statutes, he alleges that article 209 of the state constitution of 1879 limits the parish tax to 1 per centum on tbe aBsessment, and that the sum· annually col-Iected in the parish is used and needed for the alimentary purposes of the parochial government, and will furnish nothing with. which to pay his claims; that said parish has no funds on hand, and no prop, erty snbject to seizure. He alleges that the powers and remedies the courts of the state had and would 'have exercised, under act No. 69 and section 2748, for the enforcement of the obligation of this contractt have been .acts destroyed and taken away by the enactment of the and article of the state constitution; that these, acts; No. 69 and section ,2743".,lOw repealed, entered into and: were vital elements 'in his contract; that the state has by these:subsequent xepea,ling laws impaired the obligations of his contract, contrary to article 1, § 10,
756
FEDERAL .REPORTER.
of the constitution of the United States. He avers that his suit arises under the constitution of the United States. Defendant de· nies the jurisdiction of this court. His motion is now under consid· eration. He urges that "plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the same state, and that plaintiff's demand and alleged contract, if any exists, can be enforcl;ld in the.courts of the state of Louisiana under act No. 69, A. D. 1869; that said act, and remedy therein provided, was not repealed by act No. 96, 1877, nor by the provisions of the constitu. tion of 1879. After stating so much byway of denying jurisdiction, he adds in his motion that "it is the well.settled jurisprudence of the state that these repealing acts and article of the constitution do not affect the remedy or rights of parties under contracts entered into, as plaintiff'a was, before the passage of act No. 96, 1877, or before the constitu. tion of 1879." To 81:Istain the suggestions in his motion he cites a number of cases reported -in the Louisiana Reports. They 'will be noticed later. Defendant's objection to this court's jurisdiction, if confined to the suggestions' in his motion, is very limited, and if the question was tried on! an admission of all he says,it is doubtful if any circuit court would refuse jurisdiction to try plaintiff's suit since the passage of the act of congress of March 3, A. D. 1875. , . He denies that act No.tl9,' so far as it affects the legal rights of the plaintiff claiming, as he does,. under a contract, has been repealed; that thestateconrts, while allowing the repealing act of 1877 to fatally affect all, persons not claiming under an anterior con· tract, will protect plaintiff from any loss of right or remedy inconsequence of tile repeal. The fact of the repeal 'cannot be denied. The act, No. 69, cer· tainly did exist as an operative law in A. D. 1872, and it is equally clear that fRct,No.96, of 1877, destroyed the remedies and powers under act No, '69.,. 1869, anll section 2743 of Revised Statutes·. The act, No. 96,1877, limits and greatly reduces the per centull1 of ·taxa.tion that the parish of Concordia could collect when plaintiff entered into his contract with defendant. The municipal' law of the state which binds the parties to perform their agreement constitutes the obligation of a. contril.ct:. These laws, existing at the time ofihecon. tract, must govern and 'control the contract in every shape in which it is intended they should bear on it, whether they affect the validity or constrU'ction of contract.
SAWYER V. PARISH . .QF CONCORDIA.
757
The jurisdiction of this court cannot ·be tested, as it applies to case, by the jurisprudence of the state courts, however much in the cases cited they may have sought to restrain the effect of the state statutes enacted subsequently to th!'l date of plaintiff's contract. The state courts, of course, have ample power to try this case, or any other suits involving an interpretation of their statutes or constitu. tion, and before the act of March 3, .1875, had original jurisdiction over such cases as this, to the exclusion of the federal courts. It is now conceded that that act is constitutional, and that congress intended under its operation to extend to the circuit courts of the United States all the judicial power which congress could, under the constitutio:p., confer on such courts. The act enables -this._ court to try, concurrently with the state courtfl, all suits of a nature; at . common law or in equity, involving over $500, "arising under, the Before the passage of constitution or laws of the United the act of 1875 the supreme court. only could, ill-nder its appellate power, examine and revise the decisiollsof the highest state courts when they, in a· final judgment, passed Qn a "title, right; privilege, or immunity, specially set "Q.p or claimed by either party under the constitution of the United States." In such cases, when the judgment was against the title,right, or privilege,the cause could go up on writ of error to the supreme court. Now it is no longer necessary, in order to reach the federal court, that a suitor, setting up any such right or privilege, should begin his action -in the state courts. Such a right, privilege, or immunity makes up a federatquestion, and if his suit involves such a question he may begin it in this court. The act of March 3, 1875, made sonie ramcaJ.changes in theprac. tice and jurisdictional powers of the circuit courts. .The effect and extent of the change has not been fully realized, nor ,has the act, as yet, been comprehensively interpreted by the supreme of the objects1>f the .act, obviously, was to open the eircuit courts to suitoxs claiming rights under the federaLconstitution and laws, and to enable such litigants to reach the courts of the United States with.. out the tedious and oftentimes difficult process of an of error to the supreme court. May it not be J), fact that all suits involving a federal question, which, prior to ,the act of 1875, could have been taken up on writ 'of error from the state courts of last resort to the supreme 'court, may now be filed and tried originally in the circuit courts?: Certainly the counsef motion has
758
fallen far short in his estimate of the changes made by this act of 1875. . It must be admitted as true that -plaintiff entered into the contract as alleged; that act No. 69, giving him certain remedies, and section 2748, Rev. St., existed at the date of his agreement; that thE:l act, No. 96, 1877, and article 209 of state constitution,repealed the two statutes, No. 69 and section 2743. The motion to the jurisdiotion ca.nnot put at issue these facts as plaintiff alleges them. The constitution of the United States prohibits the impairment of the obliga. tion of a contract. It does not, in such a way, protect the obligation of an ordinary debt. If his cause of action was to enforce the collection of an account or an ordinary debt, then the allegation that certain laws affecting his remedy had been repealed would not present a federal question. His right to sue in this court attaches at once if he has presented such a question. It must depend on the subject-matter of his suit In Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 824, the court says the right to sue "is anterior to the defence, and 'must depend on the state of things when the action is brought." Can his right to sue depend on any. thing else? If the jurisdiction depends on or could be ousted by the character of the defence, or was limited by the denials in defendant's answer" should he file one, or by the matter or facts he should choose to put at issue, then it is -apparent that the ingenuity of counsel would have much to do with confirming or denying jurisdiction. If it depended on the jurisprudence of the state courts, on similar issues to those involved in the case at bar, the power in this court to try such cases as this one would often rest on the opiriions of the state judges. In this connection, it was suggested that defendant's an· swer, when filed, might admit the execution of the contract agreement, and put at issue only the question of performances on Sawyer's part. Then, on this limited issue, no federal question would have to be passed on, adversely or otherwise, by any court trying the case. This suggestion is answered in case of Railroad v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 140, and in a number of cases of recent date. In the case noted the court s,aid, speaking of the matter of jurisdiction: " It iii not sufficient to exclude the jurisdiction of the judicial' puwer of the United States from a particular C8l'le that it involves questions which do not all depend on the constitution or laws of the United States, butwhell a question, to which the judicial power is extended by the c(lDstituti011. forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is within the power of congress to giv6t the cirCUit court jurisdiction, although other questions of fact may be involved iu it."
84WYEl) V. PARISH, OVOONCORDIA..
759
'In Mayorv. Cooper, 6 .Wall. 253, thecourt,'discussing the qUflstion, said: IINor is it any objection tliatquestions are involved which are not at all ota federal character. If one of the latter exists-if there be a single such ingredient in the mass-it is Rllfficient. That element is decisive u-pon the subject of jurisdiction."
Chief Justice Waite, in the case of GoZd Washing (/;, Water Oo.v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 203, said: ) .. The suit must, at least in part. arise out of a controversy between the parties in rega,rd to the and effect of the constitution or lltws upon the facts involved." .
In Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 822, it is said the case arises under title or right set up -by the party may be the constitution . defeated by oneconstruotion of the oonstitution or laws of the United States, or sustained by the opposite oonstruction." It is olear that a federal question, or the ingredient of one,would not have to be passed on if plaintiif was suing ,on an obligation growing out of a debt or an aocount. But he sues on a ,contract, and invokes the protection of the constitution; and it seems that no judgment oould be given in his favor on any of the issues involved, unless the court pronounoing judgment should construe, one way orll;nother, the artiole of the constitution prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of a contract. The repealing acts and article of the state constitution, which have impaired his remedies, must be annulled and put at naught, so far as they affect anterior cqntracts, before al:l.Y exigible judgment ,can be given to plaintiff. 'The original cause of action cotl,Sists of. a demand .the enforcement of the contract, -and ofa ,demand for and exigible judgment for the money due him. The "title or right. he sets up for such a judgment cannot" be passed on without recognizing an existing "controversy between the parties in regard ,to the operation and effect constitution or laws 'upon the facts Unless an exigible state court would be an judgment can be obtained, his suit idle formula and a vain ce:rempny. -' is the very life of a judgment; and now, under t'heact of 1875, he has a right to go into a court that has the power to give him an exigible judgment on all parts of his claim, if well fouuded. The Louisiana, cases cited by defendant's counsel show istence of a. distinctive in this case. the case of Folsom v. City of New OrZeans, 32 La. Ann. 714, the'co\lrt
760
BEPORTER.
speaking of the repealing act, No. 96, 1877, and of the effect of article 209, state constitution, that "no court has the right to question the validity of any article of a state constitution, except on the ground that it violates the constitution of the United States." In the other cases the Bame principle was announced, and in all the cases the court held that act No. 69 was repealed, and that act No. 96, 1877, and article 209, would be valid against everybody but for the restraining effect which this construction of the paramount law exercised upon the validity of the act, No. 69, and article 209. In all the cases cited it iEiapparent that the state court was constrained to recognize the existence of a constitutional question, and to give judgment accordingly. In all of these suits, where a contract was established, the courts protected the .claimants, on ·the ground that, in their opinion, the statute of 1877 and artide 209 of state con,gti· tution violate the constitution of the United States. Plaintiff oan, if he chooses, institute his suit in tile state court, and all the elements of the cause of action, if well founded, could be sustained by an exigible judgment·; but it is equally as clear to me that no exigi. ble judgment could, in any court, state or federal, be given to him, unless the laws of which he complains as affecting his remedy are declared void, as against him, because· of their repugnancy to the constitution of the United States. I think the jurisdiction of this court covers the subject.matter of his suit. Motion overruled. NOTE. FEDERAL QUESTIONS. Where there is a federal question involved, the circuit court has jurisdiction 'Vithout regard to the citizenship of the parties. Wilder v. Union Nat. Bank,12 Chi. Leg. News, 75. See Wi.qgins' Ferry 00. v. Ohicago &: A. R. 00. 11 FED. REP. 384: Green v. Klinger, 10 FED. REP. 692, and note. The United States court is the final arbiter of constitutional construction, and congress may invest it with the power to construe any constitutional law, (Van Home v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304: Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Oohensv. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264: .Ableman v.Booth, 21 How. 506: S. C. 3 Wis. 1: The Mayor v. Oooper, 6 Wall. 247;) but for its power to extend to a constitutional question it mnstbe in· B case at law or in equity, (Cohens v. 6 Wheat. 264.) The power of the United States court extends over statutefl, whether passsed by a state legislature or by congress, which are claimed to be in contravention of the constitution of the United States: but not to statutes claimed to be void under a state constitution, (Calder v. Ball; 8 Dall. 390; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137: Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518: Wiggins' Ferry 00. v. Ohicago & .A. R. 00. 11 FED. REP. 382;) and the objection must not be doubtful, (U. S. v. Jackson, 3 Sawy.
SAWYER V. PARISH 01l' CONCORDIA.
761
59; People v. Brinkerhoff, 68 N.
Y. 259;) but the act must be clearly subversive of the constitution, (Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54; Central C. R. Co. \'. Twenty-Third St1'eet R. Co. MHow. Pr.168; Remington v. Park, 50 Vt.178.) OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRAC!. l'he obligation of a contract is that which requires the performance of the legal duties imposed by it, (Blaun v. State. 39 Ala. 353;) and consists of that right or power over his will or action which a party by his contract confers on another, (Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Lapsley v. B1'ashears, 4: Litt. 47;) and includes everything within its object and scope, (Sturges v. Crouminshield, 3 Wheat. 122; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Blair v. Williams, 4: Litt. 34; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1.) It does not inhere and consist in the contract itself, but in the law applicable ,to the contract, (Edwards v. K ea1'zey, 96 U. S. 595; B1'01lson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McC1'acken v. Hayward, 2 How, 608;) and laws relating to the validity, construction, discharge,and enforcement are a part of the contract, (Edward$ v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608;) the validity, construction, and remedy being part of the obligatiQIl., (Greenv. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; People v. Bond, 10 Cal. 570; Story v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 223; Walker v. Whitehead,,16 Wall. 3.14.) The obligation of a contract commences at its date, (Blair v. Williams, 4 Litt. 34;) and depends on the laws in existence when it is made, (Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 84; Johnson v.Duncan, 3 Mart. 531; West. Sa'O.Fund v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa.St.175; Wood v. Wood, 14 Rich. 148; Smith v. Okveland, 17 Wis. 556;) and continues until the debt is paid, or the act performed, (Baily v. Gentry, 1 Mo. 164; Forsyth v. bury, R. M.Charl. 324;) and extends to future possessions, (Edward8;.v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595.) Theobligation of other things than contracts is not within the protecting clause of the constitution, (Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Robinson v. Ma.gee, 9 Cal. 84; Blair v. Williams, 4 Litt. 34.) IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION. To impair means to alter so as to make the contract more beneficial to one party and less to the other than by it" terms it purports to be. Bailey v. Gent1"y, 1 Mo. 164. The impairment is not a qlJ,estion of degree, manner, or cause, (Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; planters' Bank v. Sha1']>, 6 How. 301; S. C.12 Miss. 17; Walke1'v. Whitehead, Wall. 314; S. C. 4:> Ga. 538; Von Ho.tfman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Gault's Appeal, 33Pa. St. 194; Farnsworth v. Reeves, 2 Cold. 111; Winter v.Jones, 10 Ga. 190;) it cannot be impaired in the remotest degree, (Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Von Ho.tfman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535.) Where a contract is discharged, (Farmers' & Meeh. Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131,) or where it is destroyed, (Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 84,) or an essential part is annulled, (New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Craneh, 164,) or partially rescinded, (Grinnball v. Ross, T. U. P. CharI. 175,) the obligation is impaired. The obligation is impaired by a statute which authorizes its discharge by a smaller sum. or at a different time, or in a different manner than stipulated, (Golden v. Prince, 5 Hall, L. J. 502; Edmonds v. Fe1'guson, 11 Mo. 344.) A state can no more pass a law violating the obligation of a contract by means of a convention than by its legislature, (Marsh v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 463; see Pacific R. 00. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36;) so a provision in a state constitution which prohibits the enforcement of a contract is void, (White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; S. C. 39 Ga. 306: Fl'elwh Y. Tom-
762·
FEDERAL REPORTER.
lin, 19 L. Reg. 541 ; Jacoway v. Dentan, 25 Ark. 625; McNealy v. (heg. ory, 13 Fla. 417; but see Shorter v. (Jobb, 39 Ga. 285; Armstrong v. Lecompte, 21 La. Ann. 528; Dranquet v. Bost, Id. 538.) A mere license given by charter to an incorporated company is not a contract, (Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, Id. 659;) so a provision in a constitution prohibiting lotteries is not an impairment of of a contract, (Stone ·v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814.) The remedy enters into and forms a material part oftbeobligation of the con· tract. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Walkerv. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314;. S. C.43 Ga. 558; fhmn v.Barry, 15 Wall. 610; S. C. 8 Bank Reg. 1; .J:ohnsonv. Hig{Jins,3 'Mete. (Ky.) 566. The validity and remedy are inseparable, and l>oth are parts {)f the obligation, (Walker v. White.head, 16. Wall. 314; S.. C. 43 Ga. 587; Sca'ine v. Bellville, 39 N. J.Law,i26;) and a statute which enfellbles (Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595) or impairs the remedy, (Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; (heen v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524 ; Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 531; Coffman ". Bank, 40 Miss. 29,) or lessens the efficiencyof the remedy, (Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 u. S. 203,) where the remedy is esaential,(Thompson v. Com. 81 Pa. St. 314,) is prohibited. The character of the parties to a contract does not prevent tbe application of the inhibitory provision of the constitution as to the impairment of thE? obligation of contracts. Trnstees v. Rider, 13 Conn. 87; Regentsv. Williams, 9 Gill & J.365.. So a c.ontract wherein the state is a party is within the protecting clause of the constitution. Hem v. 'Wisconsin, 103 U. 8. 5. This provision of the constitution is a limitatiOIton the taxing power of the stat as , the taxing power enters into and becomes a part of the obligation of tpe contract, (U. S. v. Jejfe1'SfJn County, '1 Cent. Law J. 130,) and a law changing the stipUlation of a contract, or relieving a debtor frUlO a strict and literal compliance with its requirements, is unconstitutional. MUT1'ay v. Charleston, 96 U. 8.432. So corporations are within the provisions of this section of the constitution as' a part of the general law. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; State '\T· .Wilson, 7 Cranch,·164:. Terret v. Taylor, g Cranch, 43; Town of Paw.. lett v. Clark, Id, 292: (Jreen v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Astrom v. Hammond, S McLean, 107; Woodrnff v. Trapnall. 10 How. 190; Derby T. Co. v. Parks, 10 Conn. 13 Ired. 75; Stanmire v. TaylfJ1', 3 Jones, (N. C.) 207. As long as a city exists laws are void which withdraw or restrict its taxing power 80 as to impair the obligation of her contracts made on a pledge impliedly or expressly given. Von Hoffman v. Quincy,4 Wall. 535; WOlf v. New Orleans,103,U. S. 358.-[ED.
NORTON v.
1l00!:!.
'I6;;>
NORTON v. HOOD and others.(Oircuit Court, 1JJ. D · .LouiBiana.
May, 1882.)
APPEAL-REv.
ST. § 631. An appeal from the district court to the circuit court only,lies, undersection 631 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, when the decree of the former court i8 final. The granting or refusal of an injunction is in the discretion of the court, and such interlocutory orders are not appea.lable.
2. APPEF.L-lNJUNCTION.
On Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. E. H. Fa'l'rar, John D. Rouse, and Wm. Grant, for complainant. John A. Oampbell and H. G. Morgan, for defondant. PARDEE, C. J. In this case a. motion has been filed to dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction, for the reason that the decree of the district court is not final. Rev. St. § 631. The record shows that in 1866 one Govey Hood, being the owner of certain plantations, confessed judgment in favor of Henry Frellson for a la.rge sum; that on the judgment so confessed execution was taken out, and in 1868, in September, the plantations were sold by the sheriff and adjudicated to Frellson as the purchaser; that in December, 1868, Hood went into bankruptcy and was discharged therein, January, IBn; that after Hood's discharge in bankruptcy Frellson conveyed, by act of sale, certain of the plantations to Hood, retaining & mO,rtgage thereon and vendor's lien to secure the payment of the notes given for the purchase price, running through several years. The said notes being unpaid and Hood in default, the said Henry Frellson, in 1814, sued out in the [state] district court of Oarroll parish executory process to enforce the mortgage on the lands in the parish. Hood obtained an injunction and a controversy ensued, which was terminated by its dismissal in the supreme court of the state in May, 1879. Frellson v. Hood, 31 La. Ann. 577. ' The supreme court dismissed Hood's petition for its demerits. He charged Frellson and himself as fraudulent conspirators to defraud the creditors of Hood, and that all they had done had been done with that object. His allegations of his own turpitude debarred him from a hearing, and condemned him and his pretensions, as is seen,by the judgment of that court. Some weeks after this, Norton, the assignee in bankruptcy of Hood, filed a bill in the district court of the same by Joseph P. Hornor, Esq., of the New Orleans bar.